PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 1

2008-08-15T10:53:00.001-07:00

THEY
DARE TO
SPEAK
OUT-
PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS CONFRONT ISRAEL'S LOBBY
PAUL FINDLEY
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Findley, Paul, 1921-
They dare to speak out: people and institutions confront Israel s lobby/ Paul Findley.— 3rd ed. p. ; cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-55652-482-X
1. United States—Foreign relations—Israel. 2. Israel—Foreign relations— United States. 3. American Israel Public Affairs Committee. 4. Jews—United States—Politics and government. 5. Zionists—United States—Political activity. 6. Arab-Israeli conflict. I. Title. *. # E183.8.I7F56 2003
327.7305694—dc21 2002155505
Cover and interior design by Rattray Design
©1985, 1989, 2003 by Paul Findley All rights reserved Third edition Published by Lawrence Hill Books An imprint of Chicago Review Press, Incorporated 814 North Franklin Street Chicago, Illinois 60610 ISBN 1-55652-482-X Printed in the United States of America 5 4 3 2
To our grandchildren Andrew, Cameron, Henry, and Elizabeth. May they always be able to speak without fear.
Contents
Preface vii
1 Rescue and Involvement 1
2 King of the Hill 27
3 Stilling the Still, Small Voices 51
4 The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 81
5 The Lobby and the Oval Office 117
6 Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 147
7 The Assault on Assault 187
8 Subverting Academic Freedom 209
9 Paving the Way for the Messiah 249
10 Not All Jews Toe the Line 281
11 Scattering the Seeds of Catastrophe 313
12 What Price Israel? 349
Acknowledgments 375
Notes 379
Index 395
Preface
Shortly after World War II, a small band of United States partisans for Israel marshaled self-discipline and commitment so effectively that they succeeded in ending free and open debate in America whenever Middle East issues are considered.
Their primary goal was to assure broad, substantial, unconditional, and ultimately blind support for Israel by the U.S. government. In seeking that goal, these partisans forced a severe anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias into U.S. Middle East policy that has since raised costly economic, political, and military barriers to the American national interest. The most harmful part of this process was the disappearance of unfettered discussion of the United States' relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict. These biases and restrictions, though unwritten, are as effective as if they had been carved in stone. Even in the legislative chambers on Capitol Hill, the nation's highest and most hallowed halls of debate, discussion on the Middle East is virtually nonexistent.
In a 1983 interview for the first edition of this book, the late I. F. "Izzy" Stone, a widely respected author, commentator, and self-styled radical, told me why many of his fellow Jews work so aggressively to stifle free speech. He explained that, because Jews in Israel seem constantly at war with Arabs, Jews in America feel that they are in the same war. To them, free speech is a luxury that can be sacrificed where debate might weaken U.S. support for an Israel at war. Stone summed it up, "When people are at war, it is normal for civil liberties to suffer." As long as Israel is at war, most U.S. Jews "feel they have to fight and keep fighting." Nowhere has this been more obvious than in Israel's post-September 11 incursions into the occupied territories.
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5 Preface
This reaction is almost instinctive, prompted by deeply felt anxieties, fears, and outrage that arise mainly from the common bond of religion and the knowledge of unspeakable Jewish death and suffering in the Nazi Germany Holocaust during World War II. It is not confined to people of the Jewish faith. To Muslims and many non-Muslims worldwide, the present suffering of Palestinians—to them, a latter-day holocaust—evokes a similar reaction in which free speech and other basic rights are sometimes casualties.
April 2002 provided evidence that strong passions persist on both sides. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, well known for his bias in favor of Israel, received a lesson in anti-Palestinian fervor when addressing a large crowd of people gathered for a pro-Israel rally at the U.S. Capitol. He tried to tell the crowd, "Innocent Palestinians are suffering and dying as well, and it is critical that we recognize and acknowledge that fact." His words were drowned out by boos and the shouted slogan "No more Arafat."1
A third of the way around the world, U.S. Ambassador Donald Neumann was booed for making a similar plea to a crowd of Bahraini citizens gathered to protest Israel's latest invasion of Palestine. After standing with the protesters for a minute of silence for the victims of the Israeli onslaught, Neumann remained standing and asked for a moment of silence for innocent Israeli victims of Palestinian terrorism. The crowd turned hostile and shouted back its refusal.2
Six weeks later, the scene in Bahrain remained hostile. Neumann issued an advisory, suggesting that U.S. citizens avoid crowds and vary their travel routes when away from home. He reported several beatings of U.S. military personnel, American vehicles being pelted with eggs, and local vehicles swerving near U.S. cyclists and pedestrians.3
Open Season on Palestinians
The Patriot Act brought about many changes in America, but it did not alter Israel's total domination of Capitol Hill. In 2001 Israel quickly endorsed President Bush's war on terrorism and Congress applauded Israel's war on Palestinians, accepting Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's duplicitous argument that eradicating "terrorists" from the occupied territories was an essential part of Bush's worldwide military campaign.
Preface 5
Supporting Israeli wars was normal procedure on Capitol Hill. Thanks to the effectiveness of the pro-Israel lobby, the United States had long been the key, indispensable ally in all of Israel's military victories over Arabs. Despite frequent claims over the years that it sought only policies that were fair to both sides—the "honest broker" role—the U.S. government provided critical support to Israel's expansionist campaigns without interruption since President Lyndon B. Johnson gave clandestine aid to Israel's June 1967 war against the Arabs. The American people remain largely unaware of U.S. complicity in these wars, although it is widely recognized in all countries outside the United States. To this day, Americans are poorly informed about the level of U.S. military and economic aid to Israel, not to mention our government's record of near-perfect support of Israel in critical votes in the United Nations Security Council.4
In April 2002 Sharon ordered the invasion of the territories on the pretext of rooting out the leaders who organized suicide bombings carried out inside Israel by individual Palestinians. The bombings spread fear throughout Israel, not just in areas adjacent to the occupied territories. Even armed Israeli soldiers and police officers did not feel safe. The bombers could rarely be identified in advance, as they were of both sexes and varied ages.
Sharon's counterattack was brutal and massive, utilizing tanks, helicopter gunships, and other arms—all donated to Israel through the U.S. government's military assistance program. It left major cities in the occupied territories heavily damaged and the Palestinian authority headquarters in shambles and isolated. Accurate casualty statistics may never emerge, but the UN Report on Jenin put the Palestinian death toll in Jenin alone at 52. It reported that 497 people had been killed and 1,477 were wounded during the entire military sweep. These figures were compiled from a distance, because the Israeli government, supported by Washington, refused to permit the UN inspection team to visit Jenin.
The invasion did not halt suicide bombings, but it left the Palestinian population more tightly repressed than ever before. It also left Palestinians and their sympathizers outraged at the crucial support provided to the invaders by the U.S. government.
For twelve days following the assault, Israeli forces barred a UN relief mission headed by special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, from entering the Jenin refugee camp. During this period ambulances were routinely
5 Preface
turned away, and scores of injured Palestinians bled to death. After finally being allowed to enter and tour the camp, Roed-Larsen said, "We have expert people here who have been in war zones and earthquakes, and they say they have never seen anything like it. It is horrifying beyond belief." He told reporters that 300 buildings had been destroyed and 2,000 people were left homeless.5
The Israelis did everything they could to prevent reports of the immense destruction from reaching American eyes and ears. Riad Abdelkarim, a Los Angeles physician who writes commentaries on the Middle East for U.S. newspapers and who served as a relief worker during the assault on Jenin, was arrested and held for several weeks by Israeli authorities after sending an eyewitness report on the devastation in the camp to U.S. newspapers.
Outraged by U.S. complicity in the assault, Palestinian officials in Jenin rejected a U.S. Agency for International Development shipment of tents, food, and children's toys. Their reason: the camp had been destroyed by U.S.-donated weapons.6
"A Special Relationship with Israel"
During Israel's month-long invasion, President Bush publicly demanded that Sharon order the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces. Given Bush's position as chief executive of the United States, Israel's chief benefactor, one would have expected Sharon to offer at least a touch of conciliation. Instead, with supreme arrogance, he announced simply that his war measures were not finished, and that withdrawal would not occur until they were. Faced with this defiance, Bush unaccountably praised Sharon as a "man of peace" and reminded reporters of the obvious: the United States has "a special relationship with Israel." He failed to explain what this relationship entails: letting Israeli prime ministers defy the demands of U.S. presidents, control Palestinians and their land by force of arms, and violate with impunity international laws and conventions on human rights.
Sharon's 2002 war on Palestinians was in several ways reminiscent of the bloody 1982 massacres he waged on the Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila. Sharon called both of them assaults on terrorism. In both wars, the U.S. president—in 1982, Ronald Reagan—demanded that Israel stop the war. In both, the prime minister of Israel—in 1982, Men-achem Begin—defied the presidential demand. In the greatest irony of all,
Preface 5
when both assaults came to an end, Congress promptly appropriated funds to resupply Israels war machine—$150 million in 1982, $200 million in 2002. To free up funds for the bonus to Israel, the House Appropriations Committee, in a curious reordering of priorities, cut $75 million from a project to reinforce cockpit doors to guard against intrusions by hijackers.7 Sharon's war prompted huge anti-Israel and anti-American protests worldwide. One in Rabat, Morocco, drew an estimated 1.5 million people—fully 6 percent of the nation's population. Surprisingly large protests also took place in Washington, D.C., New York, and other major U.S. cities. They received little media attention.
"Laughingstock of the World"
A Time-CNN poll showed that 60 percent of Americans favored reducing or completely eliminating aid to Israel if Sharon failed to withdraw his troops from Palestinian areas. The same poll showed 75 percent favoring Bush's diplomatic initiatives for Middle East peace.8
That sentiment was not represented on Capitol Hill in Washington, where both the House of Representatives and the Senate acted as if they were committees of the Israeli Knesset. During deliberations on Sharon's war, almost all speeches were sympathetic to Israel, echoing Sharon's "war of survival" theme.
On May 2, 2002, both the Senate and the House of Representatives adopted resolutions that praised Sharon's war and pledged full support of Israel. Although the House resolution was slightly more hostile to the Palestinian cause than the Senate version, the Atlanta Constitution columnist Martha Ezzard wrote that "Republican leaders in the House and Democratic leaders in the Senate entered into a schoolyard-like contest to see who could be the best pro-Israel cheerleader, approving resolutions that made Sharon appear as blameless for the loss of any innocent lives as Mother Teresa."9
In the House, Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR), one of twenty-one who voted "no" on the resolution, declared that it put the House of Representatives on record "to the right of Ariel Sharon and the Likud Party." Representative Nick J. Rahall (D-WV), who also voted against it, predicted that the resolution would make the House "the laughingstock of the world." Earlier, DeFazio had found only thirteen colleagues willing to sign a balanced resolution.
5 Preface
In the end, 352 of the 435 members voted yes. Twenty-one voted no. Twenty-eight others heeded the advice of Representative Marcy Kap-tur (D-OH), by voting "present." During the House debate, Kaptur warned of a "corrosive" effect: "This one-sided resolution will only fan the killing frenzy. ... I fear it represents crass domestic politics in this election year. . . . Let us be a true partner for peace, not just with Israel but as well with the Arab states in the region."10
In the Senate, only Democrats Ernest Hollings (D-SC) and Robert Byrd (D-WV) voted against the resolution. Hollings told his colleagues that Sharon "is making more terrorists than he is getting rid of."11
Nihad Awad, executive director of the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), responded, "It is truly disturbing to see American elected officials falling over themselves in an unseemly attempt to 'pledge allegiance' to a foreign government and its domestic lobby."12
Unprecedented War-Making Authority
What a difference a year can make. Within twelve months, America became, for the first time, the target of a massive, lethal assault by foreign terrorists on its own soil. Congress subsequently granted the president unprecedented authority to make war and police the world. Bush used that authority to launch a costly war in Afghanistan, with a larger one expected to follow against Iraq. Meanwhile, at home, Congress curbed precious civil liberties. All the while, several fundamental questions begged for attention:
• Why America? What, if anything, did the United States do to provoke 9/11?
• Do grievances against America remain? If so, what should America do to redress them?
• Why did almost every other nation reject or ignore President Bush's call for a multinational assault on Iraq?
These are urgent questions. They reach into the heart of the frantic, wrenching ordeal in which America finds itself, and yet, incredibly they are left unanswered—or worse, are largely unasked.
Welcome to my quest for the answers, a search that began unwittingly midway through my congressional career. It continues to this day.
1
Rescue and Involvement
"How did A congressman from the corn-hog heartland of America get entangled in Middle East politics?" people ask. Like most rural congressmen, I had no ethnic constituencies who lobbied me on their foreign interests. As expected, I joined the Agriculture Committee and worked mainly on issues such as farming, budget, and welfare reform.
Newly appointed in 1972 to the subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, I had represented the Springfield, Illinois, area for twelve years without attracting much attention at home or abroad.
Eight short years later, my involvement in Middle East politics would bring me infamy among many U.S. Jews, notoriety in Israel, and applause throughout the Arab world. By 1980, in urban centers of pro-Israel activism—far from the local Jews in central Illinois who knew and trusted me—I found myself in the most expensive congressional campaign in state history. Thanks to a flow of hostile dollars from both coasts and nearby Chicago, I became "the number one enemy of Israel" and my re-election campaign the principal target of Israel's lobby.
Prodded by a professor at Illinois College when I first joined the subcommittee, I had already begun to doubt the wisdom of U.S. policy
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5 They Dare to Speak Out
in the Middle East. In the early years, I kept these doubts private, but not because I feared the political consequences. In fact, I naively assumed I could question our policy anywhere without getting into trouble. I did not realize how deeply the roots of Israeli interests penetrated U.S. institutions.
In matters pertaining to Middle East policy, members of Congress generally paid attention only to what Israel wanted. Arab American lobbies, fledgling forces even today, were nonexistent. Muslim organizations were in their infancy. Arab embassies showed little interest in lobbying. Even if a congressman wanted to hear the Arab viewpoint, he would have had difficulty finding a spokesman to explain it.
My personal involvement with Middle East politics started with a situation that had no direct connection to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It began in the spring of 1973 when a letter arrived from Mrs. Evans Franklin, a constituent who wrote neighborhood news for a weekly newspaper I had once edited. In this letter, she pleaded for my help in securing the release of her son, Ed, from a faraway prison. He had been convicted of espionage and sentenced to five years' solitary imprisonment in Aden, the capital of the Marxist People's Democratic Republic of [South] Yemen. After reading her plea, I had to consult a map. I knew only that Aden had once been a major British base.
Had it not been for a series of canceled airline flights, his mother told me, Franklin would never have set foot in Aden. Returning from Ethiopia to his teaching post in Kuwait, he was rerouted through Aden and then delayed there by the cancelation of his departing flight. His luck worsened. Unaware of local restrictions, he photographed a prohibited area. The Adenese were still nervous about blonde-haired visitors, remembering the commando raid the British had conducted shortly after they left Aden six years earlier. When Franklin snapped the pictures, he was immediately arrested. After being kept in an interrogation center for months, he was finally brought to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced. My efforts to secure his release proceeded for the most part without aid from the State Department. Our government had had no relations, diplomatic or otherwise, with Aden since a 1969 coup moved the country's regime dramatically to the left. This meant that the State Department could do nothing directly. I asked a friend in the Egyptian embassy in Washington, D.C., to help. Franklins parents, people of
Rescue and Involvement 5
modest means living in a rural crossroads village, sent a request to Salim Rubyai Ali, South Yemen's president, seeking executive clemency. I sent a similar request. Our government asked Britain to intervene through its embassy in Aden. There was no response to any of these initiatives.
In December 1973 I visited Abdallah Ashtal, Aden's ambassador to the United Nations in New York, to ask if I could go personally to Aden and make a plea for Franklin's release. Ashtal, a short, handsome, youthful diplomat who was taking evening graduate courses at New York University, promised a prompt answer. A message came back two weeks later that I would be welcome.
If I decided to go, I would have to travel alone. I would be the first congressman—in either the House or the Senate—to visit Aden since the republic was established in 1967, and the first U.S. official to visit there since diplomatic relations were severed in the wake of the coup two years later. Although this was an exciting prospect, it caused me some foreboding. Moreover, I had no authority as an envoy. South Yemen, sometimes called "the Cuba of the Arab world," was regarded by our State Department as the most radical of the Arab states. A State Department friend did nothing to relieve my concern when he told me that Aden's foreign minister got his job "because he killed more opponents than any other candidate."
Troubling questions came to mind. How would I be received? I discussed the trip with Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asia affairs. I asked him, "If they lock me up, what will you do first?" He smiled and said, "Look for another congressman to come get you out!"
Still, I was probably the only person able to help. Franklin's mother told me, "I doubt if Ed can survive five years in a Yemen jail." My wife, Lucille, expressed deep concern over the prospects of the trip but agreed that I had little choice but to go.
I also thought the trip might be an opportunity to open the door to better relations with a vital but little-known part of the world. With the imminent reopening of the Suez Canal, better relations with Aden could be important to U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean. After all, Aden, along with French-held Djibouti, was a guardian of a world-famous and vitally important strait, the gateway to the Suez Canal. If the Soviets, already present with aid missions and military advisers, succeeded in
5 They Dare to Speak Out
dominating the Aden government, they could effectively control the canal from the south. It was obvious that, Franklin's potential release aside, the United States needed good relations with Aden.
I decided that I must go. The trip was set for late March 1974.
From Middle East scholars, I learned that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was soon to begin shuttle negotiations between Israel and Egypt, was held in high esteem in Aden. I asked him for a letter that I could take with me which would be as explicit as possible about United States-Aden relations. A personal letter arrived three days before I left. In it, Kissinger said he welcomed my "humanitarian mission" to Aden and added, "Should the occasion arise, you may wish to inform those officials whom you meet of our continuing commitment to work for an equitable and lasting Middle East peace and of our desire to strengthen our ties with the Arab world."
The letter was addressed to me, not to the Aden government. It was a diplomatic "feeler." I hoped it would convince any officials I met that the United States wanted to establish normal relations with Aden.
A good traveler always brings gifts. At the suggestion of an Egyptian friend, I secured scholarships from three colleges in Illinois to present to South Yemeni students. I also located and had specially bound two Arabic language translations of The Prairie Years, Carl Sandburg's biography of Abraham Lincoln. In addition, I carried two small busts of Lincoln—my state's most celebrated leader—hoping he would be known even in Aden.
I left Washington, D.C., early enough to visit Syria before heading south to Aden. Syria had not had normal diplomatic relations with the United States since the 1967 war with Israel, and despite its growing importance, no member of the House of Representatives had visited there for five years. To my surprise, President Hafez Assad of Syria agreed to receive me without advance appointment. Perhaps he was intrigued by the presence of a U.S. congressman who said he had an open mind about Middle East issues.
Assad received me in the spacious second-floor reception room of his offices. A tall, thickset man with a prominent forehead and a warm, quiet manner, Assad made his points forcefully but without a hint of hostility. While sipping small cups of rich Syrian coffee, he voiced his pain over the United States' support of Israel's actions: "We are bitter
Rescue and Involvement 5
about the guns and ammunition you provide to Israel, and why not? But bitterness is not hostility. In fact, we have very warm feelings about the American people. Despite the war, the Syrian people like Americans and have for years."
While sympathizing, I took the initiative, urging him to restore full diplomatic relations and to take a page from the public relations book of the Israelis. I suggested that he come to the United States and take his case directly to the American people via television.
Assad responded, "Perhaps we have made some mistakes. We should have better public relations. I agree with what you say and recommend, but I don't know when I can come to the United States."
As I rose to leave, Assad said, "You have my mandate to invite members of your Congress to visit Syria as soon as possible. They will be most welcome. We want those who are critical as well as those who are friends to come."
While I later personally extended Assad's invitation to many of my colleagues and then, in a detailed official report, to all of them, few accepted. The first congressional group did not arrive until 1978, four years later.
After my interview with Assad, I was driven late at night from Damascus to Beirut for the flight to Aden. As our car approached the Syria-Lebanon border, I could hear the sound of Israel's shelling of Lebanon's Mt. Hermon. It was a sobering reminder that, seven years after the 1967 war, the fighting still continued.
In 1974 Beirut was still the "Paris of the Middle East," a westernlike city with a lively nightlife and bustling commerce. A new Holiday Inn had just opened near the harbor. Every street seemed to boast two international banks, at least three bookstores, and a dozen restaurants. A year later the Holiday Inn became a battleground between Phalangist militia, backed by Israel, and the Lebanese left coalition, including Palestinians, which were helped by various Arab governments and by Moscow. Its walls were ripped open by shells, its rooftop pavilion littered with the bodies of fallen snipers. The vicious civil war, which began in 1975, had turned Beirut into a city of rubble.
But even in 1974, the Palestinians in the refugee camps did not share the prosperity of the city. I passed the hovels of Sabra and Shatila, where, nine years later, the massacre of hundreds of Palestinian civilians would
5 They Dare to Speak Out
shock the world. My embassy escort said, "These miserable camps haven't improved in twenty years."
I also passed the Tel Zaatar refugee camp, whose wretched inhabitants would soon suffer a fate even more cruel. A year later, it was under seige for forty-five days by rightist "Christian" militias, armed and advised by Israel's Labor government. Fifteen thousand Palestinians were killed, many of them after the camp surrendered. Virtually every adult male survivor was executed. That slaughter was barely noted by the world press. Today hardly anyone, save the Palestinians, remembers it.
At that time, the spring of 1974, however, I had no premonition of the tragedies to come. I boarded the Aden-bound plane at Beirut with just one person's tragedy on my mind—that of Ed Franklin.
Mission in Aden
In Aden, to my surprise and pleasure, I was met by a delegation of five youthful officials, three of them cabinet ministers. Mine was the only gray hair in sight that night. The group had stayed up until 2:00 a.m. to meet the plane. "Welcome. We have your quarters ready," said the government's chief of protocol. Good news! This meant, I felt, that I would not be stuck off in a hotel room. My quarters turned out to be a rambling old building which, in imperial days, was the residence of the British air commander. A tree-shaded terrace—a rarity in Aden—looked over the great harbor, a strategic prize ever since white men first rounded the Cape of Good Hope in the sixteenth century. Blackbirds chattered overhead.
I received permission to visit Franklin at 7:15 that first night. I found him under guard in an apartment on the second floor of a small modern building. When I entered, he was standing by a couch in the living room. We had never seen each other before.
"I presume you are Congressman Findley," he said.
Despite the emotion of the occasion, I smiled, sensing how Dr. Livingston must have felt years before in Africa.
After sixteen months of confinement, Franklin was thin, almost gaunt. His trousers were several sizes too big, but his blonde hair was neatly combed, his face was cleanly shaved, and he was surprisingly well tanned. He looked much older than his thirty-four years.
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We were able to talk alone. I said, "You're thin, but you look well." He answered, "I'm very glad you came, and I feel pretty well. Much better now that you're here. A few days ago when I used a mirror for the first time in months, I was shocked at how I look." He said he developed the tan from daily exercise in the prison yard, adding that he had been transferred to the flat two days before, obviously because authorities did not want me to see the prison.
"Here is a box of food items your family asked me to deliver." When I said that, his face, which until then had displayed no emotion, fell. "I guess this means I am not going home with you."
I said, "I don't know."
Franklin changed the subject. "I had to leave my Bible at the prison. I hated to, because I like to read it every day."
I said, "Many people have been praying for you."
He responded, "Yes, I knew at once, even before I got word in letters from home. I could feel it."
Franklin told me he had not been physically abused but said the food was terrible and some of the rules bothered him. "I am not allowed to have a pen and paper. I like to write. I once wrote poetry on a sack, but then my pencil was discovered and taken from me. Still, I like the Arab world. Maybe someday when the American embassy is reopened, I could even get a job here."
I assured him: "I'll do my very best to secure your release, or at least shorten your term. That's why I'm here, and I'll try to see you again before I leave. I'll also try to get approval for you to have a pencil and paper."
On the way back to my quarters, I passed on Franklin's request for writing materials to my escort officer, who answered simply, "I will report your request." I spent Friday, a Muslim day of worship, touring the nearby desolate countryside. The main tourist attraction was an ancient, massive stone that was used to store the area's scarce rainfall. That evening the British consul, a compassionate man who had occasionally delivered reading material to Franklin, joined me for dinner. The British had long ago understood the importance of maintaining diplomatic relations even with hostile regimes and, shortly after their stormy departure from Aden, they established an embassy there.
On Saturday morning Foreign Minister M. J. Motie came to my quarters for a long discussion of United States-Yemen relations. The
5 They Dare to Speak Out
plight of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation was at the top of his agenda, Franklin at the top of mine. He complained, "The United States is helping Saudi Arabia foment subversion along Yemen's borders." I told him I was troubled by this charge, was unaware of such activity, and hoped to help improve relations. Motie responded, "While the past is not good, the present looks better, but we need a substantial sign of friendship. For example, we need aid in buying wheat."
After the discussion, I spent a long and fruitless afternoon trying to fill a shopping list my family had sent with me. The bazaar had little but cheap Japanese radios and a few trinkets. It had even fewer shoppers. I returned to the guest house empty-handed, only to find an assortment of gifts, each neatly wrapped. Among them was zjambia, the traditional curved Yemeni dagger, and a large ceremonial pipe. The gifts were accompanied by a card bearing the words: "With the compliments of the president."
Were these gifts merely sweeteners to take the place of Franklin on my homeward journey? Or were they a harbinger of success? I dared not believe the latter. I had received no hint that the government would even shorten Franklin's sentence. At least it had acceded to his request for paper and pencil.
My second visit with Franklin was more relaxed than the first. He accepted the pencils and paper I brought him with the comment, "I hope I won't need them except for tonight." I responded that I had no reason to hope he would be able to leave with me, but that, strictly on my own hunch, I felt that he would be released soon.
I met with President Ali the night before my scheduled departure inside the heavily guarded compound where the president both lived and had his offices. I was ushered into a long reception hall adorned with blue flowered carpeting and gold drapes that covered three walls. The fourth side opened into a large courtyard. Two rows of ceiling fans whirred overhead. In the center of this large hall was a lonely group of gold upholstered sofas and chairs.
By the time I reached the circle of furniture, President Ali, the foreign minister of Aden, and an interpreter were walking through the same door I had entered. The president needed no introduction. I had seen Ali's picture in many places around Aden, but frankly it did him little justice. He was a tall, well-built man of forty. His black hair had a touch
Rescue and Involvement 5
of gray. His skin was dark, his bearing dignified. He was soft-spoken, and two gold teeth glistened when he smiled. After we exchanged greetings, I thanked him for his hospitality and for the gifts. Then I launched into my own presentation of gifts: first the book and bust, then the scholarships.
What he was waiting for, of course, was the letter from Kissinger, which would indicate the weight the United States gave my mission. When I handed it to him, I tried to broaden its importance.
"Perhaps Your Excellency will permit me to explain," I said. This letter formally presents the desire of the United States to reestablish diplomatic relations. This is important. Our government needs these relations in order to understand Aden's policies and problems. The president of the United States and the secretary of state are limited in foreign policy. They can do only whatever the Congress will support, so it is also important for congressmen to gain a better understanding of Aden's situation and of the Arab world in general."
Ali responded: "Aden is the shining example of the republic. Other areas of our country are quite different. The people are much poorer." I gulped. I had seen only Aden, Ali's "shining example," which struck me as very poor, so I could only guess at conditions elsewhere.
While I took notes, Ali told me that the antipoverty efforts of his government were handicapped by "subversion" from neighboring states. He said, bluntly, "The belief is held by the people of our country that all suffering, all damage caused by subversives, is really the work of the United States government. All military equipment we capture is United States equipment." Some of it, he said, was outside this building, placed there for me to examine.
I interjected that this information was not known in the United States, and I underscored the need for diplomatic relations so this sort of injury would stop. He nodded. "I favor relations with the United States, but they must relate to grievances now seen by my people." He added, "Aden does not wish to be isolated from the United States."
Ali thanked me for the gifts, indicating the interview was over. I sensed this was my long-awaited opportunity, my chance to launch into an appeal for Franklin.
It was not needed. Ali interrupted by saying simply, "Regarding the prisoner, as soon as I heard of your interest in him, I saw to it that he
5 They Dare to Speak Out
received preferential treatment. I have carefully considered your request and your desire that he be released. I have decided to grant your request. When you want him, you may have him."
I could scarcely believe what I had heard. "When you want him, you may have him." I was so overcome with joy I half-stumbled leaving the room. Franklin was free. In fact, he was waiting at my quarters when I returned. We were on the plane at 6:00 the next morning, headed for Beirut, and then to New York and finally St. Louis, where a joyous family welcomed Franklin home.
I am convinced that the main reason for Franklins release was the decision by our government to probe ever so cautiously for better relations with Yemen. Caution was necessary, because there were those in both nations who did not wish to see relations improved. Ali was the least Marxist of a three-man ruling junta. In the State Department, even some "Arabists," still resentful over Yemen's expulsion of the United States presence years before, rejected Aden as nothing but a "training ground for PLO terrorists." Others, such as Kissinger, felt differently. Ed Franklin had provided the opportunity to begin the probing.
But the U.S. government fiddled, hedged, and stalled for three years. Jimmy Carter replaced Gerald Ford in the White House, and Cyrus Vance became secretary of state. Our government turned down Aden's request to buy wheat on credit, then refused to consider a bid to buy three used airliners. The United States kept putting off even preliminary talks. At a second meeting with me in September 1977—this time in New York, where he addressed the United Nations—Ali restated his desire for renewed relations with the United States and suggested that I report our discussion to Secretary of State Vance. I did so, and after my report, Vance and Foreign Minister Motie of South Yemen agreed to exploratory talks. To me, this appeared like a momentous breakthrough. The talks were to begin in Aden in just a few weeks, shortly after New Year's Day. Sadly, procrastination took over.
No precise date for the meetings had been set when I returned to the Middle East with a number of other congressmen in January 1978. I altered my own itinerary to include a side trip to Aden. Before I left the group, we met with Secretary of State Vance, whose travels happened to cross ours, and with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd, a large, impressive man who spoke eloquent English and who would soon become the
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Saudi monarch. Fahd spoke approvingly of my efforts in Aden and asked me to tell officials there that Saudi Arabia was ready to resume sending them economic aid.
"It's a Good Omen"
As I saw when I arrived, the scene in Aden had improved. South Yemen had already exchanged ambassadors with former enemy Saudi Arabia, even though the two nations still had disputes over territory. Aden had also just agreed to diplomatic relations with Jordan. The local radio station no longer harangued American and Saudi "imperialists." This time my wife, Lucille, accompanied me. We were assigned to the same guest house I had used before, where the principal change was the presence of a well-stocked refrigerator.
President Ali received us, this time with an honor guard, in the same spacious hall we had used before. Although he avoided comment on Saudi Arabia's offer of aid, Ali spoke of Crown Prince Fahd with great warmth.
Then he added, "We are looking forward to the expected arrival of the diplomatic delegation from the United States before the end of the month." I am sure my face fell. I knew the delegation was not coming that month. In fact, the mission had been delayed indefinitely. A few days before, Vance had told me the bad news but had not explained why. When I expressed the hope that Ali had been notified of the delay, Vance had replied, "We will take care of it." Unfortunately, no one had.
Ali was left waiting, day by day, for a group that would not arrive. I did not feel free to tell him of the change, so I listened and tried to look hopeful. I knew the delay would strengthen his local critics, who opposed reconciliation with the United States.
I changed the subject. "Some of our strategists say you have let the Soviets establish a naval base here. Do you have a comment?"
He strongly protested. "That is not true. We do not allow the Soviets, or any foreign nation, to have a military base in our territory. But we do cooperate with the Soviets because they help us." Ali concluded our discussion by giving me a message to Washington:
Please extend my warm greetings to President Carter. Kindly inform him that we are eager to maintain smooth and friendly relations between
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Democratic Yemen and the United States. We recognize that President Carter is concerned about maintaining friendly relations with all countries. We feel that is a positive policy. We believe our relations should be further strengthened.
As we parted, I gave Ali a pottery vase our daughter Diane had made for him. He said, "That's very nice. Please thank your daughter. I admire it." Then he stepped to the door to admire something else—rain, which is a rarity in Aden.
"Its a good omen," he said.
I left Aden more convinced than ever that diplomatic relations would help the United States and our friends in the region. The United States and Saudi Arabia had a common interest in minimizing the Soviet presence in South Yemen. We needed a diplomatic mission there. Back in Washington, I missed no opportunity to press this recommendation on Secretary Vance and the White House staff.
At the White House a month later, I was able to make a personal appeal to President Jimmy Carter. Carter said he was "surprised and pleased" by Ali s message: "His words are surprisingly warm. We've been hoping to improve our situation there." I urged that there be no further delays. "Another cancellation would be baffling to President Ali, to say the least," I cautioned. Carter thanked me and assured me that he would "take care of the matter."
Carter was true to his word. Five months after my last meeting with Ali, a team of State Department officials arranged to visit Aden on June 26, 1978, for "exploratory talks" to discuss, "in a noncommittal way," the resumption of diplomatic negotiations. Ali was to meet them on the day of their arrival.
It was too late. Aden's Marxist hard-liners had decided to act. Concerned by Ali's initiatives for improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia, radicals seized fighter planes, strafed the presidential quarters, took control of the government, and, on the day the U.S. delegation was scheduled to arrive, arrested Ali. He was executed by a firing squad. Ambassador Ashtal called from New York to tell me the delegation would still be welcome, but that the U.S. mission was scrubbed. After traveling as far as Sana'a, the capital of North Yemen, the State Department officials returned to Washington.
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Distressed over the execution of Ali, I asked Ashtal for an explanation. He replied, "Its an internal matter of no concern to the outside world." Still, Alis fate troubled me. It still does. I have often wondered whether my goodwill visit and Ali s decision to release Franklin contributed to the president s downfall and death.
My journeys to Aden had broad personal implications. After years on Capitol Hill, I heard for the first time the Arab perspective, particularly the plight of the Palestinians. I began to read about the Middle East, talk with experts, and try to understand the region. Arabs emerged as human beings.
Reports of my experiences made the rounds, and soon my office became a stopping place for people going to and from the Middle East— scholars, business people, clerics, government officials. It was unusual for anyone in Congress to visit Arab countries and take an interest in their problems. I began to speak out in Congress. I argued from what I considered to be a U.S. viewpoint—neither pro-Israel nor pro-Arab. I declared that our unwillingness to talk directly to the political leaders of the Palestinians, like our reluctance to talk to President Ali in Yemen, handicapped our search for peace. Diplomatic communication with other parties, however alien, however small, is a convenience to our government. It does not need to be viewed as an endorsement. Thus, I asked, why not talk directly to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, the acknowledged political voice of the Palestinians? One reason, I discovered, was that Henry Kissinger, who had provided help on my road to Aden, had agreed to an Israeli request, under which the U.S. government would not communicate formally with the PLO until the organization recognized the right of Israel to exist. It was a tough demand, especially in light of Israels flat refusal to accept a Palestinian state as its neighbor, but Kissinger had agreed to it.
To help break the ice, I decided to communicate with Arafat myself, not to negotiate anything but to serve, as best I could, as a bridge of information between the U.S. government and an important Arab community. I met the PLO leader for the first time in January 1978 in Damascus, just before meeting with Ali in Aden for what would be the last time. Before the meeting with Arafat, I had the same misgivings that I felt before going to Aden four years earlier. Meeting Arafat crossed the line that Kissinger, at Israels demand, had drawn.
5 They Dare to Speak Out
"I Stand Behind the Words"

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 2

2008-08-15T10:49:00.000-07:00

"I Stand Behind the Words"
To my surprise I discovered that Arafat, who received us in a heavily guarded second-floor apartment, was not a wild-eyed, gun-waving fanatic. Welcoming our small group, which included Mrs. Findley and several other members of Congress, he spoke softly and listened attentively. He was bareheaded and nearly bald. This took us by surprise, because in public he was always attired in the Palestinian headdress or military cap. To questions about PLO terrorism, he repeated his usual litany, but coming directly from his lips the words had added force: "I am a freedom fighter. We are fighting for justice for our people, the four million Palestinians dispossessed and scattered by three decades of war."
Later that year, I had a second and more productive meeting with the PLO leader, again in Damascus. This time I was alone. With Arafat were Abu Hassan, his security leader who was soon to die in a car bombing in Beirut, and Mahmoud Labadi, his public affairs officer, who later deserted Arafat and joined Syrian-supported hard-liners. Such was the ferment in the Palestinian community. I wanted Arafat to clarify the terms under which the PLO would live at peace with Israel. Was he ready to recognize Israel? In a four-hour discussion that stretched late into the night, he provided the answer. Working carefully word by word, and phrase by phrase, he fashioned a statement and authorized me to report it to Carter—and to the public.
The PLO will accept an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and Gaza, with a connecting corridor, and in that circumstance will renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state. I would reserve the right of course to use non-violent, that is to say diplomatic and democratic means, to bring about the eventual unification of all of Palestine. We will give de facto recognition to the State of Israel. We would live at peace with all our neighbors. —Damascus, November 30, 1978.
I wrote the words on a legal sheet and read them back several times so he could ponder their full meaning. I asked Arafat if he would sign his name on the paper bearing the words. He answered, "No, I prefer not to sign my name, but I stand behind the words. You may quote me."
I was elated, perhaps too much so. Arafat s pledge contrasted sharply with the harsh rhetoric of earlier Palestinian public statements which
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called, in effect, for the elimination of the State of Israel. It was not, of course, everything Israel or the United States would want, but it was an encouraging start, and it belied the image of the fanatic who believed only in violence. During the long interview we covered many points, and, determined to protect my credibility, I asked Arafat to identify statements he did not wish to make public. The carefully drafted pledge was not one of these. He wanted the world to know what he pledged, and, clearly, he expected a positive response from President Carter. To use one of the PLO leader s favorite expressions, he had "played a card" in authorizing me to transmit this statement. It was a step beyond anything his organization had officially proclaimed before.
Tragically, it brought no reaction from the U.S. government. I later learned that Secretary of State Vance privately recommended that the administration "take note" of it, but his suggestion was rejected. In a subsequent interview on NBC's Meet the Press, Arafat—always a nimble actor—sidestepped questions about the pledge. Carter's newly appointed special ambassador to the Middle East, Robert Strauss, a prominent Democrat who had previously served as chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was intrigued by my communication with Arafat and became a frequent visitor to my office.
I often thought that bringing Arafat and Strauss together would be important to the peace process. The fact that Strauss is Jewish would have helped thousands of Jews in Israel put aside their government s hard line. But Strauss, despite his unique intimate relationship with Carter and his demonstrated ability to negotiate complicated problems on both the international and domestic scene, never received full presidential backing on the Middle East. Late in his diplomatic mission, just before he was shifted to the chairmanship of Carter s ill-fated campaign for reelection, Strauss told me, "If I had had my way, I would have been talking directly to Arafat months ago."
I found myself being drawn deeper into Middle East politics. Early one Sunday, Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders called for help. At Arafat's behest, Kuwait was demanding consideration of a United Nations resolution that was sympathetic to the Palestinians. The United States, because of Israels objections, would not support it, but did not want to go on record against it. The vote was scheduled for the following Tuesday. Saunders hoped that, given more time, he could find
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a formula that would satisfy both the Arab states and the United States. Mindful of Carter's rule against even informal talks with the PLO, Saunders carefully avoided directly asking that I call Arafat. Nevertheless, I knew Saunders well enough to grasp the real purpose of his call to me. I told him I would try to persuade Arafat to postpone the scheduled vote.
My call to Arafat's office went through instantly, which was unusual for the chaotic Beirut exchange. I urged Arafat to postpone the UN vote, arguing that the delay would cost him nothing and would earn him U.S. gratitude. Two hours later Kuwait postponed the vote. That same weekend, Carter's ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young, had acted less cautiously than Saunders. He'd met to discuss the same issue with Zuhdi Labib Terzi, the PLO observer at the UN. So firm was Carter's edict against talking with the PLO that this incident led to Young's resignation.
I was soon on the phone again with the State Department. This time my help, through Arafat, was needed in getting the U.S. hostages out of our embassy in Tehran. In our 1978 meeting, Arafat had told me of his close relationship with the revolutionaries in Iran. I saw this crisis as an opportunity for Arafat to help in a humanitarian cause and, perhaps, to open the door for peaceful discussions on a broader scale. This time Arafat was away from headquarters, but I had a long talk with his deputy, Mahmoud Labadi, whom I had met during my second interview with Arafat.
Labadi reminded me that Arafat had taken my advice on the UN confrontation but, in Labadi's words, "got nothing in return." He was right. Labadi told me he disagreed with me regarding the situation in Iran but would carefully report my recommendation to his leader. Once more, Arafat cooperated. He sent an envoy to Khomeini, and, according to Saunders, that envoy successfully arranged the release of the first eleven hostages.
For this, the Carter administration thanked Arafat privately—very privately. Publicly, the Carter spokesmen did nothing to discourage the unfounded speculation that the PLO had actually conspired with Iran to seize the hostages. The reverse was true. Just before he left office, Vance told me that he was in "almost daily" communication with Arafat and his staff, enlisting PLO help during the protracted Iranian hostage ordeal, but he never said so publicly.
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On several occasions during off-the-record meetings at the White House, I urged Carter to publicly acknowledge Arafat's moderate cooperative course. I was warned that failure to do so would strengthen more radical forces. I later learned that Vice President Walter Mondale, more than any other personality in the administration, had argued persuasively against making any public statements that acknowledged PLO cooperation.
Labadi never forgave Arafat for this cooperation. He later deserted the PLO leader and joined the rebels who were laying siege to Arafat at Tripoli.
Turmoil in the Middle West
While I was organizing my one-man peace initiative, my critics were organizing to throw me out of office. Partisans back home, who had watched my re-election margins grow to 70 percent in 1978, correctly surmised that my unusual activities in foreign policy would provide them the money to attack me in the upcoming elections. In the spring of 1979, an aggressive former state legislator, David Robinson, strongly encouraged by pro-Israel activists, began campaigning full-time for the Democratic nomination for the congressional seat I had held for nineteen years. Three months before the March 1980 primary, David Nuessen, the popular Republican mayor of Quincy, Illinois, challenged my renom-ination in a professionally managed campaign that was supported mainly by pro-Israel political action committees and individuals. Their contributions financed a relentless pummeling that bruised me more than I realized. I squeaked through the primary with only 55 percent of the vote.
It was a year of surprises, the greatest being the reaction to my candidacy of Dr. Arthur Burns, former chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and, in 1980, the U.S. ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. Just after the primary election, I explained my campaign challenge in a telephone conversation with him. Burns responded generously, "We simply cannot afford to lose you. Your re-election is very important to the entire nation." Gratified, I made a modest request: "If you will put those sentiments in a letter I can use in the campaign, that would be a great help."
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His endorsement was not a high priority objective. In fact, I did not even think to ask for it until he praised my record, but I expected Burns to agree without hesitation, as we had been friends throughout my career. Our views on fiscal and economic policies were identical.
His answer was the deepest wound in a traumatic year: "Oh, I couldn't do that. Its your views on the PLO. I'm sorry." I was stupefied. I am used to surprises—and disappointments—but his refusal left me speechless. No event, before or since, disclosed to me so forcefully the leverage of the pro-Israel lobby on the U.S. political scene. This great, kind, generous Jewish elder statesman, a personal friend, could not ignore the lobby and say a public good word for my candidacy. I report this episode for this reason: If an otherwise stalwart man like Burns felt intimidated, lesser men and women who do speak out are truly courageous.
Meanwhile, Democrat Robinson solicited campaign contributions by advertising in Jewish newspapers throughout the country, where he called me a "practicing anti-Semite, who is one of the worst enemies that Jews and Israel have ever faced in the history of the U.S. Congress." He drew funds from each of the fifty states. Robinson and I raised about $600,000 each. It was the most expensive congressional campaign in Illinois history. College students from both coasts and in between came to central Illinois on Robinson's behalf, manning phone banks and canvassing door-to-door.
Midway through my speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, a man burst into the hall and shouted, "We've received a call. There's a bomb in the room." The crowd of five hundred made a fast exit. The police later found a pipe loaded with bubble gum in the grand piano on the stage. Later, Robinson activists converged on Detroit, Michigan, where I was a delegate to the Republican convention, to picket and amuse onlookers with the chant, "Paul, Paul, he must go. He supports the PLO."
Trapped on a Bos with Percy
At first, my plight escaped the attention of the Ronald Reagan presidential campaign. In fact, when Reagan's scheduling office learned that I was having a fundraising luncheon in Springfield, his manager asked if Reagan could stop by, as he would be nearby that day. That unsolicited
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warmth quickly chilled. New York City organizers warned Reagan's managers: "Appear friendly with Findley and you lose New York." This led them to take unusual measures to keep their candidate a safe distance from me.
Springfield, located in the heart of my district, posed a problem, because it was the home of the first Republican president, Abraham Lincoln, and therefore a "must visit" for the party's presidential candidates. During a day in Illinois, a candidate simply could not pass by Springfield. The Reagan team was concerned about how to make the expected pilgrimage and still keep me out of camera range.
Greg Newell, chief of scheduling, first planned to finesse the problem by having Reagan deliver a major address from the steps of the Lincoln home at the very moment he knew I would be attending my major fundraiser of the year halfway across town. Just for insurance, Newell moved Reagan's Springfield appearance to the Lincoln Tomb, all the way across town. He also scrubbed Reagan's speech, a move designed to minimize press interest in the Springfield stop.
I realized, however, that most of my supporters would also want to see Reagan when he came to town. To accommodate them (and to assure good attendance at my own function), I rescheduled my fundraiser early enough so those attending—myself included—could also attend the Reagan appearance at the tomb.
Reagan's manager passed on an order quietly, or so they thought, that read: "Under no circumstance is Findley to get near Reagan," even though elsewhere in Illinois, congressional candidates were to appear on speaking platforms with him. Learning of the order, Don Norton, my campaign manager, vented his outrage to Reagan's headquarters. The Reagan team shifted gears again. This time they declared that all congressmen were to be treated alike during the day in Illinois: none was to share a platform with Reagan. Representative Ed Madigan, who later became Reagan's secretary of agriculture, was irritated to learn that he would have to either speak before Reagan's arrival in Bloomington that day or wait until Reagan had left the platform. Madigan opted to make no speech at all.
At Springfield, Reagan campaign staffer Paul Russo had only one assignment, but it was an important one. He was to keep me out of camera range when Reagan was nearby. Unaware at the time of the panic of
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Reagan's crew, I was literally corralled behind a rope fifty feet away while Reagan was photographed in the ceremonial "rubbing Lincoln's nose" on a statue at the tomb entrance.
At the next stop, a coal mine near Springfield, Russo's team tried to keep me on a bus and in the process trapped my friend, Senator Charles H. Percy, too. Their goal was to keep only me away from Reagan during his remarks to the crowd. But Percy had the misfortune to be on the bus with me, so he too was detained. Together we managed to force the door open, but only after Reagan had concluded his remarks and left the area.
Bob Hope Backs Bot
The Reagan team's panic even spread to Hollywood. Bob Hope, who never wavered under enemy fire on war fronts in World War II and who withstood heavy criticism for his support of President Nixon's Vietnam policies, encountered a new and more devastating line of fire when he agreed to appear at a fundraising event for me in Springfield.
Two years earlier I had organized a seventy-fifth birthday party for Hope in the House of Representatives in Washington. It was the most fun-filled moment in the chamber that I can remember. Hope and his wife sat in the gallery as one congressman after another voiced praise of the great entertainer. The tributes filled fourteen pages of the Congressional Record. Gratefully recalling the unique party, Hope agreed to help with my 1980 campaign. His manager, Ward Grant, knowing from the start I was being opposed by pro-Israel activists because of my work on Middle East policy, declared, "We need men in Congress who speak their mind." Coast-to-coast pressure quickly brought a change. Don Norton recalled receiving an urgent telephone message from Hope's manager:
Grant told me that Hope was getting tremendous pressure from Jews and non-Jews all over the country. He said it's gotten to the point where Hope's lawyer of thirty-five years, who is Jewish, has threatened to quit. The pressure was beyond belief, like nothing they had ever experienced before, and Hope just couldn't come.
Stunned, Norton pleaded that the event was widely publicized, all arrangements were made, tickets were sold, and enthusiasm was high. His plea was to no avail. When Norron told me of the crisis, I tried to
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get a call through to Hope himself, hoping to persuade him to reconsider. Failing to get a call through, I wrote a confidential letter, giving Hope details of my unpublicized endeavors the year before to promote understanding between PLO leader Arafat and Robert Strauss, President Carter's special emissary to the Middle East. I sent him copies of messages I had transmitted at the request of the two leaders. I asked Hope to keep the information confidential, because the U.S. government was maintaining a public posture of refusing to communicate with the PLO. My letter brought no response, nor were my phone calls returned.
Happily, Strauss—a prominent Democrat and a Jew—agreed to help. Encountering him one afternoon on the steps of the House of Representatives, I explained my problem and asked him to talk to Hope. By then Strauss had left his diplomatic post and was chairman of Carter's campaign for re-election. In a remarkable gesture of magnanimity to a Republican in the midst of a hotly contested election, Strauss agreed, adding, "Maybe I can help him understand the 'crazy' pressure he is getting." He gave me phone numbers where Hope could reach him. In a wire to Hope I said: " [Strauss] will be glad to talk with you or anyone about the value of my work and what he described as the 'crazy pressure' you have been receiving."
By then, however, the "crazy pressure" had taken its toll, and Hope never made the call. I still have a souvenir of my chat with Strauss. It bears the phone number he gave me and my record of his parting words: "I wish you the best. I hope we both make it November 4, because we need to work together on the problems that remain."
A few days later, I finally got a call through to Hope. He was not his usual bubbly self. I assured him it had never occurred to me that he would have such an avalanche of protest calls, but now that the event had been scheduled, it would hurt if he failed to come.
Hope interjected: "I read those letters you sent me. You should go public on this. Defend yourself with the facts." I responded, "I just can't do that. It is highly secret information, and releasing it might hurt the peace process Carter is trying to advance." He paused, then said, "I just don't need this problem. I've been getting all these calls. It's too much pressure. I don't want to get involved."
Hope did not come. Happily, only one ticket holder asked for a refund. The sellout crowd heard a stirring address by my friend and
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colleague, Representative Guy Vander Jagt of Michigan, who agreed to fill in at the last minute.
Lobby pressure also intervened when former President Gerald R. Ford agreed to appear in my behalf, this time in Alton, Illinois. The first sign of trouble was a call from Palm Springs, in which Ford's secretary reported that the former president had to cancel his date because his staff had mistakenly booked him to speak at a meeting of the Michigan Bar Association the same day. There was no other time that Ford could speak for me, the caller said, before election day. To determine if some accommodation could be arranged, Bob Wichser, my assistant, called the Michigan Bar Association, only to learn that there was no conflict— no event was scheduled on the day in question.
I was puzzled. I had worked closely with Ford during the sixteen years he was Republican leader of the House, noting with admiration that he had never let disagreement on a policy issue keep him from campaigning for Republican congressmen seeking re-election. When I finally reached Ford by phone, he said, "Paul, I've got to be up-front with you. I've got to be candid. If I come out and support you, at every press conference I will be badgered and dogged with the question of how I could campaign for Reagan and then go and support Findley with his views on the PLO."
Despite these setbacks and the nationwide campaign against me, I won in 1980 with 56 percent of the vote. I assumed the worst was over. What more could the pro-Israeli activists do? Accordingly, I continued my endeavors for Middle East peace and did not anticipate the severe new challenges related to the Arab-Israeli dispute that were yet to come. In late 1981a federal court, responding to shifts in population, ordered boundary changes in my district that removed Jacksonville, my old hometown, and added, Decatur, the city with the nation's highest unemployment. Marginally Democratic before the border changes, the new district was now substantially so. In addition, local industry was in a deep depression and farmers were restless.
I was unopposed in the 1982 primary, but a strong Democratic opponent, Richard Durbin, emerged in the general election. Experienced and popular, he quickly picked up the resources that Robinson had amassed, including Robinson's list of. nationwide contributors. The Associated Press reported: "Israel's American supporters again are pouring
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money into an emotional drive to unseat Central Illinois Representative Paul Findley." On the plus side, Reagan's lieutenants were helping me this time. Vice President George H. W. Bush, my former House colleague, brushed aside pro-Israeli complaints from Texas and appeared at an event on my behalf in Springfield.
This time, re-election was not to be. I lost by 1,407 votes, less than 1 percent of the total cast. In a vote that close, almost any negative development could account for the difference. The attack by pro-Israel activists was only one of several factors. Nevertheless, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Washington's principal pro-Israel lobby, claimed credit for my defeat. In a report to a Jewish gathering in Austin, Texas, a few days after election day, Thomas A. Dine, the organization's executive director, said his forces brought 150 students from the University of Illinois to my district to "pound the pavements and knock on doors." He concluded, "This is a case where the Jewish lobby made a difference. We beat the odds and defeated Findley." He later estimated that $685,000 of the $750,000 raised by Durbin came from Jews. With my supporters raising almost exactly the same sum, the contest once again set a new state recording for total campaign spending.
No Ready Answers
The campaign to remove me from Congress started early in 1979 and spanned most of the next four years. It attracted the attention and financial resources of pro-Israel people in every state in the Union. Reports from friends suggested its national scope. Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, my seatmate on the House Agriculture Committee for six years, told me he heard pro-Israel leaders in Kansas speak with great emotional intensity about my candidacy both before and after election day. Clarence Palmby, the former undersecretary of agriculture, learned that my defeat was the principal 1982 political objective of the partners in a large New York City law firm.
After twenty-two years in Congress, losing was, of course, a disappointment. But my main reaction was wonderment. I was puzzled by the behavior of the pro-Israel activists. Why did they go to such trouble to eliminate me from Congress? WJvy did people from all over the country, who did not know me personally and very likely knew little of my
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record, dig so deeply into their own pockets, many of them contributing $1,000 to my opponents? What sustained this commitment for a four-year period?
Israeli activists could find few flaws in my voting record. Over the years I voted consistently for aid to Israel. Sometimes I was critical of Egypt and other Arab states. Even when, in an effort to force Israel to halt its attacks on Lebanon, I tried to get President Carter to suspend aid, I voted for all measures that authorized future military and economic aid to Israel. Interestingly, many Israelis and U.S. Jews shared my views about the Arab-Israeli dispute. Beyond Middle East policy, I supported causes that most Jews applauded: civil rights, community action programs, equal rights for women, a freeze on nuclear weapons, and normalization of relations with China.
Moreover, I was but one of 435 members of the House of Representatives. While senior among Republicans, I was just one of nine on the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee dealing with the Middle East. When I criticized Israel, whether I spoke in committee or on the floor of the House of Representatives, I almost always stood alone. Surely the lobby for Israel realized that I posed no serious threat. Could Israel's supporters not tolerate even one lonely voice of dissent?
Or was the lobby's goal to make an example of me in the Elizabethan tradition? According to legend, Queen Elizabeth occasionally hanged an admiral just to keep others on their toes. Was I chosen for a trip to the political gallows to discourage other congressmen from speaking out?
I could not reconcile the harsh tactics I experienced with the traditional Jewish advocacy of civil liberties, a record I had admired all my life. In Congress, I worked closely with Jewish colleagues, including Allard Lowenstein and Ben Gilman. In my wonderment, I pressed Doug Bloomfield, a friend on the AIPAC staff, for an explanation. He shrugged. "You were the most visible critic of Israeli policy. That's the best answer I can give." It was hardly adequate.
The unanswered questions led to others.
Do other congressmen have similar experiences? To be sure, those who speak out are few in number, but it seemed implausible that the lobby would target me alone. I wanted the facts. What about the president and the vast array of "movers and shakers" employed in the executive branch? What pressures, if any, do they experience? A lobby
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formidable enough to intimidate two former presidents of the United States must have great leverage at the highest levels of government.
What of those in other occupations? The lobby had forced Bob Hope to back down. Did it have similar power over people in different professions? On campus, for example, does tenure and the tradition of academic freedom give immunity to teachers and administrators from the kind of pressure I received? Do members of the clergy escape it? How about people in business, large and small? And, vitally important in our free society, how about reporters, columnists, editorial writers, publishers, and the commentators on television and radio?
Deep questions. To me, crucial questions.
There were no ready answers, so I decided to seek them. I began my quest by calling the Capitol Hill offices of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

Jurgen Graf : Holocaust or Hoax

http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/hoh/index.html

Germar Rudolf : Lectures on the Holocaust

http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/loth/
http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres7/lectures.pdf

RUDOLF Germar Auschwitz : Plain Facts

http://www.vho.org/aaargh/fran/livres5/apf.pdf

Arthur R. Butz : The Hoax of the Twentieth Century

http://www.vho.org/GB/Books/thottc/

2
King of the Hill
Washington is a city of acronyms, and today one of the best known in Congress is AIPAC. The mere mention of it brings a sober, perhaps furtive, look to the face of anyone on Capitol Hill who deals with Middle East policy. AIPAC—the American Israel Public Affairs Committee—is now the preeminent power in Washington lobbying.
In 1967, as a fourth-term congressman just named to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I had never heard of it. One day, in private conversation in the committee room, I voiced a brief criticism of Israel's military attack on Syria. A senior Republican, William S. Broomfield of Michigan, responded with a smile, "Wait till Si Kenen over at AIPAC hears what you've said." He was referring to I. L. Kenen, then executive director of AIPAC, whose name was just as unfamiliar to me as the organization he headed. I learned later that Broomfield was not joking. AIPAC sometimes finds out what congressmen say about Middle East policy even in private conversations, and those who criticize Israel do so at their political peril.
AIPAC is only a part of the Israeli lobby, but in terms of having a direct effect on public policy it is clearly the most important. The organization
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has deepened and extended its influence in recent years. It is no overstatement to say that AIPAC has effectively gained control of virtually all of Capitol Hill s action on Middle East policy. Almost without exception, House and Senate members do its bidding, because most of them consider AIPAC to be the direct Capitol Hill representative of a political force that can make or break their chances at election time.
Whether based on fact or fancy, the perception is what counts: AIPAC means power—raw, intimidating power. Its promotional literature regularly cites a tribute published in the New York Times: "The most powerful, best-run and effective foreign policy interest group in Washington." A former congressman, Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey, puts it more directly: Congress is "terrorized" by AIPAC.1 Other congressmen have not been so candid on public record, but many House and Senate members privately agree.
The Washington presence of AIPAC is only the most visible tip of this lobby. Its effectiveness rests heavily on the nationwide foundation built by U.S. Jews who function through more than 200 groups. A professional on the AIPAC staff says:
I would say that at most two million Jews are interested politically or in a charity sense. The other four million are not. Of the two million, most will not be involved beyond giving some money.2
Actually, those who provide the political activism for all organizations in U.S. Jewry probably do not exceed 250,000. The lobby's most popular newsletter, AIPAC s Near East Report, goes to about 60,000 people, a distribution that the organization believes is read by most U.S. citizens who take a responsibility in pro-Israeli political action, whether their primary interest is AIPAC, B'nai B nth, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish National Fund, the United Jewish Appeal, or any of the other main national groups. The newsletter is also sent, without charge, to news media, congressmen, key government officials, and other people prominent in foreign policy. AIPAC members get the newsletter as a part of their annual dues.
In practice, the lobby groups function as an informal extension of the Israeli government. This was illustrated when AIPAC helped draft the
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official statement defending Israel's 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, then issued it at the same hour that Israel s embassy did.3
No major Jewish organization ever publicly takes issue with positions and policies adopted by Israel.4 Thomas A. Dine, executive director of AIPAC from 1981 to 1993, spoke warmly of President Reagan's peace plan when it was announced in September 1982, but as soon as Israel rejected the plan, Dine fell silent. This close coordination sometimes inspires intragovernment humor. "At the State Department we used to predict that if Israel's prime minister should announce that the world is flat, within twenty-four hours Congress would pass a resolution congratulating him on the discovery," recalls Don Bergus, former ambassador to Sudan and a retired career diplomat.5
To Jewish organizations, however, lobbying Washington is serious business, and they look increasingly to AIPAC for leadership. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, deputy editor of the Washington Post editorial page, rates AIPAC as "clearly the leading Jewish political force in America today."6
AIPAC's charter defines its mission as legislative action, but it now also represents the interests of Israel whenever there is a perceived challenge to that country's interests in the news media, the religious community, on U.S. college campuses—anywhere. Because AIPAC's staff members are paid from contributions by American citizens, they need not register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In effect, however, they serve the same function as foreign agents.
Over the years the pro-Israel lobby has thoroughly penetrated this nation's governmental system, and the organization that has made the deepest impact is AIPAC, to whom even a president of the United States turned when he had a vexing political problem related to the Arab-Israeli dispute.
The Ascendancy of Thomas A. Dine

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 3

2008-08-15T10:47:00.000-07:00

The Ascendancy of Thomas A. Dine
In October 1983 President Ronald Reagan, faced with rising public opposition to the presence of U.S. Marines in Lebanon, sought help from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. The terrorist bombing that would kill more than 200 marines as they slept in their barracks at the Beirut airport was yet to come. Still, four marines had already died, three by sniper fire, and congressional concern was rising. Democratic
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Congressman Sam Stratton of New York, a veteran known for his hawkish views, called the marines "sitting ducks" and predicted heavy casualties. He wanted them out of Lebanon.
Others cited the War Powers Resolution and questioned whether the president had the authority to keep forces in a hostile environment such as Beirut for more than ninety days without the express approval of Congress. Some congressmen began drawing parallels between the marine presence in Lebanon and the beginnings of the disastrous U.S. experience in Vietnam.
President Reagan objected, as had his predecessors, to the restrictions imposed by the War Powers legislation. If he accepted its terms, he would have to withdraw the forces within ninety days or get Congress to approve an extension. If he insisted that the law did not apply because the situation was not hostile, events might quickly prove him wrong. Regardless, he would have a rebellious Congress on his hands.
Reagan decided to finesse the problem. He asked Congress for legislation that would allow him to keep the existing force of marines in Lebanon for eighteen months. This would please the "strict constructionists" who felt that the chief executive must live with the War Powers Resolution. It would also suit his own needs, because he was confident that the orderly removal of the marines would occur within the eighteen-month period.
Thanks to extraordinary help from an unlikely quarter, Reagan's plan had relatively clear sailing in the House of Representatives. Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, the most prominent elected Democrat in the nation, gave the legislation his strong support. To O'Neill, it was a question of patriotism, and enough Democrats answered his call to assure passage of the legislation in the Democrat-controlled body.
But the Senate, although controlled by his fellow Republicans, posed a more difficult problem for the president. An informal "nose count" showed a close vote and probably defeat. The president decided he needed help, and he enlisted the cooperation of Thomas A. Dine, the slender, aggressive, dark-haired young Capitol Hill staff veteran who then headed AIPAC.
Reagan's appeal to Dine for support on the marine issue was without precedent. The pending bill contained no money for Israel, and AIPAC and other Israeli lobby groups had kept hands off the Lebanon
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controversy. Pro-Israeli forces did not want other Americans to blame Israel if the marines should encounter more trouble. Certainly Israel already bore enough responsibility for U.S. problems in Lebanon.7 It had discreetly but effectively helped to engineer the original marine presence in Beirut by agreeing to withdraw its forces from Beirut in favor of a multinational force, provided the United States was included. (The multinational force would have been unnecessary had Israel not invaded Lebanon in the first place.) Although AIPAC privately wanted the marines to stay in Lebanon, under the circumstances its leadership preferred to stay in the background.
The White House call to Dine was exceptional for another reason: Reagan needed help with Senators who were normally his most stalwart supporters.8 The president was unsure of the votes of twelve Republicans, among them John Warner of Virginia, Dan Quayle of Indiana, William Cohen of Maine, and James A. McClure of Idaho. All were generally regarded as hawkish on military matters and all except McClure were strong supporters of Israel. Learning of the presidential plea, one AIPAC staffer said, "If the White House is worried about those votes, the bill is going down."
Despite its reluctance to get publicly involved in the sensitive issue, AIPAC made the calls. Nine of the twelve senators, including the four mentioned above, voted with the president and helped him win a narrow 54-46 victory.9
AIPAC's role in the outcome was not noted in most media reports of the dramatic event, but an elated President Reagan called Dine personally to express his thanks. Michael Gale, then handling White House relations with the Jewish community, provided a transcript of the conversation with the suggestion that AIPAC publicize it. AIPAC declined, preferring to maintain its low profile on the issue, so Gale gave the text to CNN's Wolf Blitzer, who at the time wrote for the Jerusalem Post and had previously written for AIPAC's Near East Report. The Post quoted Reagan as saying to Dine, "I just wanted to thank you and all your staff for the great assistance you gave us on the War Powers Act resolution. ... I know how you mobilized the grassroots organizations to generate support."10
"Well, we try to use the telephone," responded Dine. "That's part of our job. And we wanted to do it and will continue to do it. . . . We want to work together, obviously."
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Work together they did. The Reagan executive branch established a relationship with AIPAC of unprecedented intimacy. It was not the first time, however, that the White House or the State Department had turned to the lobbying group for help. Although these high level approaches are little known even on Capitol Hill, they actually occur every time foreign aid legislation is up for a vote. Whoever controls the White House finds that securing congressional approval of foreign aid is a challenge and, as the legislation includes economic and military aid to Israel, naturally looks to AIPAC for help. Except for a few humanitarian and church-related organizations, AIPAC serves foreign aid's only domestic constituency.
Without AIPAC, foreign aid legislation would not have been approved at the $15 billion-plus level in 2001, and might have difficulty surviving at all. A candid tribute to the lobby came from John K. Wil-helm, the executive director of the presidential commission that made recommendations in late 1983 on the future direction of foreign aid.11 Briefing a world hunger board at the State Department in January 1984, Wilhelm, a career veteran in the Agency for International Development, said the active support of the pro-Israeli lobby was "vital" to congressional approval of foreign aid. (In the early 1960s, when aid to Israel was modest—less than $100 million a year—a foreign-aid bill squeaked through the House of Representatives by a scant five votes. But AIPAC was then in its infancy.)
AIPAC also crafted the strategy that produced a $510 million increase in 1983 aid for Israel—an astonishing increase, considering it came just after the indiscriminate bombing of Beirut and complicity of Israeli forces in the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, events that aroused unprecedented public criticism of Israeli policy.
The administration opposed the 1983 increase but was outmaneu-vered. By the time Judge William Clark, who at the time was National Security Adviser to President Reagan, sent an urgent appeal to Republican Senator Mark Hatfield to block the increase, the issue was already settled. AIPAC had locked in support by persuading a majority on the Appropriations Committee that the increase was a simple question of being for or against Israel. No one wanted to champion the negative side.
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AIPAC had already confounded the administration on the House side, where the White House had argued against the increase for budgetary reasons, contending it would be at the expense of other needy countries. This argument was demolished when AIPAC lobbyists presented elaborate data showing how the extra aid to Israel could be accomplished without cutting support for other countries. An AIPAC lobbyist summed it up: "The administration lobbyists really didn't do their homework. They didn't have their act together." By 1984 the aid level had risen to over $2 billion a year—all of it in grants with no repayment required—and the approval margin was 112.
In February 1983 Secretary of State George Shultz named a "blue ribbon" panel of prominent citizens to recommend changes in the foreign aid program. Of the forty-two on the commission, twenty-seven were Senate or House members with primary responsibility for handling foreign aid legislation. The others had been prominent in administering foreign aid in years past.
Only one full-time lobbyist was named to the panel: AIPAC's executive director, Thomas A. Dine. To my knowledge, it was the first time that a lobbyist had been selected for such a prestigious government assignment, and Dines selection was particularly surprising because it put him in a close working relationship with the handful of people who formulate and carry out policy on the very matter AIPAC was set up to influence—aid to Israel.
A more enviable position for a lobbyist could hardly be imagined. Former Senator James Abourezk, head of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, commented:
It would make as much sense to let the president of Lockheed Corporation serve on a Defense Department board which decides what planes our air force will buy.
In November Dine took an even bigger step up the ladder of Washington prestige and influence.12 He was invited to the White House for a private meeting with National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane, President Reagan's closest advisor on day-to-day policy in the Middle East. On the agenda were two foreign policy topics of great sensitivity:
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the Lebanese situation and the proposal to help Jordan establish a rapid deployment force. Both of these issues were, of course, of vital interest to Israel. Dine's invitation came just a week after he received the President's jubilant phone call thanking him for his help in getting the War Powers Resolution authority extended.
In January 1984 Washingtonian magazine listed Dine among the most influential people in the nations capital.
Dine's reputation has even stirred Arab capitals. In 1984 King Hussein of Jordan publicly blamed AIPAC, in part, for the decline of U.S. influence and leadership for peace in the Middle East.13 He also criticized the inordinate influence of the Israeli lobby on U.S. presidential candidates. He said the candidates had to "appeal for the favors of AIPAC, Zionism, and Israel."
One development especially provoked the king: For ten days beginning in mid-March 1984, Dine personally took part in direct foreign policy negotiations with Undersecretary of State Lawrence S. Eagle-burger and National Security Adviser McFarlane.14 During one session, Eagleburger offered to withdraw a widely publicized proposal to sell antiaircraft missiles to Jordan if AIPAC would drop its support of legislation requiring the removal of the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
By then, King Hussein's sharp criticism of the United States—and AIPAC—had appeared in U.S. newspapers, and Dine knew it had strengthened congressional opposition to the sale of the missiles. At the time Eagleburger made his proposition, AIPAC already had forty-eight senators committed in opposition, and he received pledges from six more the next day.15 Thus, AIPAC was able to kill the sale without cutting a deal on other issues.
After he rejected Eagleburger's offer, Dine promised that AIPAC would cease active opposition to a proposal to help Jordan establish a rapid deployment force and would lobby to work out a compromise on the bill to transfer the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem if the administration would take two important steps: first, refuse to sell Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Saudi Arabia; second, issue a public letter announcing that it would engage in no further indirect communications with the Palestine Liberation Organization.16 Although the public letter
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did not appear, the administration backed away from the Stinger sales to both Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
Dine emerged from these negotiations with his prestige greatly enhanced. Richard Murphy, assistant secretary of state for Near East and South Asia affairs and the official charged with the development and administration of U.S. policies relating to the Middle East, was not invited to the Eagleburger-McFarlane-Dine negotiations, nor was he notified of the administrations decision to cancel the proposed sale of Stinger missiles until twelve hours after AIPAC received the information.
The Washington Post concluded that the episode "raised questions about the propriety of the administrations making deals on foreign policy issues with a private, special-interest organization." Dine had a ready response: "We think it's better to be strong and criticized, than weak, ignored, and not respected."
In part, the unprecedented presidential consideration was a tribute to Dines combination of ingratiating manner, tough, relentless spirit, and sheer dynamism. Under Dine, AIPAC's membership has risen from 11,000 to more than 50,000, and its annual budget had grown from $750,000 to more than $3 million.
Dine's influence was felt in power centers beyond the Oval Office. He received calls from presidential candidates as well as presidents, and he reported that former Vice President Walter Mondale "bounces ideas off us" before issuing statements on Middle East policy. And most congressional actions affecting Middle East policy were either approved or initiated by AIPAC.
Broadening the Network
To accomplish these feats for Israel—sometimes cooperating with the president of the United States, sometimes not—AIPAC's director utilized a team of hard-driving, able professionals and kept them working together smoothly. Policy lines were kept clear and the troops are well-disciplined. AIPAC's role is to support Israel's policies, not to help formulate them, so AIPAC maintained daily telephone communication with the Israeli embassy, and Dine's successor as executive director Howard Kohr met personally with embassy officials at least once a week.
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Although AIPAC has a small staff in comparison to other major U.S. Jewish organizations, it taps the resources of a broad nationwide network of unpaid activists. Annual membership meetings in Washington are a major way to rally the troops. Those attending hear prominent U.S. and Israeli speakers, participate in workshops and seminars, and contribute financially to the cause. The conferences attract top political talent: the Israeli ambassador, senior White House and State Department officials, and prominent senators and House members. Recent conferences featured Senators Tom Daschle of South Dakota and John McCain of Arizona, Representative Tom DeLay of Texas, former and current Israeli Prime Ministers Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, and Texas Governor George W. Bush—the year he was elected president.
The White House is also well represented at such conferences. While serving as Reagan's vice president, former U.S. president George Herbert Walker Bush assured AIPAC delegates that the Reagan administration would keep fighting against anti-Semitism at the United Nations and criticized three Democratic presidential candidates—Walter Mondale, Gary Hart, and Jesse Jackson—for being "soft on anti-Semitism."
Ties to other interest groups are carefully cultivated. Christian outreach was announced as AIPAC's newest national program, and Merrie White, a "born-again Christian," was introduced as the director of relations with the Christian community. According to Art Chotin, Dine's deputy, the goal was nothing less than to "bring that community into AIPAC." He noted the presence of fifty Christians representing thirty-five states as evidence of progress already made toward this end. White helped organize the annual Religious Roundtable Prayer Breakfast for Israel the following February. Chris Gerstein, AIPAC's political director, came to the position after seven years as special assistant to the president of the International Union of Operating Engineers.
AIPAC's coast-to-coast outreach is enhanced by its speaking program. Its officers, staff members, and representatives filled more than 900 dates in 1982 alone. Receptions are held in scores of smaller cities. "Parlor briefings" in the homes of Jewish leaders across the country help raise money to supplement revenue from membership dues. Social events on Capitol Hill help spread the word to the thousands of high school and college students who work as interns in the offices of senators and congressmen or in committee offices.
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Tours of Israel, which other Jewish groups arrange, help to establish a grassroots base for AIPAC's program. For example, in April 1982, the Young Leadership Mission, an activity of United Jewish Appeal, arranged for 1,500 U.S. Jews to take one-week tours. "The visitors were given a view of the magnificence you will find in any country," observed an AIPAC staff member. He said the tour had profound impact: "It built spirit for the cause, and it raised money. The pitch for funds was the final event. It came right after the folks walked out of the memorial to the Holocaust." The effect was awesome. "The tour directors have it down to a science," he reported. "They know how to hit all the buttons." The United Jewish Appeal and Israel share the proceeds. Larry Kraftowitz, a Washington journalist who attended a similar tour, calls the experience "profound." He adds, "I consider myself more sympathetic to the New Jewish Agenda goals [than current Israeli government policy], but I must say I was impressed."
Tours are not just for Jews. Governors, members of state legislatures, and community leaders, including news media personnel, are also given the opportunity for expense-paid tours of Israel. Trips are also arranged for our nation's leaders, especially those on Capitol Hill. While AIPAC does not itself conduct the tours, it facilitates the process. Over half the membership of Congress has traveled to Israel, about half on what is deemed official business at the expense of the U.S. government. With few exceptions, Jewish organizations or individuals paid the expenses of the rest.
Another group of potentially influential—but often overlooked— Washington functionaries that AIPAC tries to influence is made up of congressional staffers. AIPAC works with Israeli universities, who arrange expense-paid tours for staff members who occupy key positions. These annual trips are called the Hal Rosenthal Program, named for former Republican Senator Jacob Javits's staff aide, who was gunned down by a Palestinian terrorist on the first such trip.
AIPAC is as successful at keeping lawmakers from visiting Arab countries as it is in presenting only Israel's views. When the National Association of Arab Americans, working through the World Affairs Council of Amman, invited all congressmen and their spouses to an expense-paid tour of Jordan with a side trip to the West Bank in 1983, a notice in AIPAC's Near East Report quickly chilled prospects for participation. It
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questioned how Amman, without Israeli cooperation, could get the tourists across the Jordan River for events scheduled in the West Bank. It also quoted Don Sundquist, a Republican congressman from Tennessee, as expressing "fear" that if any of his colleagues accepted the trip they would be "used" by anti-Israeli propagandists. Only three congressmen made the trip. A 1984 tour was cancelled for lack of acceptances.
AIPAC's outreach program is buttressed by a steady stream of publications. In addition to "Action Alerts" and the weekly Near East Report, it issues position papers and monographs designed to answer, or often discredit, critics and to advance Israel's objectives.
The most controversial publication of all was an "enemies list" issued as a "first edition" in the spring of 1983. A handsomely printed 154-page paperback entitled The Campaign to Discredit Israel, it provided a "directory of the actors": 21 organizations and 39 individuals AIPAC identified as inimical to Israeli interests.
Included were such distinguished public servants as former Undersecretary of State George W. Ball, retired ambassadors Talcott Seelye, Andrew Killgore, John C. West, and James Akins, and former Senator James Abourezk. There were also five Jewish dissenters and several scholars on the list.
Seemingly unaware of the AIPAC project, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith almost simultaneously issued its own "enemies list," titled Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles and Voices. It too was identified as a "first edition," and lists thirty-one organizations and thirty-four individuals. These books were nothing more than blacklists, reminiscent of the worst tactics of the McCarthy era.
A similar "enemies list" was employed in AIPAC's extensive program at colleges and universities.
They Get the Word Out Fast
Through its "Action Alert" mailings, AIPAC keeps more than one thousand Jewish leaders throughout the United States informed on current issues. An "alert" usually demands action to meet a legislative challenge on Capitol Hill, requesting a telephone call, telegram, or, if need be, a personal visit to a reluctant congressman.
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The network can have almost instantaneous effect. One day I whispered to a colleague in the Foreign Affairs Committee that I might offer an amendment to a pending bill cutting aid to Israel. Within thirty minutes, two other congressmen came to me with worried looks, reporting that they had just had calls from citizens in their home districts who were concerned about my amendment.
Paul Weyrich, who worked as a Senate aide before becoming a political analyst, details the effectiveness of AIPAC:
Its a remarkable system they have. If you vote with them, or make a public statement they like, they get the word out fast through their own publications and through editors around the country who are sympathetic to their cause. Of course, it works in reverse as well. If you say something they don't like, you can be denounced or censured through the same network. That kind of pressure is bound to affect Senators' thinking, especially if they are wavering or need support.17
This activism is carried out by an elaborate system of officers, committees, and councils that give AIPAC a ready, intimate system for political activity from coast to coast. Officers meet once a month to confer with Executive Director Kohr on organization and management. Each of its five vice presidents can expect to eventually serve a term as president. A large executive committee is invited to Washington every three months for briefings. A recent national council listed more than 200 names. These subgroups include the leadership of most major U.S. Jewish organizations.
The AIPAC staff is not only highly professional and highly motivated but also thoroughly experienced. Prior to joining AIPAC, director Howard Kohr was a management fellow for the Department of Defense, deputy director of the National Jewish Coalition, and assistant Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee.
Lobbyists for AIPAC have almost instant access to House and Senate members and feel free to call them at their homes in the evening. Republican Congressman Douglas Bereuter of Nebraska, an exception, received no lobbyists, AIPAC or otherwise, but the doors were wide open to AIPAC lobbyists at the offices of almost all other congressmen. A congressional aide explained why:
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Professionalism is one reason. They know what they are doing, get to the point, and leave. They are often a useful source of information. They are reliable and friendly. But most important of all, they are seen by congressmen as having direct and powerful ties to important constituents.
The result is a remarkable cooperation and rapport between lobbyist and legislator. Encountered in a Capitol corridor one day, an AIPAC lobbyist said, "Tomorrow I will try to see five members of the House. I called this morning and confirmed every appointment, and I have no doubt I will get in promptly." Two days later, even he seemed somewhat awed by AIPAC's clout. He reported, "I made all five. I went right in to see each of them. There was no waiting. Our access is amazing."
This experience contrasts sharply with the experience of most other lobbyists on Capitol Hill. One veteran lobbyist reflected with envy on the access that AIPAC enjoys: "If I can actually see two congressmen or senators in one long day, its been a good one."
Despite its denials, AIPAC keeps close records on each House and Senate member. Unlike other lobbies, which keep track of only a few "key" issues voted on the House or Senate floor, AIPAC takes note of other activities, too—votes in committees, cosponsorship of bills, signing of letters, and even whether speeches are made. "That's depth!" exclaims an admiring Capitol Hill staff member.
An illustration of lobby power occurred October 3, 1984, when the House of Representatives approved a bill to remove all trade restrictions between the United States and Israel; 98.5 percent (416) voted in the affirmative, despite the strong opposition of the AFL-CIO and the American Farm Bureau Federation. The vote was 416-6 on legislation that normally would elicit heavy reaction because of its effect on markets for commodities produced in the United States.
As they voted, few were aware of a Commerce Department study that found that the duty-free imports proposed in the bill would cause "significant adverse effects" on U.S. producers of vegetables.18 Because the White House wanted the bill passed, notwithstanding its effects on jobs and markets, the study was classified "confidential" and kept under wraps. One congressman finally pried loose a copy by complaining bitterly—and correctly—to the White House that AIPAC had secured a copy for its own use.
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"I Cleared It with AIPAC"
Until his defeat in an upset on November 6, 1984, Congressman Clarence D. "Doc" Long, a seventy-four-year-old Democrat from Maryland, exemplified the strong ties between AIPAC and Capitol Hill. He delivered for Israel as chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, which handles aid to Israel.
The tall, gray-haired, former economics professor at Johns Hopkins University trumpeted his support: "AIPAC made my district their number one interest." AIPAC supported Long for a good reason: he held the gavel when questions about funding Israeli aid came up. The lobby wanted him to keep it. Chairmanships are normally decided by seniority, and next in line after Long was David Obey of Wisconsin, who earned lobby disfavor in 1976 by offering an amendment to cut aid to Israel by $200 million.19 "Doc" Long never had any misgivings about aid to Israel, and he helped his colleagues defeat Obeys amendment by a vote of 342-32.
Sitting at a table in the House of Representatives restaurant during a late House session in 1982, Long explained:
Long ago I decided that Id vote for anything AIPAC wants. I didn't want them on my back. My district is too difficult. I don't need the trouble [pro-Israeli lobbyists] can cause. I made up my mind I would get and keep their support.
The conversation turned to one of Obeys questions about the high levels of Israeli aid. Long said, "I cant imagine why Dave would say things like that." A colleague chided, "Maybe he's thinking about our own national interest."
In September 1983, Long led a battle to get U.S. marines out of Lebanon. He proposed an amendment that would have cut funding for the operation in sixty days. John Hall, a reporter who knew Longs close ties with the lobby, asked Long, "Are you sure this amendment wont get you in trouble?" Without hesitation, the congressman replied, "I cleared it with AIPAC." He was not joking. This was not the first congressional proposal to be cleared in advance with the Israeli lobby, but it was the first time the clearance had been specifically acknowledged in the public
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record. The proposal to cut aid to Lebanon provoked a lively debate but, opposed by such leaders as Speaker Tip O'Neill and Lee Hamilton of Indiana, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the measure failed, 274-153.
Although heavily supported by pro-Israeli interests—eighteen pro-Israel political action committees chipped in $31,250 for Long's 1982 re-election campaign—Long denies a personal linkage:
Nobody has to give me money to make me vote for aid to Israel. I've been doing that for twenty years, most of the time without contributions.
The money and votes that Israel's supporters provided to Long's candidacy were insufficient in 1984. Although pro-Israel PACs (political action committees) gave him $155,000—four times the amount that went to any other House candidate—Long lost by 5,727 votes, less than 3 percent of those cast. A factor in his defeat was advertising sponsored by people prominent in the National Association of Arab Americans, who attacked Long for his uncritical support of Israel's demands. Obey, Long's likely successor as chairman, was the only Democrat on the panel who did not accept money from pro-Israel political action committees.
"They Have Never Forgiven Me"
On one occasion, Israel's U.S. lobby had a hand in putting a vice president out of office. In a letter to me dated April 20, 1988, former Vice President Spiro T. Agnew credited AIPAC and other elements of Israel's U.S. lobby with keeping him from becoming president. Before resigning the vice presidency over corrupt payments dating from his career as governor of Maryland, Agnew was the idol of conservatives. They loved his caustic and sometimes entertaining attacks on liberals, whom he once called "nattering nabobs of negativism."
In the letter, Agnew said he was engaged in a second reading of my book, They Dare to Speak Out, and added:
Although you do not speak of my experience in your book, I trace the advent of my difficulties to a confrontation with this same lobby. In 1971, President Nixon wished me to visit Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to provide a little balance to the teeming of congressmen who run to Israel on the slight
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est pretext. The White House staff suggested that I also go to Israel, but I declined on the basis that doing so would substantially diminish the signal that my visits were trying to send to the Arab countries. AIPAC raised hell, and I received a torrent of letters and calls from Jewish friends and acquaintances as well as numerous requests for appointments with Jewish pressure groups. I stuck to my guns and did not visit Israel, and they have never forgiven me. And they made sure that I would not become president.
In subsequent correspondence, Agnew asked me not to place the text of his letter on the public record during his lifetime. In a curious twist to the Agnew history, I was among those who did not want him to succeed Nixon, but my reasons differed from those he ascribed to AIPAC. I was uneasy with Agnews brand of Republicanism in early 1973 and had a discussion with Senator Charles "Mac" Mathias (R-MD) and a few other Republicans over what, if anything, could be done to keep the vice president from becoming the party's presidential nominee in 1976. The question proved moot when, faced with corruption charges, Agnew resigned the vice presidency in October 1973. Richard Nixon resigned a year later. After serving a prison term, Agnew returned to private life as a business consultant. He died in 1996.
Outreach on an International Scale
AIPAC champions not only Israel s U.S. causes, but its international ambitions as well. The lobby recently began an international outreach program, serving Israels interests by facilitating U.S. aid to other countries. In 1983 it tried to help Zaire, Israels new African friend. Israel wanted Zaire to get $20 million in military assistance requested by President Reagan, but AIPAC decided against assigning the lobbying task to its regular staff. Instead, it secured the temporary services of a consultant, who buttonholed members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The amendment failed, but the effort helped to pay the debt that Israel incurred when Zaire extended full diplomatic recognition to Israel the previous year.
Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak viewed the initiative as the first step in an Israeli program "to broker aid favors for other pariahs on the congressional hit list to enhance its influence." They described this new effort by Israel as "an exercise of domestic political power by a foreign nation that raises troubling questions."
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Beyond AIPAC to the PAG
AIPAC differs from most lobbies in that it avoids endorsing candidates publicly and does not raise or spend money directly in partisan campaigns. Campaign involvement is officially left to private individuals and pro-Israel political action committees (PACs). More than 3,000 PACs are registered under federal law, and most are clearly affiliated with special-interest lobbies. There are fifty-three PACs that focus on support for Israel, although none lists an affiliation with AIPAC or any other Jewish organization.
The first pro-Israel political action committees were organized in 1979. By 1982 they had mushroomed to a total of thirty-one. Pro-Israel PACs contributed more than $1.8 million to 268 different election campaigns during the 1981-82 Federal Election Commission reporting cycle, putting them in the highest political spending range.20 By mid-August 1984, the list had increased to seventy-five PACs, and they had accumulated $4.25 million for the 1984 federal elections.
These numbers dropped significantly by the 1999-2000 election cycle, in which fifty-three pro-Israel PACs distributed approximately $2 million among 316 campaigns. The reason for this decline is that individual fund-raisers have largely supplanted PACs as the primary means of raising pro-Israel money for candidates. The decline in the number of pro-Israel PACs does not, therefore, indicate a decline in pro-Israel activism. According to former Democratic National Committee head Steve Grossman, who has raised hundreds of thousands of dollars for pro-Israel candidates, "The record will show there is far more money going to pro-Israel candidates than during the days when PACs were created." This isn't to say that pro-Israel PACs have completely ceased their activities: "Since a contribution of $10,000 can't really make a difference, what we try to do is thank our friends," says Morris Amitay, who heads the pro-Israel Washington PAC.21
Few of these PACs bear names or other information disclosing their pro-Israeli interest, nor do any list affiliations with AIPAC or other pro-Israeli or Jewish organizations. Most choose to obscure their pro-Israel character by using a bland title, such as the "Committee for 18," "Arizona Politically Interested Citizens," "Joint Action Committee for Political Affairs," or "Government Action Committee." Yet all are totally committed to one thing: Israel.
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"No one is trying to hide anything," protests Mark Siegel, founder of the pro-Israeli National Bipartisan Political Action Committee and a former White House liaison with the Jewish community. He insists that the bland names were chosen because "there are those in the political process who would use the percentage of Jewish money [in a given race] as a negative." The PAC Siegel heads was originally formed to help in the late Senator Henry Jackson's 1978 presidential bid.
Norman Silverman, who helped to found the Denver-based Committee for 18, is more explicit, saying that the name selection became "an emotional issue." Some of the organizers, mainly younger people, wanted the committee's Jewish identity plainly set forth in its name. "Others," Silverman noted, "said they didn't want to be a member if we did that."
Richard Altman, former executive director of the highly influential—and exclusively pro-Israel—National Political Action Committee, spoke candidly about PAC contributions to the political process: "Money makes the political engine run. To elect a friend, you have to pay for it— and we're not the only ones who know that."22
As a matter of fact, AIPAC sometimes drops all pretenses of staying apart from fund-raising. For instance, a pro-Israel political action committee was organized in Virginia in 1983 during a workshop sponsored by AIPAC. In addition, financial help does not stop at United States borders. Jewish Americans living in Israel are solicited for political action in the United States. Newton Frolich, a former Washington lawyer who moved to Israel in 1977, founded the Jerusalem-based Americans in Israel Political Action Committee. Through the committee, Frolich says, Americans in Israel can "keep making their contribution" to the U.S. political process. The contribution comes back, of course, in the form of enormous U.S. grants to Israel—greater than to any other country.
A lobby veteran who is now engaged full-time in fund-raising worries about appearances. AIPAC's former executive director, Morris Ami-tay, feels that smaller local PACs are best and fears that large, well-publicized, national PACs may create the impression that Jews exercise too much political power. He founded the relatively small Washington Political Action Committee, which dispensed $193,722 in 106 races during the 1999-2000 elections.23
Too much or not, Jewish influence in fundraising is widely recognized. Given recent campaign finance reforms, the "middle-sized"
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contributions of individual donors have become especially valuable. Laws banning "soft money" prevent huge cash donations from corporations and extremely wealthy individuals to political parties. The focus is thus placed on individual donors, who by law may only contribute up to $2,000 directly to a candidate per election cycle, and up to $10,000 to a political action committee. Since PACs may contribute $10,000 per candidate, individuals often contribute the $2,000 limit directly to a candidate, and also the $5,000 limit to one or more PACs supporting the same candidate. In all, an individual donor can effectively contribute up to $57,000 to one candidate per election. Jewish donors are especially sought after. According to the Jewish weekly Forward, "... in the 1999-2000 election cycle, some twenty of the top fifty individual donors of soft money were Jewish."24 That kind of generosity is not ignored by politicians.
In August 1983 the Wall Street Journalreported that "several ranking Congressmen—most of whom wouldn't comment on the record for this story—say they believe the political effect of Jewish PAC money is greater than that of other major lobbies because it is skillfully focused on one foreign policy issue."
Focused it is. The pro-Israel PACs concentrate exclusively on federal elections and focus heavily on Senate races and on House members who occupy key foreign policy assignments. PAC leader Mark Siegel says that the PACs concentrate on the Senate because it is the "real battleground" on questions of foreign policy. In 1999-2000, PACs invested $1,083,101 in Senate races, with $961,505 going to House contests.25
Guided by AIPAC, PACs choose their targets with care. In 1982 when Lynn Adelman, a Jewish state senator in Wisconsin, mounted the first primary election challenge that Democrat Clement J. Zablocki had experienced in thirty years, AIPAC recommended against an all-out effort. AIPAC was unhappy with Zablocki's record, but did not consider him a problem. Furthermore, it concluded that Adelman could not win. Adelman received only $9,350 from thirteen pro-Israel political action committees. The contest made national news, because Zablocki was chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, through which all Israeli aid measures must go. Despite AIPAC's low-key recommendation, a letter soliciting funds for Adelman cited two "gains" if Zablocki lost: "Adelman's election not only means a friend of Israel in Congress, but also that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs will have a friend
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of Israel as its new chairman," referring to Dante Fascell of Florida, the Democrat who was next in line to succeed Zablocki. Zablocki was reelected by a two-to-one margin.
After the 1982 election—a year before he was elected chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee after the sudden death of Zablocki, Fas-cell remarked:
The whole trouble with campaign finances is the hue and cry that you've been bought. If you need the money, are you going to get it from your enemy? No, you're going to get it from your friend.26
"Our Own Foreign Policy Agenda"
Much of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's work in 1982 centered on expanding grassroots support, enlarging outreach programs ro the college and Christian communities, and helping pro-Israel political action committees sharpen their skills. These efforts were largely aimed at increasing the lobby's influence in the Senate. AIPAC wanted no repetition of its failure to block the 1981 AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia.
One way in which AIPAC increases the number of its Senate friends is illustrated by its interventions in a critical race in Missouri. AIPAC stood by a friend and won. Republican Senator John C. Danforth, an ordained Episcopal minister, was opposed for re-election by a Jewish Democrat, Harriett Woods. In the closely fought contest, the non-Jewish Danforth found that an unblemished record of cooperation brought him AIPAC support even against a Jewish challenger. The help was crucial, as Danforth won by less than 1 percent of the vote.
AIPAC also weighed in heavily in Maine, helping to pull off the upset victory of Democratic Senator George Mitchell over Republican Congressman David Emery. The Almanac of American Politics rated Mitchell "the Democratic Senator universally regarded as having the least chance for re-election." Defeated for governor by an independent candidate in 1974, he was appointed to fill the Senate vacancy caused when Senator Edmund Muskie resigned in 1980 to become President Carter's secretary of state. He had never won an election.
Encouraged by AIPAC, twenty-seven pro-Israel political action committees, all based outside Maine, contributed $77,400 to Mitchell's
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campaign. With this help, Mitchell fooled the professionals and won handily. In a post-election phone call to AIPAC director Thomas A. Dine, Mitchell promised: "I will remember you."
In another example, Republican Senator David Durenberger of Minnesota received for his 1982 re-election bid $57,000 from twenty pro-Israeli political action committees, with $10,000 of it coming from the Citizens Organized PAC in California. This PAC contributed $5,000 during a breakfast meeting four months after Durenberger voted against the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, and added $5,000 more by election day. Directors of the PAC include Alan Rothenberg, the law partner of Democratic National Chairman Charles Manatt.
In close races, lobby interests sometimes play it safe by supporting both sides. In the 1980 Senate race in Idaho, for example, pro-Israeli activists contributed to their stalwart friend, Democrat Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but also gave to his challenger, Republican Congressman Steven D. Symms. One reason for the dual support was the expected vote in the Senate the next year on the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia—during the campaign both Symms and Church were listed as opposing it. With the race expected to be close, the lobby believed it had a friend in each candidate and helped both.
Symms defeated Church by a razor-thin margin, but the investment in Symms by pro-Israeli interests did not pay off. By the time the new senator faced the AWACS vote he had changed his mind. His vote approving the AWACS sale helped to give AIPAC one of its rare legislative setbacks.
In a post-election review in its newsletter, Near East Report, AIPAC concluded that the new Senate in the 98th Congress would be "marginally more pro-Israel." As evidence, it noted that two of the five new senators were Jewish: Frank Lautenberg, Democrat of New Jersey, and Chic Hecht, Republican of Nevada, each "with long records of support for Israel." It could also count as a gain the election of Democrat Jeffrey Bingaman of New Mexico, who defeated Republican Senator Harrison Schmitt. Voting for the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia and opposing foreign aid had given Schmitt bad marks, and AIPAC gave its support to his challenger, Bingaman, in the campaign.
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Because favored candidates need more money than PAC sources provide, AIPAC also helps by providing lists for direct mail fundraising. The appeal can be hard-hitting. An example is the literature mailed in early 1984 on behalf of Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota. Fellow Republican Lowell Weicker wrote the introductory letter, citing him as a "friend of Israel in danger." He noted Boschwitz s key position as chairman of the subcommittee "that determines the level of aid our country gives to Israel," and praised his efforts to block military sales to Saudi Arabia. The appeal included tributes by Senator Bob Pack-wood and Wolf Blitzer, then the Washington correspondent for the Jerusalem Post.
AIPAC has convinced Congress that it represents practically all Jews who vote. Columnist Nat Hentoff reported this assessment in the Village Voice in June 1983 after a delegation of eighteen dissenting rabbis had scoured Capitol Hill trying to convince congressmen that some Jews oppose Israeli policies.27 The rabbis reported that several congressmen said they shared their views but were afraid to act. Hentoff concluded: "The only Jewish constituency that's real to them [congressmen] is the one that AIPAC and other spokesmen for the Jewish establishment tell them about."
An Ohio congressman speaks of AIPAC with both awe and concern:
AIPAC is the most influential lobby on Capitol Hill. They are relentless. They know what they're doing. They have the people for financial resources. They've got a lot going for them. Their basic underlying cause is one that most Americans sympathize with.
But what distresses me is the inability of American policy makers, because of the influence of AIPAC, to distinguish between our national interest and Israel's national interest. When these converge—wonderful! But they don't always converge.
After the 1982 elections, Thomas A. Dine summed up the significance of AIPAC's achievements: "Because of that, American Jews are thus able to form our own foreign policy agenda."28
Later, when he reviewed the 1984 election results, Dine credited Jewish money, not votes: "Early money, middle money, late money."29 He claimed credit for defeating Republican Senators Charles Percy of
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Illinois and Roger Jepsen of Iowa and Democratic Senator Walter Hud-dleston of Kentucky, all of whom incurred AIPAC's wrath by voting for the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. Dine said these successes "defined Jewish political power for the rest of this century."
Our allies are aware of Americas tendency to place lobby interests over the interests of the United States. After AIPAC blocked a $1.6 billion arms sale to Jordan, King Hussein complained, "The United States is not free to move except within the limits of what AIPAC, the Zionists, and the State of Israel determine for it." A Democratic senator conversing with a visiting European diplomat put it bluntly: "All of us here are members of Likud now."30
3
Stilling the Still, Small Voices

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 4

2008-08-15T10:46:00.001-07:00

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Stilling the Still, Small Voices
The youthful congressman from California listened as his House colleagues expressed their views. His earnest manner and distinctive shock of hair roused memories of an earlier congressman, John F. Kennedy. For more than an hour, between comments of his own, Representative Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey yielded the floor to othet congressmen, twenty-three in all. While they cooperated by requesting from Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill allocations of time for the debate, most of them did so in order to avoid a sticky issue. They were ducking legislative combat, not engaging in it.
Real debate was almost unknown regarding the subject McCloskey had chosen—aid to Israel. Most congressmen, fearing lobby pressure, carefully avoid statements or votes that might be viewed as critical of Israel. Not McCloskey. Admired for his courage and independence, he began opposing the Vietnam war long before most Americans. He withstood the lobbying of Greek Americans to cut off military aid to Turkey, consistently supported controversial civil rights measures, and now challenged conventional wisdom on Middle East policy. He and I were members of
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a tiny band of congressmen who were willing to criticize Israel publicly, and both of us would soon leave Capitol Hill involuntarily.
On that June afternoon in 1980, most of McCloskeys colleagues provided him debate time—and joined him in the discussion—because they saw this as the only way to keep him from forcing them to vote on an amendment to cut aid to Israel. Some of them privately agreed with McCloskey s position, but they did not want his amendment to come to a vote. If that happened, they would find themselves in the distressing circumstance of reacting to the pressure of Israel s lobby by voting against McCloskeys amendment—and their own consciences.
In offering his amendment, McCloskey called for an end to the building of Israeli settlements in the territory in the West Bank of the Jordan River, which Israel held by force of arms.1 To put pressure on Israel to stop, he wanted the United States to cut aid by $150 million— the amount he estimated Israel was annually spending on these projects. In the end, tough realities led him to drop his plan to bring the amendment to a vote:
Friend and foe alike asked me not to press the amendment. Some of my friends argued that if I did get a roll call, the amendment would have been badly defeated. If that happened, they argued, Israel would take heart—saying "Sure, somebody spoke out, but look how we smashed him." Every Jewish congressman on the floor of the House told me privately that I was right.2
Representative James Johnson, a Republican from Colorado and one of the few to support McCloskey, was aware of the pressure other congressmen were putting on him.3 Johnson declared that many of his colleagues privately opposed Israels expansion of settlements, but said that Congress was "incapable" of taking action contrary to Israeli policy: "I would just like to point out the real reason that this Congress will not deal with the gentleman's amendment is because [it] concerns the nation of Israel."
It was not the first time peer pressure had stopped amendments viewed as anti-Israeli, and McCloskey was not the first to back down to accommodate colleagues. Such pressure develops automatically when amendments restricting aid to Israel are discussed. Many congressmen are embarrassed by the high level of aid—Israel receives one-third of all U.S. foreign aid—and feel uncomfortable being recorded as favoring it.
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But, intimidated by Israel's friends, they are even less comfortable being recorded in opposition. How much of the lobby's power is real, and how much is illusion, is beside the point. Because they perceive it as real, few congressmen wish to take a chance. Worrying endlessly about political survival, they say: "Taking on the Israeli lobby is something I can do without. Who needs that?" On several occasions, sensing I was about to force a troublesome vote on aid to Israel, a colleague would whisper to me, "Your position on this is well known. Why put the rest of us on the spot?"
Most committee action, like the work of the full House, is open to the public, and none occurs on Israeli aid without the presence of at least one representative of AIPAC. This ensures that any criticism of Israel will be quickly reported to key constituents. The offending congressman may have a rash of angry telephone messages to answer by the time he returns to his office from the hearing room.
Lobbyists for AIPAC are experts on the personalities and procedures of the House. If Israel is mentioned, even behind closed doors, they quickly get a full report of what transpired. The lobbyists know that a roll call vote on aid to Israel will receive overwhelming support. In fact, administration lobbyists count on this support to carry the day for foreign aid worldwide. Working together, the two groups of lobbyists pursue a common interest by keeping the waters smooth and by frustrating "boat rockers" like McCloskey.
Assaulting the Citadels
For McCloskey, compromise was an unusual experience. Throughout his public career he usually resisted pressures, even when his critics struck harshly.
This was true when he became nationally prominent as a critic of the Vietnam war—an effort that, in 1972, led him to a brief but dramatic campaign for the presidency.4 His goal was a broad and unfettered discussion of public issues, particularly the war. The wrong decisions, he believed, generally "came about because the view of the minority was not heard or the view of thinking people was quiet."5 He contended that the Nixon administration was withholding vital information on a variety of issues. He charged it with "preying on people's fear, hate, and anger."6
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When McCloskey announced his bid for the presidency, his supporters sighed, "Political suicide." His opponents, particularly those in the party's right wing, chortled the very same words. Although the Cal-ifornian recognized that his challenge might jeopardize his seat in Congress, he nevertheless denounced the continuation of the war: "Like other Americans, I trusted President Nixon when he said he had a plan to end the war."7 McCloskey agonized over the fact that thousands of U.S. soldiers continued to die, and that U.S. airpower, using horrifying cluster bombs, rained violence on civilians in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.8
McCloskey knew of war's effects firsthand.9 As a marine in Korea, he was wounded while leading his platoon in one of several successful bayonet assaults on entrenched enemy positions. He emerged from the Korean war with a Navy Cross, a Silver Star, and two Purple Hearts. He later explained that this wartime experience gave him "a strong sense of being lucky to be alive."10 It also toughened him for subsequent assaults on entrenched enemies of a different sort—endeavors that brought no medals for bravery.
For protesting the war, McCloskey was branded "an enemy of the political process," and even accused of communist leanings.11 "At least fifty right-wing members of the House believe McCloskey to be the new Red menace," wrote one journalist.12 The allegation was ridiculous, of course, but party stalwarts in California clearly were restive. So much so, according to the California Journal, that McCloskey "needed the personal intervention of then Vice President Gerald R. Ford to save him in the 1974 primary."
His maverick ways exacted a price. He was twice denied a place on the Ways and Means Committee.13 Conservatives on the California delegation rebuffed the liberal Republican's bid for membership, even though he was entitled to the post on the basis of seniority.
By the time of his ill-fated 1980 amendment on aid to Israel, McCloskey had put himself in the midst of the Middle East controversy. After a trip to the Middle East in 1979, he concluded that new Israeli policies were not in America's best interests. He was alarmed over Washington's failure to halt Israel's construction of West Bank settlements— which the administration itself had labeled illegal—and to stop Israel's illegal use of U.S.-supplied weapons. The congressman asked, "Why?"
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The article appeared shortly before McCloskey's bid for his party's nomination for the 1982 senatorial race in California. It was an
The answer was not hard to find. The issue, like most relating to the Middle East, was too hot for either Congress or the White House to handle. A call for debate provoked harsh press attacks and angry constituent mail. To McCloskey, the attacks were ironic. He viewed himself as supportive of both Jewish and Israeli interests. As a college student at Stanford University in 1948, he had helped lead a successful campaign to open Phi Delta Theta fraternity for the first time to Jewish students.14 He reminded a critic, Earl Raab of San Francisco's Jewish Bulletin, that he had "voted for all the military and economic assistance we have given to Israel in the past."15 McCloskey also vigorously defended Israel's right to lobby: "Lobbying is and should be an honorable and important part of the American political process."16 He described the American Israel Public Affairs Committee as "the most powerful [lobby] in Washington," and insisted that there was "nothing sinister or devious" about it.
Still, McCloskey had raised a provocative question: "Does America's 'Israeli lobby' wield too much influence?"17 In an article for the Los Angeles Times he provided his answer: "Yes, it is an obstacle to real Mideast peace." McCloskey cited the risk of nuclear confrontation in the Middle East and the fundamental differences between the interests of Israel and the United States. He observed that members of the Jewish community demand that Congress support Israel in spite of these differences. This demand, he argued, "coupled with the weakness of Congress in the face of any such force, can prevent the president, in his hour of both crisis and opportunity, from having the flexibility necessary to achieve a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace."
He pleaded for full discussion:
If the United States is to work effectively toward peace in the Mideast, the power of this lobby must be recognized and countered in open and fair debate. I had hoped that the American Jewish community had matured to the point where its lobbying efforts could be described and debated without raising the red flag of anti-Semitism. ... To recognize the power of a lobby is not to criticize the lobby itself.
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I hesitate to use the term that he was anti-Semitic. Being anti-Israeli is a political decision. Being anti-Semitic is something totally different. I think he did not just creep over the boundary.
unorthodox opening salvo, to say the least, and most of the reaction was critical. One of the exceptions was an analysis by California's Redlands Daily Facts, which called his campaign a "brave but risky business."18 The newspaper described him as "the candidate for those who want a man with whom they will disagree on some issues, but who has the courage of his intelligent convictions."
On the other hand, Paul Greenberg, in a syndicated article in the San Francisco Examiner, wrote that McCloskey had accused the Israeli lobby of "busily subverting the national interest," and he linked him with notorious anti-Semite Gerald L. K. Smith.19 This time, McCloskey did not need to fight back. A few days later, the same newspaper published an opposing view.20 Columnist Guy Wright noted that Greenberg had accused McCloskey of McCarthy-era tactics without quoting "a single line from the offensive speech." Wright observed that this was itself a common tactic of McCarthyism. He cited with approval several of McCloskeys recommendations on foreign policy and concluded: "Now I ask you. Are those the ravings of an anti-Semite? Or fair comment on issues too long kept taboo?"
Such supportive voices were few. An article in the B'nai B'rith Messenger charged that McCloskey had proposed that all rabbis be required to register as foreign agents, declaring that he had made the proposal in a meeting with the editors of the Los Angeles Times.2' The author assured his readers that the tidbit came from a "very reliable source," and the charge was published nationally. The charge was a complete fabrication, and Times editor Tony Day was quick to back up McCloskeys denial.22
The Messenger published a retraction a month later, but the accusation lingered on.23 The Washington office of the Israeli lobby was apparently not even aware of the retraction. In an interview about McCloskey two years later, Douglas Bloomfield, legislative director for AIPAC, repeated the accusation as fact.24 Such false information may have colored his view of McCloskey, whom he described as "bitter" with "an intense sense of hostility" toward Jews:
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Despite the Messengers retraction, there was no letup in criticism of McCloskey. The Messenger charged McCloskey with denigrating "the Constitutional exercise of petitioning Congress," with "obstreperous performances," and with marching on a "platform of controversy unmindful of the fact that the framework of his platform is dangerously undermined with distortion, inaccuracy, and maybe even malicious mischief."25 Another Jewish publication published his picture with the caption, "Heir to Goebbels."26 An article in the Heritage Southwest Jewish Press used such descriptive phrases as "No. 1 sonovabitch," "obscene position against the Jews of America," "crummy," and "sleazy" in denouncing him.27
Although used to rough and tumble partisanship, McCloskey was shocked by the harshness of the attacks. No rabbis or Jewish publications defended him. One of a small number of individual Jews who spoke up on his behalf was Merwyn Morris, a prominent businessman from Ather-ton, California. Morris argued that "McCloskey is no more anti-Semitic than I am"—but he still switched his support to McCloskey's opponent in the senatorial election.28
Josh Teitelbaum, who had served for a short time on McCloskey's staff and was the son of a Palo Alto rabbi, resigned from McCloskey's staff partly because he disagreed with the congressman's attitude toward Israel. But he also defended his former employer: "McCloskey is not anti-Semitic, but his words may give encouragement to those who are."29
McCloskey's views on Israel complicated—to put it mildly—campaign fund-raising.30 Potential sources of Jewish financial support dried up. One former supporter, Jewish multimillionaire Louis E. Wolfson, wrote: "I now find that I must join with many other Americans to do everything possible to defeat your bid for the U.S. Senate and make certain that you will not hold any future office."31
Early in the race, when McCloskey was competing mainly with Senator S. I. Hayakawa for the nomination, he felt he had a chance. Both were from the northern part of the state, where McCloskey had his greatest strength. After Hayakawa dropped out and Pete Wilson, the popular mayor of San Diego, entered the contest, McCloskey's prospects decreased.
When the primary election votes were counted, McCloskey had won the North but lost the populous South. He finished 10 percentage points behind Wilson. Still, his showing surprised the experts. Polls and
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forecasters had listed him third or fourth among the four contenders right up to the last days. Congressman Barry Goldwater, Jr., the early favorite, emerged a poor third, and Robert Dornan, another congressional colleague, finished fourth.
The final tally on election day was close enough to cause a number of people to conclude that without the Jewish controversy McCloskey might have won. All three of McCloskeys opponents received Jewish financial support. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, deputy editorial page editor of the Washington Post, drew a definite conclusion: "Jewish political participation" had defeated McCloskey.
The lobby attack did not end when the polls closed, nor did McCloskey shun controversy. On September 22, 1982, a few days after the massacre of almost two thousand Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps near Beirut, McCloskey denounced a proposed new $50 million grant for Israel in a speech on the House floor.32 He warned that the action "might be taken as a signal of our support for what Israel did last Thursday in entering West Beirut and creating the circumstances which led directly to the massacre." Despite his protest, the aid was approved.
In the closing hours of the Ninety-seventh Congress, after fifteen years as a member of "this treasured institution," McCloskey invoked George Washington's Farewell Address in his own farewell, citing the first president's warning that "a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils."33 McCloskey found this advice "eminently sound" and said that Congress, in action completed the day before, had demonstrated a "passionate attachment" to Israel by voting more aid per capita to that country "than we allow to many of the poor and unemployed in our own country," despite evidence that "Israel is no longer behaving like a friend of the United States."
McCloskeys Academic Freedom
With his political career interrupted, if not ended, McCloskey planned to return to a partnership in the Palo Alto law firm he had helped to establish with John Wilson, a fellow graduate of Yale Law School, years before. "Many of my old clients are still clients," he said, "and I wanted to go back to them. I never thought of going anywhere else."34
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But others had different thoughts about McCloskey's future. Ken Oshman, president of the Rolm Corporation, the firm's biggest client, warned that his company "might take their law business elsewhere" if McCloskey were to rejoin the firm.35 The senior partners invited McCloskey to lunch. They told him that the episode would not cause them to withdraw their invitation, but that they wanted McCloskey to be "aware of the problem." McCloskey's response: "I don't want to come back and put you under that burden." In a letter to Oshman, McCloskey expressed his dismay. In reply, the industrialist said his company really wouldn't have taken its business elsewhere, but he reiterated his disagreement with McCloskey's views on Israel.
McCloskey accepted a partnership with the San Francisco law firm of Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, but the pressures followed him there.36 The firm received a telephone call from a man in Berkeley, California, who identified himself only as a major shareholder in the Wells Fargo bank, one of the law firm's major clients. He said that he intended to go to the next meeting of the shareholders and demand that the bank transfer its law business to another firm. The reason: the San Francisco firm was adding to its partnership a "known anti-Semite" who supported the Palestine Liberation Organization and its chairman, Yasser Arafat. McCloskey's partners ignored the threat, and the bank did not withdraw its business.
A tracking system initiated by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) assured that McCloskey would have no peace, even as a private citizen. The group distributed a memorandum containing details of his actions and speeches to its chapters around the country.37 According to the memo, it was designed to "assist" local ADL groups with "counteraction guidance" whenever McCloskey appeared in public.
Trouble dogged him even on the campus. McCloskey accepted an invitation from the student governing council of Stanford University to teach a course on Congress at Stanford.38 Howard Goldberg—a council member and also director of the Hillel Center, the campus Jewish club— told the group that inviting McCloskey was "a slap in the face of the Jewish community."39 Student leader Seth Linfield held up preparation of class materials, then demanded the right to choose the guest lecturers.40 McCloskey refused, asserting that the young director had earlier assured him he could choose these speakers himself.
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Difficulties mounted as the semester went on. Guest speakers were not paid on time. McCloskey felt obliged to pay such expenses personally, then to seek reimbursement. His own remuneration was scaled downward as the controversy developed.41 Instead of the $3,500 stipend originally promised, Linfield later reduced the amount to $2,000, and even that amount was in doubt. According to a report in the San Jose Mercury News, the $2,000 would be paid only if Linfield was satisfied with McCloskeys performance.42 One student, Jeffrey Au, complained to school authorities that the controversy impaired academic quality.43 Responding, Professor Hubert Marshall wrote that he viewed the student activities as "unprecedented and a violation of Mr. McCloskeys academic freedom."44
When the situation was finally resolved—by means of an apology from Provost Albert H. Hastorf—McCloskey told the Peninsula Times Tribune, "Stanford doesn't owe me an apology." He said his satisfaction came when all but one of the fifty students rated his class "in the high range of excellence," but he warned that other schools might face trouble. He noted that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee "has instructed college students all over the country to take [similar] actions."
McCloskey Goes to Court
AIPAC's endeavors did not stop McCloskey from seeking out justice in issues related to the Middle East. In 1993, the district attorney of San Francisco released 700 pages of documents implicating the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, a major Jewish organization that calls itself "a defender of civil rights," in a vast spying operation. The targets of the ADL operation were American citizens who were opposed to Israel's repression of Palestinians and to the South African government's policy of apartheid. The ADL was also accused of passing on information to both governments. After experiencing "great political pressure," the district attorney dropped the charges, prompting victims to file a suit against the ADL for violation of their privacy rights. They chose Pete McCloskey as their attorney.
McCloskey and his clients, two of whom were Jews who had been subjected to spying after criticizing Israeli policy in the occupied territories, revealed an extensive operation headed by ADL undercover oper
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ative Roy Bullock, whose files contained the names of 10,000 individuals and 600 organizations, including thousands of Arab Americans and national civil rights groups such as the NAACR Much of Bullocks information was gained illegally from confidential police records. In April 2002, after a nine-year legal battle, McCloskey won a landmark $150,000 court judgment against the ADL. His clients issued the following statement:
Many questions must still be answered about the activities of the ADL and its nonprofit status as an "education organization." The settlement offered by the ADL is recognition on its part that it could not afford to go to a trial in front of a jury and face the likelihood that more of its dirty secrets would be revealed.
It Didn't Cripple Us...." But—
While McCloskey, a leader in the white Republican establishment, battled for universal human rights and against further U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, a black Baptist preacher from the District of Columbia, known nationally as a street activist, pursued the same goals within Democratic ranks.
Good friends, both were members of the House of Representatives, and both undertook controversial journeys to Lebanon in behalf of peace. Both paid a price for their activism, but the preacher survived politically, while the ex-marine did not. Their work for justice in the Middle East—not their record of activism for civil rights at home or opposition to the Vietnam War—caused trouble for both of them.
In large measure, Reverend Walter Fauntroy's problems began over another black leader's endeavors for justice in the Middle East. Andrew Young resigned under fire as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in August 1979, after it was revealed that he had met with the PLO's UN observer, Zuhdi Labib Terzi. Many blacks were outraged by the resignation, blaming it on Israeli pressure and, like Young, found unreasonable the policy that prohibited our officials from talking even informally with PLO officials.45
Relations between American blacks and Jews—longtime allies in the civil rights movement—had already been strained by disagreements over
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affirmative action programs intended to give blacks employment quotas, and by Israel's close relations with the apartheid regime in South Africa. The resignation of Young, the most prominent black in the Carter administration, intensified the strain. "This is the most tense moment in black and Jewish relations in my memory," said the Reverend Jesse Jackson shortly after Young's resignation.
During the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Fauntroy, one of the blacks most disturbed by the resignation, had worked with Young in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) under Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. They had acquired the nickname "The Brooks Brothers" because of their habit of wearing suits and neckties at civil rights marches, while most of the other participants were dressed more casually.
To show support for Young and disagreement with U.S. policy, Fauntroy and SCLC President Joseph Lowery traveled to New York in the fall of 1979 to meet with Terzi.46 Fauntroy said he hoped to help establish communication between Arabs and Israelis and to promote a nonviolent solution to Middle East problems, adding, "Neither Andy Young nor I, nor other members of the SCLC, apologize for searching for the relevance of Martin Luther King, Jr. s policies in the international political arena."47
While Terzi said he was "happy and gratified" at the meeting with the black leaders and that he hoped "much more will be learned by the American people," prominent members of Washington's Jewish community were upset.48
"I don't think a responsible congressman should have any truck with terrorists," complained Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz.49 Although many American Jews echoed this sentiment, a few stood by Fauntroy. Prominent businessman Joseph B. Danzansky said Fauntroy "has a right to do what he thinks his position entitles him to do."50 Danzansky, a friend and political ally of Fauntroy, added, "I'd be very shocked if there were any trace of anti-Jewish feeling. I have confidence in him as a human being."
In an attempt to calm the critics and demonstrate their "fairness," Fauntroy, Lowery, and other SCLC leaders met with U.S. Jewish leaders and with Israel's UN ambassador, Yehuda Blum.51 Afterward, Fauntroy told reporters that the black leaders were "asking both parties [in the Middle East dispute] to recognize each other's human rights and the
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right of self-determination." But pro-Israel interests saw the outcome differently. Howard Squadron, president of the American Jewish Committee, emerged from the meeting to say that SCLC's contact with Terzi was "a grave error, lending legitimacy to an organization committed to terrorism and violence."32
Against this tense background, black leaders from across the United States convened in New York to express their concern ovet Young's resignation and to affirm their right to speak out on matters of foreign policy.
Some said they were making "a declaration of independence" in matters of foreign policy.53 Said Fauntroy:
In every war since the founding of this nation, black citizens have borne arms and died for their country. Their blood was spilled from Bunker Hill to Vietnam. It is to be expected that should the United States become drawn into war in the Middle East, black Americans once more will be called upon to sacrifice their lives.54
His words were prophetic of the sacrifices blacks were soon to make in Lebanon. While blacks constitute only 10 percent of the total U.S. population, 20 percent of the marines killed in the terrorist truck bombing in Beirut—47 of 246—were black.
Fauntroy's views led to a loss of financial support from Jewish donors. "It didn't cripple us," says Fauntroy, "it just made us more resourceful and more sensitive to our need to put principle above politics on questions that bear on nonviolence and the quest for justice."55 It hurt fund-raising for his personal campaign: "No question about that. Some of my former close supporters flatly stated to me that they were not going to contribute to my candidacy because I had taken the position that I did."
He demonstrated his persistence three weeks later when he joined Lowery on a controversial trip to the Middle East. As they departed, Lowery declated their determination to "preach the moral principles of peace, nonviolence, and human rights."56
In a meeting with Yasser Arafat, they appealed for an end to violence, asking the PLO leader to agree to a six-month moratorium on violence. Arafat promised to present the proposal to the PLO's executive council. Fauntroy recalls the dramatic moment, "We asked Dr. Harry Gibson of the United Methodist Church to pray. Then a Roman Catholic priest
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said a prayer in Arabic. We wept. At the end of the prayer, someone—I don't know who—started singing 'We Shall Overcome,' and Arafat immediately crossed his arms and linked hands."57
Some American Jews feared the emotional meeting symbolized a new "black alliance" with the PLO and a betrayal of their own support of civil rights for blacks. They rejected the black leaders' insistence that they were impartial advocates of peace.
At a news conference at his New Bethel Baptist Church, Fauntroy described his mission for peace and said he would persist: "I am first and foremost a minister of the gospel, called to preach every day that God is our father and all men are our brothers, right here from this pulpit."58 He added: "I could not be true to my highest calling if, when an opportunity to do so arose, I refused." He challenged his critics: "So let anyone who wishes run against me. Let anyone who wishes withdraw his support. It doesn't matter to me."
Reflecting on the problems created by his quest for self-determination of people in the Middle East, as well as in the District of Columbia, Fauntroy calls it "a growing experience." He continued to grow through the 1980s as a leading civil rights activist. His act of civil disobedience on behalf of the black people of South Africa—he refused to leave the office of the ambassador of South Africa until nine South African labor leaders were released, and was escorted out in handcuffs— focused national attention on the issue. His endeavors helped prompt Congress to impose economic sanctions against South Africa, a step that would eventually lead to the freeing of Nelson Mandela and the end of the apartheid regime.
"Three Calls Within Thirteen Minutes"

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 5

2008-08-15T10:44:00.001-07:00

"Three Calls Within Thirteen Minutes"
Only a few members of the House of Representatives have criticized Israeli policy in recent years, reflecting mainly the vigilance and skill of Israel's U.S. lobby. It reacts swiftly to any sign of discontent with Israel, especially by those assigned to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
A young man working in 1981 in the office of the late Democratic Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, who was then the leader of the House's "Jewish caucus," witnessed firsthand the efficiency of this monitoring. Michael Neiditch, a staff consultant, was with Rosen
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thai in his office one morning when, just before 9:00, the phone rang.59 Morris Amitay, then executive director of AIPAC, had just read the Evans and Novak syndicated column that morning in the Washington-Post, and he didn't like what he read.60 The journalists reported that Rosenthal had recently told a group of Israeli visitors: "The Israeli occupation of the West Bank is like someone carrying a heavy pack on his back—the longer he carries it, the more he stoops over, but the less he is aware of the burden." Rosenthal had personally related the incident to Robert Novak. Although he used the descriptive image "ever so gently," according to Neiditch, it caused a stir.
Amitay chided Rosenthal for speaking "out of turn." About five minutes later, Ephraim "Eppie" Evron, the Israeli ambassador to the United States, called with the same message. Then, just a few minutes later, Yehuda Hellman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations called. Again, the same message. Neiditch remembers that Rosenthal looked over and observed, "Young man, you've just seen the Jewish lobby's muscles flex." Neiditch recalls: "It was three calls within thirteen minutes."
Another senior committee member, an Ohio congressman who was more independent of Israel's interests than Rosenthal, nevertheless found his activities closely watched. Republican Charles Whalen felt the pressure of the lobby when he accepted a last-minute invitation to attend a February 1973 conference in London on the Middle East.61 It was held under the auspices of the Ford Foundation. No Israeli representative was present, but to his surprise, on his return to Washington, Whalen was called on by an Israeli lobby official who demanded all of the meeting's details—the agenda, those present, why Whalen went, and why Ford had sponsored it.
Whalen recalled, "It was just amazing. They never let up." Whalen believed it was the last such conference Ford sponsored. "They got to Ford," Whalen speculated, adding that the experience was a turning point in his own attitude toward the lobby: "If I couldn't go to a conference to further my education, I began to wonder, 'What's this all about?'"
A Minnesota Democrat had reason for similar wonderment after he left Congress. Richard Nolan, a businessman in Minneapolis, discovered the reluctance of his former colleagues to identify themselves
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with a scholarly article on the Middle East.62 He individually approached fifteen congressmen, asking each to insert in the Congressional Record an article that discussed the potential for the development of profitable U.S. trade with Arab states. Written by Ghanim Al-Mazrui, an official of the United Arab Emirates, it proposed broadened dialogue and rejection of malicious stereotypes. Under House rules, when such items are entered in the Record, the name of the sponsoring member must be shown. Nolan reports, "Each of the fifteen said it was a terrific article that should be published but added, 'Please understand, putting it in under my name would simply cause too much trouble.' I didn't encounter a single one who questioned the excellence of the article, and what made it especially sad was that I picked out the fifteen people I thought most likely to cooperate." The sixteenth congressman he approached, Democrat David E. Bonior of Michigan, agreed to Nolan's request. The article appeared on page E 4791 of the October 5, 1983, Record. It was one of those unusual occasions when the Congressional Record contained a statement that might be viewed as critical of policies or positions taken by Israel or, as in this case, promoting dialogue with the Arabs.
It was one of several brave steps by Bonior that made him a future target of Israel's lobby. Speaking before the Association of Arab American University Graduates in Flint, Michigan, two months before the 1984 election, Bonior called for conditions on aid to Israel, declaring that the United States has been "rewarding the current government of Israel for undertaking policies that are contrary to our own," including Israel's disruption of "U.S. relations with long-standing allies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia."
"An Incredible Burst of Candor"
Even those high in House leadership who represent politically safe districts are not immune from lobby intimidation. They encounter lobby pressure back home, and sometimes they vote against their own conscience.
In October 1981 President Reagan's controversial proposal to sell AWACS (intelligence-gathering airplanes) and modifying equipment for F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia was under consideration in the House. Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski, chairman of the Ways and
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Means Committee and one of the most influential legislators on Capitol Hill, got caught in the Israeli lobby's counterattack. It was the first test of strength between the lobby and the newly installed president. Under the law, the sale would go through unless both the House and the Senate rejected it. The lobby sttategy was to have the initial test vote occur in the House, where its strength was greater. A rejection by the House, it was believed, might cause the Senate to follow suit.
Under heavy pressure from the lobby, Rostenkowski cooperated by voting no. Afterward, he told a reporter for Chicago radio station WMAQ that he actually favored the sale but voted as he did because he feared the "Jewish lobby."63 He contended that the House majority against the sale was so overwhelming that his own favorable vote "would not have mattered." Overwhelming it was, 301 to 111. Still, the Israeli lobby's goal was to ensure the highest possible number of negative votes in order to influence the Senate vote. To the lobby, Rostenkowski's vote did matter very much.
Columnist Carl Rowan called Rostenkowski's admission "an incredible burst of candor."64 While declaring "it is as American as apple pie for monied interests to use their dough to influence decisions" in Washington, Rowan added, "There are a lot of American Jews with lots of money who learned long ago that they can achieve influence far beyond their numbers by making strategic donations to candidates. .. . No Arab population here plays such a powerful role." Rostenkowski, however, was not a major recipient of contributions from pro-Israeli political action committees. In the following year, his campaign received only $1,000 from such groups.65
While the lobby is watchful over the full membership of the House, particularly leaders like Rostenkowski, it gives special emphasis to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, where the initial decisions are made on aid, both military and economic.
Allegiance to Israeli interests sometimes creates mystifying voting habits. Members who are "doves" on policy elsewhere in the world are unabashed "hawks" where Israel is concerned. As Stephen S. Rosenfeld of the Washington Post wrote in May 1983:
A Martian looking at the way Congress treats the administration's aid requests for Israel and El Salvador might conclude that our political system
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makes potentially life-or-death decisions about dependent countries in truly inscrutable ways.*
Rosenfeld was intrigued by the extraordinary performance of the Foreign Affairs Committee on one particular day, May 11, 1983. Scarcely taking time to catch its breath between acts, the panel required the vulnerable government of El Salvador to "jump a series of extremely high political hurdles" in order to get funding "barely adequate to keep its nose above water," while, a moment later, handed to Israel, which was clearly the dominant military power in the Middle East, "a third of a billion dollars more than the several billion dollars that the administration asked for it." One of Israel's leading partisans, Congressman Stephen J. Solarz, spoke with enthusiasm for the El Salvador "hurdles" and for the massive increase to Israel.
Outdoing the United Jewish Appeal
Stephen J. Solarz, a hardworking congressman who for eighteen years represented a heavily Jewish district in Brooklyn, prides himself on accomplishing many good things for Israel. Since his first election in 1974, Solarz established a reputation as an intelligent "eager beaver," widely traveled, aggressive, and totally committed to Israel's interests. In committee, he seemed always bursting with the next question before the witness could respond to his first.
In a December 1980 newsletter to his constituents, he provided an unprecedented insight into how Israel—despite the budgetary restraints under which the U.S. government labors—is able to get ever-increasing aid. Early that year he started his own quest for increased aid. He reported that he persuaded Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to come to his Capitol Hill office to talk it over. There he threatened Vance with a fight for the increase on the House floor if the administration opposed it in committee. Shortly thereafter, he said, Vance sent word that the administration would recommend an increase—$200 million extra in military aid—although it was not as much as Solarz desired.
His next goal was to convince the Foreign Affairs Committee to increase the administration's levels. Solarz felt an increase approved by the committee could be maintained on the House floor. The firsr srep was
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a private talk with Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, the panel that would fust deal with the request. Tall, thoughtful, scholarly and cautious, Hamilton prided himself on staying on the same "wavelength" as the majority—whether in committee or on the floor. Never abrasive, he usually worked out differences ahead of time and avoided open wrangles. Representing a rural Indiana district with no significant Jewish population, he was troubled by Israel's military adventures but rarely voiced criticism in public. He guarded his role as a conciliator.
Solarz found Hamilton amenable: "He agreed to support our proposal to increase the amount of [military assistance] ... by another $200 million." That would bring the total increase to $400 million. Even more important, Hamilton agreed to support a move to relieve Israel of its obligation to repay any of the $785 million it would receive in economic aid. The administration wanted Israel to pay back one-third of the amount.
"As we anticipated," Solarz reported, "with the support of Congressman Hamilton, our proposal sailed through both his subcommittee and the full committee and was never challenged on the floor when the foreign aid bill came up for consideration." Democrat Frank Church of Idaho, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Jacob Javits, senior Republican—both strongly pro-Israeli—guided proposals at the same level smoothly through their chamber.
Solarz summed it up: "Israel, as a result, will soon be receiving a grand total of $660 million more in military and economic aid than it received from the U.S. government last year." He reflected upon the magnitude of the achievement:
Through a combination of persistence and persuasion, we were able to provide Israel with an increase in military-economic aid in one year alone which is the equivalent of almost three years of contributions by the national UJA [United Jewish Appeal].
In his newsletter Solarz said that he sought membership on the Foreign Affairs Committee "because I wanted to be in a position to be helpful to Israel." He explained that, while "most members of Congress, Republicans as well as Democrats" support Israel, "it is the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, and the Foteign Relations
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Committee in the Senate, who are really in a position to make a difference where it counts—in the area of foreign aid, upon which Israel is now so dependent."
Solarz s zeal was unabated in September 1984 when, as a member of the House-Senate conference on Export Administration Act amendments, he demanded in a public meeting to know the legislations implications for Israel.67 He asked Congressman Howard Wolpe, "Is there anything that the Israelis want from us, or could conceivably want from us that they weren't able to get?"68 Wolpe responded with a clear "no." Solarz pressed, "Have you spoken to the [Israeli] embassy?" Wolpe responded, "I personally have not," but he admitted, "my office has." Solarz tried again. "You are giving me an absolute assurance that they [the Israelis] have no reservation at all about this?" Finally convinced that Israel was content with the legislation, Solarz relaxed. "If they have no problem with it, then there is no reason for us to."
A veteran Ohio congressman observed:
When Solarz and others press for more money for Israel, nobody wants to say "No." You don't need many examples of intimidation for politicians to realize what the potential is. The Jewish lobby is terrific. Anything it wants, it gets. Jews are educated, often have a lot of money, and vote on the basis of a single issue—Israel. They are unique in that respect. For example, antiabortion supporters are numerous but not that well educated, and don't have that much money. The Jewish lobbyists have it all, and they are political activists on top of it.69
He divided his colleagues into four groups:
For the first group, it's rah, rah, give Israel anything it wants. The second group includes those with some misgivings, but they don't dare step out of line; they don't say anything. In the third group are congressmen who have deep misgivings but who won't do more than try quietly to slow down the aid to Israel. Lee Hamilton is an example. The fourth group consists of those who openly question U.S. policy in the Middle East and challenge what Israel is doing. Since Findley and McCloskey left, this group really doesn't exist anymore.
He put himself in the third group: "I may vote against the bill authorizing foreign aid this year for the first time. If I do, I will not state my reason."
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Solarz never wavered in his commitment to Israel. A 1992 taped conversation with former AIPAC president David Steiner revealed that the organization was involved in "negotiations" with newly elected President Bill Clinton over who would become the new secretary of state— Solarz was AIPAC's leading preference.
Another congressman, although bringing much the same level of commitment when he first joined the committee, later underwent a change.70
"Bleeding a Little Inside"
Democratic Congressman Mervyn M. Dymally, former lieutenant governor of California, came to Washington in 1980 with perfect credentials as a supporter of Israel. He said, "When you look at black America, I rank myself second only to Bayard Rustin in supporting Israel over the past twenty years."71 Short, handsome, and articulate, Dymally was the first black American to go to Israel after both the 1967 and 1973 wars.
In his successful campaign for lieutenant governor, he spoke up for Israel in all the statewide Democratic canvasses. He cofounded the Black Americans in Support of Israel Committee, organized pro-Israeli advertising in California newspapers, and helped to rally other black officials to the cause. In Congress, he became a dependable vote for Israeli interests as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
Nevertheless, in 1982 the pro-Israeli community withdrew its financial support of Dymally. The following year, the AIPAC organization in California marked him for defeat, and began seeking a credible opponent to run against him in 1984. Explaining this sudden turn of events, Dymally cited two "black marks" against his pro-Israeli record in Congress. First, he "occasionally asked challenging questions about aid to Israel in committee"; although his questions were mild and not frequent, he stood out because no one else was even that daring. Second—far more damning in the eyes of AIPAC—he met twice with PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Both meetings were unplanned. The first encounter took place in 1981 during a visit to Abu Dhabi, where Dymally stopped to meet the local minister of planning while on his way back from a foreign policy conference in southern India.72 The minister told him he had just met with Arafat and asked Dymally if he would like to see him. Dymally recalled, "I was too chicken to say no,' but I thought I was safe
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in doing it. I figured Arafat would not bother to see an obscure freshman congressman, especially on such short notice."
To his surprise, Arafat invited him for an immediate appointment. This caused near panic on the part of Dymally's escort, an employee of the U.S. embassy, who was taking Dymally on his round of appointments in the ambassador's car, a vehicle bedecked with a U.S. flag on the front fender. Sensitive to the U.S. ban on contact between administration personnel and PLO officials, the flustered escort removed the flag, excused himself, and then directed the driver to deliver Dymally to the Arafat appointment. "He was really in a sweat," Dymally recalled.
After a brief session with Arafat, he found a reporter for the Arab News Service waiting outside. Dymally told him Arafat expressed his desire for a dialogue with the United States. That night Peter Jennings reported from London to a nationwide American audience over ABC's evening news program that Dymally had become the first congressman to meet Arafat since Ronald Reagan was elected president. The news caused an uproar in the Jewish community, with many Jews doubting Dymally's statement that the meeting was unplanned. Stella Epstein, a Jewish member of Dymally's congressional staff, quit in protest.
Dymally met the controversial PLO leader again in 1982 in a similarly coincidental way.73 He had gone to Lebanon with his colleagues, Democrats Mary Rose Oakar of Ohio, Nick Rahall of West Virginia, and David E. Bonior of Michigan, and Republican Pete McCloskey to meet with Lebanese leaders, visit refugee camps, and view the effects of the Israeli invasion. Dymally was shocked by what he saw. "There's no way you can visit those [Palestinian] refugee camps without bleeding a little inside," he said. After the group's arrival they accepted an invitation to meet with Arafat, who was then under siege in Beirut.
Dymally's trouble with the Jewish community grew even worse. Dymally was wrongly accused of voting in 1981 for the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. He actually voted the way the Israeli lobby wanted him to vote, against the sale. Moreover, to make his position explicit, during the House debate he stated his opposition in two separate speeches.74 He made the second speech, which was written for him by one of his supporters, Max Mont of the Jewish Labor Committee, "because Mont complained that the first was not strong enough," Dymally explained.
Still, the message either did not get through or was conveniently forgotten. Carmen Warshaw, long prominent in Jewish affairs and Demo
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cratic Party politics in California—and a financial supporter of his campaigns—accosted Dymally at a public dinner and said, "I want my money back."75 Dymally responded, "What did I do, Carmen?" She answered, "You voted for AWACS."
Dymally found membership on the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on the Middle East a "no win" situation. He has alienated people on both sides. While one staff member quit in protest when he met Arafat, another, Peg McCormick, quit in protest when he voted for a large aid package that included money to build warplanes in Israel.76
For a time, Dymally stopped complaining and raising questions about Israel in committee. Asked why by the Wall Street Journal, he cited the lobby's role in my own loss in 1982 to Democrat Richard J. Durbin. He told the Journal reporter, "There is no question the Findley-Durbin race was intimidating."77 Dymally found intimidation elsewhere as well. Whenever he complained, he said, he received a prompt visit from an AIPAC lobbyist, who was usually accompanied by a Dymally constituent.78 He met one day with a group of Jewish constituents, "all of them old friends," and told them that, despite his grumbling, in the end he always voted for aid to Israel. He said: "Not once, I told them, have I ever strayed from the course." One of his constituents spoke up and said, "That's not quite right. Once you abstained." "They are that good," marveled Dymally. "The man was right."
Fourteen Freshmen Save the Day
Under the watchful eye of Israel's lobby, congressmen will go to extreme measures to help move legislation to provide aid to Israel. Just before Congress adjourned in December 1983, a group of freshmen Democrats helped the cause by taking the extraordinary step of changing their votes in the printed record of proceedings, a step congressmen usually shun because it makes them look indecisive. This day, however, under heavy pressure from pro-Israel constituents, the first-term members buckled and agreed to switch in order to pass a piece of catchall legislation known as a Continuing Resolution. The resolution provided funds for programs that Congress had failed to authorize in the normal fashion, among them aid to Israel. Passage would prevent any interruption in this aid.79
For once, both the House Democratic leadership and AIPAC were caught napping. Usually in complete control of all legislative activities
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that relate to Israel, AIPAC failed to detect the brewing rebellion. Concern over the budget deficit and controversial provisions in the bill for Central America led these freshman Democrats to oppose their own leadership. Unable to offer amendments, they quietly agreed among themselves to oppose the whole package.
When the roll was called, the big electric board over the Speaker s desk showed defeat—the resolution was rejected, 206-203.80 Twenty-four first-term Democrats had deserted the leadership and voted no. Voting no did not mean they opposed Israeli aid. Some of them, concerned over the federal deficit, viewed their vote as a demand to the leadership to schedule a bill raising taxes. For others, it was simply a protest. But for Israel it was serious.
"The Jewish community went crazy," a Capitol Hill veteran recalls. AIPAC's professionals went to work.81 Placing calls from their offices just four blocks away, they activated key people in the districts of a selected list of the errant freshmen. They arranged for "quality calls" to individuals who had played a major role in the recent congressional election. Each person activated was to place an urgent call to his or her congressman, insist on getting through personally, and use this message:
Approval of the Continuing Resolution is very important. Without it, Israel will suffer. I am not criticizing your vote against it the first time. I am sure you had reasons. However, I have learned that the same question will come up for vote again, probably tomorrow. I speak for many of your friends and supporters in asking that you change your vote when the question comes up again.
Each person was instructed to report to AIPAC after making the calls. The calls were accordingly made and reported. The House of Representatives took up the question at noon the next day. It was the same language, word for word, that the House had rejected two days before. Silvio Conte, senior Republican on the Appropriations Committee, knowing the pressure that had been applied, challenged the freshmen Democrats to "stick to their guns" as "men of courage."82 Republican leader Bob Michel chided those unable to "take the heat from on high."83
Some of the heat came, of course, from the embarrassed Democratic leadership, but AIPAC was the institution that brought about changes in votes. On critical issues, congressmen responded to pressures from home, and, in such circumstances, House leaders had little leverage. To Repub
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Approximately 6,000 jobs would be lost as a direct result of taking the $250 million out of the U.S. economy and allowing Israel to spend it on defense articles and services which can just as easily be purchased here in the United
licans Conte and Michel, the main issue was the need for budgetary restraint.84 They argued that the measure should be rejected for that reason. During the debate, no one mentioned that day—or any other day— the influence of the Israeli lobby.
The urgent telephone messages from home carried the day. When the roll was called, fourteen of the freshmen—a bit sheepishly—changed their votes.85 They were: C. Robin Britt (NC), Jim Cooper (TN), Richard J. Durbin (IL), Edward J. Feighan (OH), Sander M. Levin (MI), Frank McCloskey (IN), Bruce A. Morrison (CT), James R. "Jim" Olin (VA), Timothy J. Penny (MN), Harry M. Reid (NV), Bill Richardson (NM), Norman Sisisky (VA), John M. Spratt, Jr. (SC), and Harley O. Staggers, Jr. (WV).
To give the freshmen an excuse they could use in explaining their embarrassing shift, the leadership promised to bring up a tax bill. Everyone knew it was just a ploy—the tax bill had no chance to become law. But the excuse was helpful, and the resolution was approved 224-189.86 The flow of aid to Israel continued without interruption.
Subsidizing Fnreign Competition

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 6

2008-08-15T10:42:00.000-07:00

Subsidizing Fnreign Competition
The final vote on the 1983 Continuing Resolution authorized a remarkable new form of aid to Israel. It included an amendment, crafted by AIPAC and sponsored by ardently pro-Israeli Congressmen Clarence Long of Maryland and Jack Kemp of New York, that permitted $250 million of the military grant aid to be spent in Israel on the development of a new Israeli fighter aircraft, the Lavi. The new fighter would compete for international sales with the Northrop F-20 and the General Dynamics R16— both specifically designed for export. The amendment authorized privileged treatment never before extended to a foreign competitor. It was extraordinary for another reason: it set aside a U.S. law that requires all foreign aid procurement funds to be spent in the United States.
During debate of the bill, Democrat Nick J. Rahall of West Virginia, was the only congressman who objected.87 He saw the provision as threatening U.S. jobs at a time of high unemployment:
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States. Americans are being stripped of their tax dollars to build up foreign industry. They should not have to sacrifice their jobs as well.
That day, Rahall was unable to offer an amendment to strike or change this provision because of restrictions the House had established before it began debate. All that he, or any other member, could do was to vote for or against the entire Long-Kemp amendment, which included controversial provisions for El Salvador and international banks, as well as aid to Israel. The amendment was approved 262-150. Unlike RahalPs, most of the 150 negative votes reflected opposition to other features of the amendment, not to the $250 million subsidy to Israel's aircraft industry.
The following May, during the consideration of the bill appropriating funds for foreign aid, Rahall offered an amendment to eliminate the $250 million, but it was defeated 379-40. Despite the amendment's obvious appeal to constituents connected with the U.S. aircraft industry, fewer than 10 percent of House members voted for it. It was the first roll call vote on an amendment dealing exclusively with aid to Israel in more than four years, and the margin of defeat provided a measure of AIPAC's power.
After the vote, AIPAC organized protests against the forty legislators who had supported the amendment. Rahall recalls that AIPAC carried out a campaign "berating those brave forty congressmen."88 He adds, "Almost all of those who voted with me have told me they are still catching hell from their Jewish constituency. They are still moaning about the beating they are taking."
The "brave" congressmen got little thanks.89 Two ethnic groups, the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the National Association of Arab Americans, congratulated Rahall on his initiative and urged their members to send letters of congratulation to each of the congressmen who supported his amendment. The results were meager. As the author, Rahall could expect to receive more supportive mail than the rest. He received "less than ten letters" and speculates that the other thirty-nine got even fewer.90
"Don't Look to Congress to Act"
The relucrance of congressmen to speak critically of Israel was apparenr in 1983 when the House gave President Reagan permission, under rhe War
Stilling the Still, Small Voices 5
Powers Act, to keep U.S. Marines in Lebanon for eighteen months. The vote took place a few days before the tragic truck bombing killed more than 240 marines in Beirut. At the time the House acted, however, several marines had already died. A number of congressmen warned of more trouble ahead, opposed Reagan's request, and strongly urged withdrawal of the U.S. military force. Five took the other side, mentioning the importance of the marine presence to the security of Israel's northetn border.
In all, ninety-one congressmen spoke, but they were silent on the military actions Israel had carried out in Lebanon during the previous year— unrestricted bombing of Beirut, forced evacuation of PLO fighters, and aiding in the massacres at Sabra and Shatila by surrounding the camps, allowing Lebanese Christian Phalange fighters in and refusing to allow fleeing refugees out, sending them back to be slaughteted.91 These events had altered the Lebanese scene so radically that President Reagan felt impelled to return the marines to Beirut. Israel's actions had necessitated the marines' presence, yet none of these critical events was mentioned among the thousands of words expressed during the lengthy discussion.
A veteran congressman, with the advantage of hindsight, explained it directly.92 Just after the terrorist attack that killed U.S. Marines who were asleep in their Beirut compound, Congressman Lee Hamilton was asked if Congress might soon initiate action on its own to get the marines out of Lebanon. The query was posed by William Quandt, a Middle East specialist who had served in the Carter White House, at the close of a private discussion on Capitol Hill involving a small group of senior congressmen. Hamilton, a close student of both the Congress and the Middle East, responded, "Don't look to Congress to act. All we know is how to increase aid to Israel."
Hamilton's statement has proved true. Aid to Israel—despite our country's budget problems and Israel's defiant behavior toward the United States in its use of U.S.-supplied weapons and its construction of settlements on occupied territory—continues to increase, with no peak in sight.
Bonior and Secret Evidence
The voices of protest in the House of Representatives became less audible in 2001 with the announcement by Democrat David Bonior of Michigan that he would not seek re-election. Bonior, a member of the House since 1976 and Democraric Whip since 1992, was known for his
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strong positions on environmental, labor, and human rights issues, and has always fought for social and economic justice. He sponsored the Secret Evidence Repeal Act (H.R. 2121) in the 106th Congress, and a similar bill (H.R. 1266) in the 107th. Virtually every person against whom secret evidence has been used has been an Arab Muslim, and Bonior—who pro-Israel Washington PAC founder Morris Amitay called "the poster child for the pro-Arab cause in this country"—long opposed the discriminatory and unconstitutional use of secret evidence.93 Severely crippled by newly instituted redistricting, Bonior lost his bid for the governorship of Michigan in the 2002 elections.
"Here We Go Again"
Another blow to honest debate in the House was the retirement of Congressman Thomas Campbell (R-CA), who cosponsored the Secret Evidence Repeal Act with Bonior. In November 2000, Campbell lost his bid to unseat Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) in the U.S. Senate race, and resumed a teaching post at Stanford Law School. Feinstein would go on to propose and pass Senate Resolution 247, which the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee described as "a one-sided message to the American people and our friends and allies throughout the world that American elected officials are only concerned about Israel in the Middle East."
A similar resolution was introduced by Tom DeLay (R-TX) in May 2002 in the House of Representatives. It passed by a vote of 352-21, with twenty-nine abstentions. Thirty-three members did not vote, suggesting discontent with the legislation modified by fear of AIPAC. The resolution, which extensively condemned Palestinian suicide attacks and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat but offered no criticism whatsoever of Israel's aggressive policy of collective punishment, was called "unbalanced and . . . counterproductive" by Congressman Jim Moran (D-VA). John Dingell (D-MI), who called the resolution "one-sided" and "provocative," noted that its passage—at a time when President George W. Bush was expressing his sternest criticism yet of Israel—"will undermine rhe administration, diminish U.S. leverage with the Palestinians, and further damage U.S. credibility in the region." Nick Rahall (D-WV) put it more bluntly: "Here we go again. How many times has this body
Stilling the Still, Small Voices 5
passed resolutions of this nature that are so unbalanced, so one-sided, that we become the laughingstock of the world?"94
Some members voted to open up debate on the tesolution, with the intention of including new language that would offer more balance. As Congressman Mark Green (R-WI) noted the day of the vote, however, "in a House of 435 members, there were only eighty-two who voted with me on this, and only three of those were Republicans. I wish we had more, because I think we would have ended up with a better piece of legislation."95
Despite the eloquence of courageous members of Congress—whose ranks included Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. (D-IL), Lois Capps (D-CA), David Price (D-NC), Peter DeFazio (D-OR), Jay Inslee (D-WA), Amory Houghton (R-NY), Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), and of coutse David Bonior—anti-Palestinian oratory became deafening on the Republican side of the House of Representatives. It was an especially depressing development to Republicans like myself.
The resolution was a factor in the defeat of a five-term Democrat, Earl Hilliard, in the Alabama runoff primary on June 25, 2002. Hilliard, a supporter of Palestinian statehood, was one of the twenty-one who voted against the resolution. Arab American and Muslim groups rallied financial support in his campaign, but Hatvard-educated Artur Davis, according to Hilliard, was able to outspend him by a larger margin, thanks to strong support from New York City Jews. Davis focused on charges of ethics violations by Hilliard and accused him of links with terrorism. Both candidates are African American.
As evidence of the pro-Israel bias in the House, soon-to-retire majority leader Richard Armey (R-TX), proposed on May 1, 2002, that Palestinians simply vacate the West Bank. Prodded in an interview by MSNBC's Chris Matthews, Armey said, "I happen to believe that the Palestinians should leave." Faced with prorests, Armey said, days later, that he meant to say that Palestinian terrorists should leave.
The week before, Tom DeLay, Armey's heir apparent as majority leader and future creator of the controversial "Israel First" resolution, told the annual AIPAC convention, "As long as I'm in Congress, I'll use every tool at my disposal to ensure that the Republican conference in the House of Representatives continues to preserve and strengthen America's alliance with the State of Israel."96
4
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate
Just off the second-floor corridor connecting the central part of the U.S. Capitol building with the Senate wing is the restored old Senate chamber, where visitors can look around and imagine the room echoing with great debates of the past. Action there gave the Senate its reputation as the "world's greatest deliberative body," where no topic was too controversial for open debate.
In most respects, that reputation is deserved and honored. In fact, all five former senators—John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, Robert LaFollette, and Robert Taft—who are pictured in the ornate reception room near the large chamber now used by the Senate were distinguished by their independence and courage, not by conformity.
Today, on Middle East issues at least, independence and courage are almost unknown, and the Senate deliberates not at all. This phenomenon was the topic of discussion during a breakfast meeting in 1982 between Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Senator Claiborne Pell of
5
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Rhode Island, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.1 Pell explained with candor his own record of consistent support for Israel and his failure to recognize Arab interests when he told the Jordanian leader, "I can be honest with you, but I cant be fair." Pells record is typical of his colleagues.
Since the establishment of modern Israel in 1948, only a handful of senators have said or done anything in opposition to the policies of the government of Israel. Those who break ranks find themselves in difficulty. The trouble can arise from a speech, an amendment, a vote, a published statement, or a combination of these. It may take the form of a challenge in the next primary or general election. Or the trouble may not surface until later—after service in the Senate has ended. Such was the destiny of a senator from Illinois.
"Adlai, You Are Right, But—"
The cover of the October 1982 edition of the monthly magazine Jewish Chicago featured a portrait of Adlai E. Stevenson III, Democratic candidate for governor of Illinois. In the background, over the right shoulder of a smiling Stevenson, an Arab, rifle slung over his shoulder, glared ominously through a kaffiyeh that covered his head and most of his face. The headline announcing the issue's feature article read, "Looking at Adlai Through Jewish Eyes."
The illustration and article were part of an anti-Stevenson campaign conducted by some of the quarter-million people in Chicago's Jewish community who wanted Stevenson to fail in his challenge to Governor James R. Thompson, Jr.
Thompson, a Republican, was attempting a feat sometimes tried but never before accomplished in Illinois history: election to a third term as governor.2 Normally, a Republican in Illinois can expect only minimal Jewish support at the polls. A crucial part of the anti-Stevenson campaign was a caricature of his Middle East record while he was a member of the United States Senate.3 Stevenson was presented as an enemy of Israel and an ally of the PLO.
Stevenson was attempting a political comeback after serving ten years in the Senate, where he had quickly established himself as an independent.4 During the oil shortage of the mid-1970s he alarmed corporate
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
interests by suggesting the establishment of a government corporation to handle the marketing of all crude oil. He warned of the "seeds of destruction" inherent in nuclear proliferation and called for international safeguards to restrain other nations from using nuclear technology to manufacture weapons. Concerned about the country's weakening position in the international marketplace, he called for government-directed national economic strategies to meet the challenge of foreign competition.
Stevenson lacked the flamboyant extroverted character of many politicians. Time magazine described him as "a reflective man who seems a bit out of place in the political arena."5 Effective in committee, where most legislation is hammered out, he did not feel comfortable lining up votes.6 "I'm not a backslapper or logroller," he said. "I don't feel effective running about buttonholing Senators."
Chicago Daily News columnist Mike Royko wrote of Stevenson's lack of charisma in a tone of affectionate teasing:
The most dangerous element in politics is charisma. It makes people get glassy-eyed and jump and scream and clap without a thought in their heads. Adlai Stevenson never does that. He makes people drowsy. His hair is thinning. He has all the oratorical fire of an algebra teacher. His clothes look like something he bought from the coroner s office. When he feels good, he looks like he has a virus. We need more politicians who make our blood run tepid.7
Royko could have added that Stevenson also had none of the self-righteousness often found on Capitol Hill. Although a "blue blood," as close to aristocracy as an American can be, he displayed little interest in the cocktail circuit or the show business of politics.8 On a congressional tour of China in 1975 he didn't seem to mind when the other three senators received lace-curtained limousines and he and his wife, Nancy, were assigned a less showy sedan.
During his second Senate term, he became disillusioned with the Carter administration.9 He saw it as "embarrassingly weak" and more concerned with retaining its power than with exercising it effectively. In 1979 he announced he would not seek re-election to the Senate, but he mentioned a new interest: the presidency. He might run for the White House the next year. "I'm going to talk about ideas and see if an idea can
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still triumph, or even make a dent," he said.10 It didn't. Stevenson ultimately decided not to run. With Senator Edward Kennedy in the race, he felt he would get little media attention.11 By the time Kennedy pulled out, Stevenson concluded it was too late to get organized.
After a years breather, in 1981 he announced his interest in running for the governorship of Illinois. This time he followed through.
The make-up of his campaign organization, the character of his campaign, and the support he had received in the past in Jewish neighborhoods provided little hint of trouble ahead from pro-Israeli quarters.
Several of the most important members of his campaign team were Jewish: Philip Klutznick, president emeritus of B'nai B nth and an organizer of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, who agreed to organize Stevenson's main campaign dinner; Milton Fisher, prominent attorney and chairman of his finance committee; Rick Jas-culca, a public relations executive who became Stevenson's full-time press secretary.12
Stevenson chose Grace Mary Stern as his running mate for the position of lieutenant governor. Her husband was prominent in Chicago Jewish affairs. Stevenson himself had received several honors from Jewish groups in preceding years.13 He had been selected by the Chicago Jewish community as its 1974 Israel Bond "Man of the Year," commended by the American Jewish Committee for his legislative work against the Arab boycott of Israel in 1977, and honored by the government of Israel, which established the Adlai E. Stevenson III Chair at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot. Stevenson had every reason to expect that organized Illinois Jewry would overlook his occasional mildly critical position of Israeli policy.
But trouble developed. A segment of the Jewish community quietly launched an attack that would cost him heavily. Stevenson's detractors were determined to defeat him in the governor's race and thus discourage a future Stevenson bid for the presidency. Their basic tool was a document provided by the AIPAC in Washington.14 It was presented as a summary of Stevenson's Senate actions on Middle East issues—although it made no mention of his almost unblemished record of support for Israel and the tributes the Jewish community had presented to him in testimony of this support. Like most AIPAC documents, it would win no prizes for balance and objectivity.
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
For example, AIPAC pulled from a twenty-one-page report that Stevenson had prepared after a 1976 trip to the Middle East just this lonely phrase: "There is no organization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to represent the Palestinians." This was a simple statement of fact. But the writer of the Jewish Chicago article, citing the AIPAC "summary," asserted that these words had helped to give Stevenson "a reputation as one of the harshest critics of both Israel policy and of U.S. support for the Jewish state." Stevenson's assessment of the PLO s standing in the Palestinian community was interpreted as an assault on Israel.
In fact, the full paragraph in the Stevenson report from which AIPAC took its brief excerpt is studied and reasonable:
The Palestinians are by general agreement the nub of the problem. Although badly divided, they have steadily increased in numbers, economic and military strength, and seriousness of purpose. They cannot be left out of any Middle East settlement. Their lack of unity is reflected in the lack of unity within the top ranks of the PLO, but there is no organization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to represent the Palestinians.15
The Stevenson report was critical of certain Israeli policies but hardly hostile to Israel. "The PLO," he wrote, "may be distrusted, disowned, and despised, but it is a reality, if for no other reason than that it has no rival organization among Palestinians."
Stevenson went on to issue a challenge to the political leaders of America:
A new order of statesmanship is required from both the Executive and the Legislative Branches. For too long, Congress has muddled or gone along without any real understanding of Middle Eastern politics. Neither the United States, nor Israel, nor any of the Arab states will be served by continued ignorance or the expediencies of election year politics.
None of this positive comment found its way into the AIPAC report, the Jewish Chicago article, or any of the anti-Stevenson literature that was distributed within the Jewish community during the 1982 campaign.
The anti-Stevenson activists noted with alarm that in 1980 Stevenson had sponsored an amendment to reduce aid to Israel, and the year before had supported a similar amendment offered by Republican
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Senator Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon.16 The Hatfield amendment proposed to cut by 10 percent the amount of funds available to Israel for military credits.
Stevenson's amendment had focused on Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, which President Carter and earlier administrations characterized as both illegal and an obstacle to peace but did nothing to discourage beyond occasional expressions of regret. Stevenson proposed withholding $150 million in aid until Israel halted both the building and planning of additional settlements. The amendment did not cut funds; it simply withheld a fraction of the $2.18 billion in total aid authorized for Israel that year. In speaking for the amendment, Stevenson noted that the outlay for Israel amounted to 43 percent of all U.S. funds allocated for such purposes worldwide:
This preference for Israel diverts funds from the support of human life and vital American interests elsewhere in an interdependent and unstable world. ... If it could produce stability in the Middle East or enhance Israel's security, it could be justified. But it reflects continued U.S. acquiescence in an Israeli policy that threatens more Middle East instability, more Israeli insecurity, and a continued decline of U.S. authority in the world. Our support for Israel is not the issue here. Israels support for the ideals of peace and justice which gave it birth is at issue. It is, I submit, for the Israeli government to recognize again that Israel's interests are in harmony with our own, and for that to happen, it is important that we do not undermine the voices for peace in Israel or justify those, like Mr. Begin, who claim U.S. assistance from the Congress can be taken for granted.17
The amendment, like Hatfield's, was overwhelmingly defeated.
After the vote on his amendment, Stevenson recalls, he received apologetic comments.18 "Several Senators came up and said, Adlai, you are right, but you understand why I had to vote against you. Maybe next time.'" Stevenson did understand why: lobby intimidation produced the negative votes. He found intimidation at work on another front too: the news media. He offered the amendment, he explained, "because I thought the public was entitled to a debate on this critical issue," but news services gave it no attention. Stevenson added,
That's another aspect of this problem. It's not only the intimidation of the American politicians, it's also the intimidation of some American journal
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
ists. If it's not the journalists, then it's the editors and perhaps more so the publishers.
Anti-Stevenson campaigners also found it expedient to portray him as a supporter of Arab economic blackmail, despite his widely hailed legislative record to the contrary. Stevenson was actually the principal author of the 1977 legislation to prohibit American firms from cooperating with the Arab boycott of Israel.19 But in the smear campaign conducted against him in his gubernatorial bid his legislative history was rewritten. He was actually accused of trying to undermine the anti-boycott effort.
In fact, Stevenson, in a lonely and frustrating effort, saved the legislation from disaster. For this achievement, he received a plaque and praise from the American Jewish Committee.20 The chairman of the National Jewish Community Relations Council, Theodore R. Mann, wrote to Stevenson, expressing the organization's "deep appreciation for your invaluable contribution to the adoption of that landmark legislation."21 He added that the legislation "not only reassures the American Jewish community as to the commitment of America to fairness and nondiscrimination in international trade but, more fundamentally, stands as a reaffirmation of our nation's profound regard for principle and morality."
Jewish Chicago, making no mention of Stevenson's success in the anti-boycott effort or the unstinting praise he received from Jewish leaders, reported that he encountered "major conflicts" with "the American Jewish leadership" over the boycott legislation.22
A flyer distributed by an unidentified "Informed Citizens Against Stevenson Committee," made the same charge.23 Captioned, "The Truth About Adlai Stevenson," it used half-truths to brand Stevenson as anti-Israel during his Senate years and concluded: "It is vitally important that Jewish voters be fully informed about Stevenson's record. Still dazzled by the Stevenson name, many Jews are totally unaware of his antagonism to Jewish interests." The "committee" provided no names or addresses of sponsoring individuals. Shirley Friedman, a freelance writer in Chicago, later identified the flyer as her own. The message on the flyer concluded: "Don't forget: It is well known that Stevenson considers the governor's chair as a stepping stone to the presidency. Spread the word—let the truth be told!"
The word indeed spread in the Chicago Jewish community throughout the summer and fall of 1982.24 The political editor of the Chicago
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Sun-Times reported in June that some activists for Thompson had been "working quietly for months to assemble a group to mobilize Jewish voters" against Stevenson.25
The result of their efforts was the "Coalition for the Re-election of Jim Thompson," which included Jewish Democrats who had not backed Thompson previously. When Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota, a strong supporter of Israel, came to Chicago in October to address a breakfast gathering sponsored by the Coalition, he declared that, as a senator, Stevenson was "a very steadfast foe of aid to Israel."26
"Smear and Innuendo"
A major problem was the unprinted but widely whispered charge of anti-Semitism against Stevenson—a man, who, like his father, had spent his life championing civil rights for all Americans. "I learned after election day there was that intimation throughout the campaign," recalls Stevenson.27
Phil Klutznicks daughter, Mrs. Bettylu Saltzman, who worked on Stevensons campaign staff, remembered, "There was plenty of stuff going around about him being anti-Semitic.28 It got worse and worse. It was a much more difficult problem than anyone imagined."
Stevensons running mate, Grace Mary Stern, recalled: "There was a very vigorous [anti-Stevenson] telephone campaign in the Jewish community."29 She said that leaflets charging Stevenson with being anti-Israel were distributed widely at local Jewish temples, and added that there was much discussion of the anti-Semitism accusation: "There was a very vigorous campaign, man to man, friend to friend, locker room to locker room. We never really came to grips with the problem."
Campaign fund-raising suffered accordingly. The Jewish community had supported Stevenson strongly in both of his campaigns for the Senate. After his remarks in the last years of his Senate career, some of the Jewish support dried up. "Many of my most generous Jewish contributors stayed with me, but the organization types, the professionals, did not," Stevenson recalled.30 He believed the withdrawal of organized Jewish support also cut into funds from out-of-state that he otherwise would have received. In the end, Thompson was able to outspend Stevenson by better than two to one.31
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
Fed up by early September with unfounded charges of anti-Semitism, Stevenson finally responded, charging that a "subterranean campaign of smear and innuendo" was being waged by supporters of Thompson.32 His press secretary, Rick Jasculca, complained that the material distributed by the Coalition for the Re-election of Jim Thompson "tries to give the impression that Adlai is unquestionably anti-Israel." Thompsons political director, Philip O'Connor, denied there was a smear campaign and disavowed the Friedman flyer.
Thompson himself said of Stevenson, "I don't think he is an anti-Semite, [but he is] no particular friend of Israel." The Chicago Sun-Times published an editorial rebuke to this remark: "That's like saying, £No, I don't think Stevenson beats his wife, but she did have a black eye last week.' "33 The editorial continued:
Far more important, the statement is not true; Stevenson as a Senator may have occasionally departed from positions advocated by the Israeli government, but out of well-reasoned motives and a genuine desire to secure a lasting peace for the area. Thompsons coy phrasing was a reprehensible appeal to the voter who measures a candidate s worth by a single, rubbery standard.
The only Jews who tried to counter the attack were those close to Stevenson. Philip Klutznick, prominent in Jewish affairs and chairman of the Stevenson Dinner Committee, said, "It is beneath the dignity of the Jewish community to introduce these issues into a gubernatorial campaign."34 Stevenson campaign treasurer Milton Fisher said: "Adlais views are probably consistent with 40 percent of the Knesset [Israeli parliament]."
Stevenson was ultimately defeated in the closest gubernatorial election in the states history. The margin was 5,074 votes—one-seventh of one percent of the total 3.5 million votes cast.
The election was marred by a series of mysterious irregularities, which Time magazine described as "so improbable, so coincidental, so questionable that it could have happened only in Wonderland, or the Windy City."35 On election night ballot boxes from fifteen Chicago precincts inexplicably disappeared, and others turned up in the homes or cars of poll workers. Stevenson asked for a recount—past recounts had resulted in shifts of 5,000 to 7,000 votes—but the Illinois Supreme
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Court denied his petition by a 4-to-3 vote.36 Judge Seymour Simon, a Democrat, joined the three Republicans on the court in voting against Stevensons request.
A post-election editorial in a suburban Chicago newspaper acknowledged the impact of the concerted smear campaign on the election outcome:
An intense last-minute effort among Chicago-area Jews to thwart Adlai Stevensons attempt to unseat Illinois Governor James Thompson in last Tuesday's election may have succeeded. The weekend before the election many Chicago and suburban rabbis spoke out against Stevenson and there were thousands of pamphlets and leaflets distributed in Jewish areas ... all attacking the former Senator.
After describing the attack, the editorial concluded,
The concentrated anti-Stevenson campaign, particularly since it went largely unanswered, almost surely cost him thousands of votes among the 248,000 Chicago-area Jews—266,000 throughout the state—who traditionally have leaned in his direction politically.37
Campaign manager Joseph Novak agreed: "If that effort hadn't happened, Stevenson would be governor."38 In the predominantly Jewish suburban Chicago precincts of Highland Park and Lake County "We just got killed, just absolutely devastated." Press secretary Rick Jasculca adds, "What bothers me is that hardly any rabbis or Jewish leaders beyond Phil [Klutznick] were willing to speak up and say this is nonsense to call Adlai anti-Israel."39
Thomas A. Dine, then executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, gloated, "The memory of Adlai Stevenson's hostility toward Israel during his Senate tenure lost him the Jewish vote in Illinois—and that cost him the gubernatorial election."40 Stevenson, too, believed that the effort to discredit him among Jews played a major role in his defeat: "In a race that close, it was more than enough to make the difference."41 Asked about the impact of the Israeli lobby on the U.S. political scene, he responded without hesitation:
There is an intimidating, activist minority of American Jews that supports the decisions of the Israeli government, right or wrong. They do so very
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vocally and very aggressively in ways that intimidate others so that its their voice—even though its a minority—that is heard and felt in American politics. But it still is much louder in the United States than in Israel. In other words, you have a much stronger, more vocal dissent in Israel than within the Jewish community in the United States. The prime minister of Israel has far more influence over American foreign policy in the Middle East than over the policies of his own government generally.
The former senator reported a profound change within the Jewish community in recent years:
The old passionate commitment of Jewish leaders to civil liberties, social welfare—in short, to liberalism has to a large extent dissipated. The issue now is much more Israel itself. If given a choice between the traditional liberal commitment and the imagined Israeli commitment, they'll opt now for the Israeli commitment.
Reflecting on his career and the price he has paid for challenging Israeli policies, Stevenson concluded:
I will have no hesitation about continuing. I wish I had started earlier and been more effective. I really don't understand the worth of public office if you can't serve the public. It's better to lose. It's better not to serve than to be mortgaged or compromised.
Stevenson followed the tradition of a colleague, a famous senator from Arkansas who eloquently criticized Israeli policy and American foreign policy over a period of many years.
The Dissenter
"When all of us are dead, the only one they'll remember is Bill Ful-bright."42 The tribute by Idaho Senator Frank Church, a fellow Democrat, was amply justified. As much as any man of his time, J. William Fulbright shaped this nation's attitudes on the proper exercise of its power in a world made acutely dangerous by nuclear weapons. Dissent was a hallmark of his career, but it was dissent with distinction. The fact was that Fulbright was usually right.
He first gained national attention by condemning the "swinish blight" of McCarthyism.43 In 1954, while many Americans cheered the crusade
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of the Wisconsin senator's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, Ful-bright cast the lone vote against a measure to continue the subcommittee's funding. Because of this vote, he was accused of being "a communist, a fellow traveler, an atheist, [and] a man beneath contempt."44
Fulbright opposed U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1961 and in the Dominican Republic four years later, and was ahead of his time in calling for detente with the Soviet Union and a diplomatic opening with China. When he proposed a different system for selecting presidents, an offended Harry Truman called him "that overeducated Oxford s.o.b." Twenty-five years later, in 1974, the New York Times recognized Fulbright as "the most outspoken critic of American foreign policy of this generation."45
His deepest and most abiding interest was the advancement of international understanding through education, and thousands of young people have broadened their vision through the scholarships that bear his name.46 But Fulbright also became well known for his outspoken opposition to the Vietnam War as "an endless, futile war . . . debilitating and indecent"—a stand that put him at odds with a former colleague and close friend, President Lyndon B. Johnson.47 President Johnson believed that America was embarked on a noble mission in Southeast Asia against an international communist conspiracy. Fulbright put no stock in the conspiracy theory, feared the war might broaden into a showdown with China, and saw it as an exercise in "the arrogance of power."48
In 1963 Fulbright chaired an investigation that brought to public attention the exceptional tax treatment of contributions to Israel and aroused the ire of the Jewish community.49 The investigation was managed by Walter Pincus, a journalist Fulbright hired after reading a Pin-cus study of lobbying. Pincus recalls that Fulbright gave him a free hand, letting him choose the ten prime lobbying activities to be examined and backing him throughout the controversial investigation.50 One of the groups chosen by Pincus, himself Jewish, was the Jewish Telegraph Agency, which was at that time a principal instrument of the Israeli lobby. Both Fulbright and Pincus were accused of trying to destroy the Jewish Telegraph Agency and of being anti-Semitic.51
Pincus remembers, "Several senarors urged that the inquiry into the Jewish operation be dropped. Senators Hubert Humphrey and Bourke
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Hickeniooper [senior Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee] were among them. Fulbright refused."
The Fulbright hearings also exposed massive funding illegally channeled into the American Zionist Council by Israel.52 More than five million dollars had been secretly poured into the council for spending on public relations firms and pro-Israel propaganda before Fulbright's committee closed down the operation.
Despite his concern over the pro-Israeli lobby, Fulbright took the exceptional step of recommending that the United States guarantee Israelis borders.53 In a major address in 1970 he proposed an American-Israeli treaty, under which the United States would commit itself to intervene militarily if necessary to "guarantee the territory and independence of Israel" within the lands it held before the 1967 war. The treaty, he said, should be a supplement to a peace settlement arranged by the United Nations. The purpose of his proposal was to destroy the arguments of those who maintained that Israel needed the captured territory for its security.
Fulbright saw Israel's withdrawal from the Arab lands it occupied in the 1967 war as the key to peace: Israel could not occupy Arab territory and have peace too. He said that Israeli policy in establishing settlements on the territories "has been characterized by lack of flexibility and foresight." Discounting early threats by some Arab leaders to destroy the state of Israel, Fulbright noted that both President Nasser of the United Arab Republic and King Hussein of Jordan had in effect repudiated such Draconian threats, "but the Israelis seem not to have noticed the disavowals."
During the 1970s Fulbright repeatedly took exception to the contention that the Middle East crisis was a test of American resolve against Soviet interventionism. In 1971 he accused Israel of "communist-baiting humbuggery" and argued that continuing Middle East tension, in fact, only benefited Soviet interests.54
Appearing on CBS televisions Face the Nation in 1973, Fulbright declared that the Senate was "subservient" to Israeli policies that were inimical to Ametican interests.55 He said that the United States bore "a very great share of the responsibility" for the continuation of Middle East violence. "It's quite obvious [that] without the all-out support by the
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United States in money and weapons and so on, the Israelis couldn't do what they've been doing."
Fulbright said that the United States failed to pressure Israel for a negotiated settlement, because:
The great majority of the Senate of the United States—somewhere around 80 percent—are completely in support of Israel, anything Israel wants. This has been demonstrated time and time again, and this has made it difficult for our government.
The senator claimed that "Israel controls the Senate" and warned, "We should be more concerned about the United States' interests." Six weeks after his Face the Nation appearance, Fulbright again expressed alarm over Israeli occupation of Arab territories.56 He charged that the United States had given Israel "unlimited support for unlimited expansion."
His criticism of Israeli policy caused stirrings back home.57 Jews who had supported him in the past became restless. After years of easy election victories, trouble loomed for Fulbright in 1974. Encouraged, in part, by the growing Jewish disenchantment with Fulbright, on the eve of the deadline for filing petitions of candidacy in the Democratic primary Governor Dale Bumpers surprised the political world by becoming a challenger for Fulbright's Senate seat. Fulbright hadn't expected the governor to run, but recognized immediately that the popular young governor posed a serious challenge: "He had lots of hair [in contrast to Fulbright], he looked good on television, and he'd never done anything to offend anyone."58
There were other factors. Walter Pincus, who later became a Washington Post reporter, believed that Fulbright's decision to take a golfing holiday in Bermuda just before the primary deadline may have helped convince Bumpers that Fulbright would not work hard for the nomination.59 It was also the year of Watergate—a bad year for incumbents. In his campaign, Bumpers pointed with alarm to the "mess in Washington" and called for a change. The New York Times reported that he "skillfully exploited an old feeling that Mr. Fulbright . . . spent all his time dining with Henry Kissinger and fretting over the Middle East."60
The attitude of Jewish voters, both inside Arkansas and beyond, was also a significant factor. "I don't think Bumpers would have run without
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Fulbright predicted that the American people would back Ford if he demanded that Israel cooperate. He reminded him that Eisenhower
that encouragement," said Fulbright.61 Following the election, a national Jewish organization actually claimed credit for the young governor s stunning upset victory. Fulbright had a copy of a memorandum circulated in May 1974 to the national board of directors of B'nai B nth. Marked "confidential," the memo from Secretary-General Herman Edelsberg, announced that "... all of the indications suggest that our actions in support of Governor Bumpers will result in the ousting of Mr. Fulbright from his key position in the Senate."62 Edelsberg later rejected the memorandum as "phony."
Following his defeat, Fulbright continued to speak out, decrying Israeli stubbornness and warning of the Israeli lobby. In a speech just before the end of his Senate term, he warned, "Endlessly pressing the United States for money and arms—and invariably getting all and more than she asks—Israel makes bad use of a good friend."63 His central concern was that the Middle East conflict might flare into nuclear war.64 He warned somberly that "Israels supporters in the United States ... by underwriting intransigence, are encouraging a course which must lead toward her destruction—and just possibly ours as well."
Pondering the future from his office three blocks north of the White House on a bright winter day in 1983, Fulbright saw little hope that Capitol Hill would effectively challenge the Israeli lobby:
Its suicide for politicians to oppose them. The only possibility would be someone like Eisenhower, who already feels secure. Eisenhower had already made his reputation. He was already a great man in the eyes of the country, and he wasn't afraid of anybody. He said what he believed.65
Then he added a somewhat more optimistic note: "I believe a president could do this. He wouldn't have to be named Eisenhower." Fulbright cited a missed opportunity:
I went to Jerry Ford after he took office in 1975. I was out of office then. I had been to the Middle East and visited with some of the leading figures. I came back and told the president, 'Look, I think these [Arab] leaders are willing to accept Israel, but the Israelis have got to go back to the 1967 borders. The problem can be solved if you are willing to take a position on it.
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was reelected by a large margin immediately after he forced Israel to withdraw after invading Egypt:
Taking a stand against Israel didn't hurt Eisenhower. He carried New York with its big Jewish population. I told Ford I didnt think he would be defeated if he put it the right way. He should say Israel had to go back to the 1967 borders; if it didn't, no more arms or money. That's just the way Eisenhower did it. And Israel would have to cooperate. And politically, in the coming campaign, I told him he should say he was for Israel, but he was for America first.
Ford, Fulbright recalled, listened courteously but was noncommittal. "Of course he didnt take my advice," said Fulbright.
Yet his determination in the face of such disappointment echoes through one of his last statements as a U.S. senator:
History casts no doubt at all on the ability of human beings to deal rationally with their problems, but the greatest doubt on their will to do so. The signals of the past are thus clouded and ambiguous, suggesting hope but not confidence in the triumph of reason. With nothing to lose in any event, it seems well worth a try.66
Fulbright died on February 9, 1995, ending one of the most illustrious careers in American politics. Reared in the segregationist South, he left an imposing legacy as a fearless, scholarly, and determined champion of human rights at home and abroad.
Warning Against Absnlutism
James G. Abourezk of South Dakota came to the Senate in 1973 after serving two years in the House of Representatives. The son of Lebanese immigrants, he was the first person of Arab ancestry elected to the Senate. He spoke up for Arab interests and quickly became a center of controversy.
Soon after he took office, Abourezk accepted an invitation to speak at Yeshiva University in New York, but anxious school officials called almost immediately to tell him of rising student protests against his appearance.67 A few days later, the chairman of the dinner committee asked Abourezk to make a public statement calling for face-to-face nego
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tiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, assuring Abourezk that this proposal, identical to the one being made by Israels prime minister, Golda Meir, would ease student objections and end the protest. Although Abourezk favored such negotiations, he refused to make the requested statement. He explained, "I do not wish to be in the position of placating agitators." Rabbi Israel Miller, vice president of the school, came to Washington to urge Abourezk to reconsider. When Abourezk refused, the dinner chairman telephoned again, this time to report that students were beginning to picket. Sensing that school officials wanted the event canceled, Abourezk offered to withdraw from the obligation. His offer was hastily accepted.
Soon after, Abourezk was announced as the principal speaker at a rally to be held in Rochester, New York, to raise money for victims of the Lebanese civil war. The rally's organizing committee was immediately showered with telephoned bomb threats. In all, twenty-three calls warned that the building would be blown up if Abourezk appeared on the program. With the help of the FBI, local police swept the building for bombs and, finding none, opened it for the program. A capacity crowd, unaware of the threats, heard Abourezk speak, and the event proceeded without incident.
After making a tour of Arab states in December 1973, Abourezk sympathized with Arab refugees in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington. Covering his speech for the AIPAC newsletter Near East Report Wolf Blitzer wrote, "If [Abourezk's] position were to prevail, Israels life would be jeopardized." Blitzer s report was sent to Jews who had contributed to Abourezk's campaign, accompanied by a letter in which I. L. Kenen, AIPAC director, warned that Abourezk was "going to great lengths" to "undermine American friendship for Israel."68 The mailing, Abourezk recalled, began an "adversary relationship" with AIPAC. He added, "I doubt that I would have spent so much time on the Middle East had it not been for that particular unfair personal attack."69
On one occasion in the Senate, Abourezk turned lobby pressure to his advantage. Wishing to be appointed in 1974 to fill a vacancy on the Senate Judiciary Committee, he warned David Brody, lobbyist for B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League, that if he did not secure the appointment he would seek a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee. He
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recalls, with a chuckle, "This warning had the desired effect. The last thing Brody wanted was to see me on Foreign Relations, where aid to Israel is decided. Thanks to the help of the lobby I received the appointment to Judiciary, even though James Allen, a Senator with more seniority, also wanted the position." The appointment enabled Abourezk to chair hearings in 1977 on the legality of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. "They were the first—and last—hearings on this subject," Abourezk recalled. "And not one of my colleagues attended. I was there alone."
In 1975 Abourezk invited the head of the PLO's Beirut office, Shafiq al-Hour, to lunch in the Senate and learned that PLO-telated secrets are hard to keep. On Abourezk's assurance that the event would be kept entirely private, eleven other senators, including Abraham Ribi-coff of Connecticut, who is Jewish, attended and heard al-Hout relate the PLO side of Middle East issues. Within an hour after the event was concluded, Spencer Richardson of the Washington Post telephoned Abourezk for comment. He had already learned the identity of all senators who attended. The next day Israel's leading English language daily newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, reported that Ribicoff and the others had had lunch with "murderer" al-Hout.
A major storm erupted in 1977 when Abourezk agreed on short notice to fill in for Vice President Walter Mondale as the principal speaker at the annual Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner sponsored in Denver by the Colorado Democratic Party.71 Jewish leaders protested his appearance, and John Mrozek, a labor leader in Denver, attacked Abourezk as "pro-Arab and anti-Israel." Betty Crist, a member of the dinner committee, moved that the invitation be withdrawn. When the Crist motion was narrowly rejecred, the committee tried to find a pro-Israeli speaker to debate Abourezk, with the intention of canceling the event if a debate could not be arranged. This gave the proceedings a comic twist, as Abourezk at no point had intended to mention the Middle East in his remarks. Unable to find someone to debate their guest, the committee reconsidered and let the invitation to Abourezk stand in its original form.
Arriving at the Denver airport, Abourezk told reporters, "As a United States Senator, I have sworn to uphold the governmenr of the United States, but I never dreamed that I would be required ro swear allegiance
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to any other government." In his remarks to the dinner audience of 700, he warned of the "extraordinary influence of the Zionist lobby." He said the United States "is likely to become, if it has not already, a captive of its client state."
He said, "The point of the controversy surrounding this dinner has been my refusal to take an absolutist position for Israel. There is extreme danger to all of us in this kind of absolutism. It implies that only one position—that of being unquestionably pro-Israel—is the only position."
The Rocky Mountain News reported that his speech received a standing ovation, "although there were pockets of people who sat on their hands." The Denver newspaper editorialized, "James Abourezk is not a fanatic screaming for the blood of Israel. Colorado Democratic leaders should be proud to have him as their speaker. He is better than they deserve." In 1980, after retiring from the Senate, Abourezk founded the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which has grown into the Arab American civil rights organization with the largest membership in the country. Its purpose, Abourezk says, "is to provide a countervailing force to the Israeli lobby."
Sins of Omission

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 7

2008-08-15T10:41:00.000-07:00

Sins of Omission
The Israeli lobby's long string of Capitol Hill victories has been broken only a few times in the past forty-two years.72 Two setbacks occurred in the Senate and involved military sales to Saudi Arabia. In 1978 the Senate approved the sale of F-15 fighter planes by a vote of 54-44, and in 1981 it approved the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) intelligence-gathering planes and special equipment for the F-15s by a vote of 52-48. Curiously, both controversies entangled the American Israel Public Affairs Committee in the politics of the state of Maine.
This involvement began on the Senate floor one afternoon in the spring of 1978 when Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy received a whispered message that brought an angry flush to his face.73 AIPAC had forsaken a Senate Democrat with a consistently pro-Israel record. Senator William Hathaway of Maine, who had, without exception, cast his vote in behalf of Israel's interests, was being "dropped" by the lobby in favor
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of William S. Cohen, his Republican challenger. Kennedy strode to the adjoining cloakroom and reached for a telephone.
Kennedy demanded an explanation from Morris J. Amitay, then executive director of AIPAC. Flustered, Amitay denied that AIPAC had taken a position against Hathaway. The organization, he insisted, provides information on candidates but makes no endorsements. Pressed by Kennedy, Amitay promised to issue a letter to Hathaway complimenting him on his support of Israel.
The letter was sent, but the damage had already been done.74 While Amitay was technically correct—AIPAC does not formally endorse candidates for the House or Senate—the lobby has effective ways to show its colors, raise money, and influence votes. In the Maine race, it was making calls for Cohen and against Hathaway. The shift, so astounding and unsettling to Kennedy, arose from a single "failing" on Hathaway s part. It was a sin of omission, but a cardinal sin nonetheless.
Over the years, Hathaway had sometimes refused to sign letters and resolutions that AIPAC sponsored.75 The resolutions were usually statements of opinion by the Senate ("sense of the Senate" resolutions) and had no legislative effect. The lettets were directed to the president or a cabinet officer, urging the official to support Istael. In refusing to sign, Hathaway did not single out AIPAC projects; he often rejected such requests from other interest groups as well, preferring to write his own letters and introduce his own resolutions. Nor did he always refuse AIPAC. Sometimes, as a favor, he would set aside his usual reservations and sign.
Hathaway cooperated in 1975 when AIPAC sponsored its famous "Spirit of 76" letter.76 It bore Hathaway's name and those of seventy-five of his colleagues and carried this message to President Gerald R. Ford: "We urge that you reiterate our nation's long-standing commitment to Israel's security by a policy of continued military supplies and diplomatic and economic support." At another moment, this expression would have caused no ripples. Since the administration of John F. Kennedy, the U.S. government had been following a policy of "continued military supplies." But when this letter was made public in January 1975, it shook the executive branch as have few Senate letters in history.
Ford, dissatisfied with Israel's behavior, had just issued a statement calling for a "reappraisal" of U.S. policies in the Middle East.77 His state
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ment did not mention Israel by name as the offending party, but his message was clear: Ford wanted better cooperation in reaching a compromise with Arab interests, and "reappraisal" meant suspension of U.S. aid until Israel improved its behaviot. It was a historic proposal, the first time since the Eisenhower era that a U.S. president even hinted publicly that he might suspend aid to Israel.
Israel's response came, not from its own capital, but from the United States Senate. Instead of directly protesting to the White House, Jerusalem activated its lobby in the United States, which, in turn, signed up as supporters of Israel's position more than three-fourths of the members of the United States Senate.
A more devastating—and intimidating—response could scarcely be conceived. The seventy-six signatures effectively told Ford he could not carry out his threatened "reappraisal." Israel's loyalists in the Senate— Democrats and Republicans alike—were sufficient in number to reject any legislative proposal hostile to Israel that Ford might make, and perhaps even enact a pro-Israeli piece of legislation over a presidential veto.
The letter was a demonstration of impressive clout. Crafted and circulated by AIPAC, it had been endorsed, overnight, by a majority of the Senate membership. Several senators who at first had said no quickly changed their positions. Senator John Culver admitted candidly, "The pressure was too great. I caved." So did President Ford. He backed down and never again challenged the lobby.
This wasn't the only time Hathaway answered AIPAC's call to oppose the White House on a major issue. Three years later, Ford's successor, Jimmy Carter, fought a similar battle with the Israeli lobby.78 At issue this time was a resolution to disapprove Carter's proposal to sell F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. The White House needed the support of only one chamber to defeat the resolution. White House strategists felt that the House of Representatives would overwhelmingly vote to defeat the sale, so they decided to put all their resources into the Senate.
Lobbying on both sides was highly visible and aggressive.79 Frederick Dutton, chief lobbyist for Saudi Arabia, orchestrated the pro-sale forces on Capitol Hill. The Washington Post reported, "Almost every morning these days, the black limousines pull up to Washington's Madison Hotel to collect their Saudi Arabian passengers. Their destination, very often, is Capitol Hill, where the battle of the F-15s unfolds."80
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The Israeli lobby pulled out all the stops. It coordinated a nationwide public relations campaign that revived, as never before, memories of the genocidal Nazi campaign against European Jews during World War II. In the wake of the highly publicized television series, Holocaust, Capitol Hill was flooded with complimentary copies of the novel on which the TV series was based.81 The books were accompanied by a letter from AIPAC saying, "This chilling account of the extermination of six million Jews underscores Israel's concerns during the current negotiations for security without reliance on outside guarantees." Regarding the book distribution, AIPAC's Aaron Rosenbaum told the Washington Post. "We think, frankly, that it will affect a few votes here and there, and simplify lobbying."82
Senator Wendell Anderson of Minnesota at first agreed to support the proposed sale.83 He told an administration official: "Sure, I'll go for it. It sounds reasonable." But a few days before the vote he called back: "I can't vote for it. I'm up for election, and my Jewish cochairman refuses to go forward if I vote for the F-15s." Furthermore, he said, a Jewish group had met with him and showed him that 70 percent of the contributions to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee the previous year came from Jewish sources.
The pressure was sustained and heavy. Major personalities in the Jewish community warned that the fighter aircraft would constitute a serious threat to Israel. Nevertheless, a prominent Jewish senator, Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, lined up with Carter. This was a hard blow to Amitay, who had previously worked on Ribicoff s staff. Earlier in the year Ribicoff, while keeping his own counsel on the Saudi arms question, took the uncharacteristic step of sharply criticizing Israeli policies, as well as the tactics of AIPAC. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Ribicoff described Israel's retention of occupied tertitory as "wrong" and unworthy of U.S. support.84 He said that AIPAC does "a great disservice to the United States, to Israel, and to the Jewish community." He did not seek re-election in 1980.
The Senate approved the sale, 52-48, but in the process Carter was so bruised that he never again forced a showdown vote in Congress over Middle East policy.
Hathaway was one of the forty-eight who stuck with AIPAC, but this was not sufficient when election time rolled around. AIPAC wanted
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a Senator whose signature—and vote—it could always count on. Searching for unswerving loyalty, the lobby switched to Cohen. Its decision came at the very time Hathaway was resisting pressures on the Saudi issue. The staff at the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee was outraged. One of them declared to a visitor: "AIPAC demands 100 percent. If a fine Senator like Hathaway fails to cooperate just once, they are ready to trade in his career."85 A staff member of a Senate committee commented: "To please AIPAC, you have to be more pure than Ivory soap—99.44 percent purity is not good enough."86 Lacking the purity AIPAC demanded, Hathaway was defeated in 1978.
Caught in the AWACS Dilemma
William S. Cohen was elected to the Senate, but he soon found himself in a storm similar to the one Hathaway, his predecessor, had encountered. Once again, a proposal to sell military equipment to Saudi Arabia was raising concerns among pro-Israeli forces about a senator from Maine. It occurred soon after Ronald Reagan's inauguration, when the new president decided to approve the same request that the Carter administration had put off the year before. Saudi Arabia would be allowed to purchase its own AWACS planes, along with extra equipment to give Saudi F-15 fighters greater range and firepower. Israeli officials opposed the sale, because, they said, this technology would give Saudi Arabia the capacity to monitor Israeli air force operations.87
As it had in 1978, the Senate became the main battleground, but the White House was slow to organize. Convinced that Jimmy Carter the yeat before had taken on too many diverse issues at once, the Reagan forces decided to concentrare on tax and budget questions in the early months of the new administration. This left a vacuum in the foreign policy realm, which AIPAC skillfully filled. New director Thomas A. Dine orchestrated a bipartisan counterattack against arms transfers to Saudi Arabia. Even before Reagan sent the AWACS proposal to Capitol Hill for consideration, the Associated Press reported that the Israeli lobby had lined up "veto-strength majorities."88
AIPAC's campaign against AWACS began in the House of Representatives with a public letter attacking the proposal, which was sponsored by Republican Norman Lent of New York and Democrar Clarence
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Long of Maryland. Ultimately, in October, the House rejected the proposed sale by a vote of 301-111, but the real battleground was the Senate. Earlier in the year, before the Senate took up the question, Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon, always a dependable supporter of Israel, announced that fifty-four senators, a majority, had signed a request that Reagan drop the idea. Needing time to persuade the senators to reconsider, the White House put off the showdown. By September, fifty senators had signed a resolution to veto the sale, and six more promised to sign if necessary. Once more, the White House had no choice but to delay.
This time, the Saudis were testing their relationship with the new president, and they left more of the lobbying to the White House than was true in 1978. Their case relied heavily on the personal efforts of Howard Baker, Republican Senate leader; Senator John Tower, chairman of the Armed Services Committee; and Senator Charles Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Lobbyist Dutton was instructed to stay in the background, although David Saad, executive director of the National Association of Arab Americans, helped organize the support of U.S. industries that had a stake in the sale.89
Dines team roamed the Senate corridors, while AIPAC's grassroots contacts brought direct pressure from constituents. The Washington Post reported that "AIPAC's fountain of research materials reaches a readership estimated at 200,000 people."90 Senator John Glenn of Ohio said: "I've been getting calls from every Jewish organization in the country. They didn't want to talk about the issues. The big push was to get me to sign this letter and resolution."91 Glenn did not sign, largely because he hoped to broker a deal with the White House.
Syndicated columnist Carl Rowan wrote that "there is strong evidence" that the AWACS struggle increased "public resentment against the 'Jewish lobby.' "92 The issue was portrayed by some as a choice between President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin. Bumper stickers appeared around Washington that read, "Reagan or Begin?" When the Senate finally voted, Cohen, who had announced his opposition to the proposal, switched and provided one of the critical votes supporting the AWACS sale.93 He explained his reversal by declaring that Israel would have been branded the scapegoat for failure of the Middle East peace process if the proposal were defeated.
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Aside from this "sin," one of "commission" in the eyes of AIPAC, Cohen's behavior was exemplary. Never once did he stray from the fold, and in 1984 AIPAC did not challenge his bid for re-election.
Standing Dp for Civility
One of the most popular members of the Senate, Charles "Mac" Math-ias of Maryland was something of a maverick—a trait that was probably necessary for his political survival. He was a Republican in a state where Democrats outnumber Republicans by three to one.
During the Nixon administration especially, he frequently dissented from the Republican party line. His opposition to the war in Vietnam and his staunch advocacy of civil rights and welfare initiatives earned him a place on the Nixon administration's "enemies list" of political opponents.94 In a December 1971 speech, before the Watergate break-in at Democratic headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, and while the country was angrily divided by domestic tensions and the war in Vietnam, Mathias advised Nixon to work to "bind the nation's wounds."95 He urged the president to "take the high road" in the 1972 campaign and to disavow a campaign strategy "which now seems destined, unnecessarily, to polarize the country even more." In the same message, Mathias criticized Nixon's advisers for "divisive exploitation of the so-called social issues [through] . . . the use of hard-line rhetoric on crime, civil rights, civil liberties, and student unrest." Mathias was alarmed at what he saw as the Republican drift to the right.96
In 1975 and 1976 he considered running for president as an independent "third force" candidate in an effort to forge a "coalition of the center." The late Clarence Mitchell, director of the Washington office of the NAACP, said: "He's always arrived at his position in a reasoned way."97 In fact, early in his career Mathias marked himself as a progressive and a champion of civil rights, and his constituency took his liberalism on social issues in stride.98 A resident of Frederick, Mathias's home town, told the Washington Post, "Why, a lot of people around here think he's too liberal. But they seem to vote for him. The thing is, he's decent. He's got class."99
He also had flashes of daring. In the spring of 1981, he wrote an article in the quarterly Foreign Affairs that he knew would put him in hot
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water with some of his Jewish constituents. In it, Mathias criticized the role played by ethnic lobbies—particularly the Israeli lobby—in the formation of U.S. foreign policy. The controversial article upset Maryland's influential Jewish community, which had consistently supported Math-ias's campaigns for office.100 Mathias had voted to sell fighter planes to the Saudis in 1978, and his vote helped President Reagan get Senate clearance for the AWACS sale in 1981.
The same year the controversial article appeared, just after voters elected him to his third term in the Senate, Mathias took another step that appeared so politically inexpedient that many people assumed he had decided to retire from Congress in 1986.101 At the urging of Senators Howard Baker and Charles Percy, who wanted another moderate Republican on the Foreign Relarions Committee, Mathias gave up a senior position on the Appropriations Committee in order to take the foreign policy committee assignment.
His committee decision shook the leadership of Baltimore, the largest city in the state and a competitor for federal grant assistance. As the Baltimore Sun noted in an article critical of the move, "Had he remained on the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Mathias almost certainly would have become chairman of the subcommittee that holds the purse strings for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, an agency of great importance to the 'renaissance' of Baltimore."102
Contrary to the assumptions of Maryland political observers, Mathias was not planning to retire. He had left a committee that was important to his constituents, but the senator welcomed the opportunity to help shape the issues that come before the Foreign Relations Committee. He was exhibiting a political philosophy admired by former Senator Mike Mansfield, who once called Mathias "the conscience of the Senate," and by former Secretary of State Henty Kissinger, who recognized Mathias as "one of the few statesmen I met in Washington."103
These qualities led Mathias to write his controversial Foreign Affairs article, which called for "the reintroduction of civility" into the discussion of "ethnic advocacy" in Congress.104 He acknowledged that ethnic groups have the right to lobby for legislation, but he warned, "The affirmation of a right, and of the dangers of suppressing it, does not... assure that the right will be exercised responsibly and for the general good."
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Mathias cited the Israeli lobby as the most powerful ethnic pressure group, noting that it differs from others in that it focuses on vital national security interests and exerts "more constant pressure." Other lobbying groups "show up in a crisis and then disappear" and tend to deal with domestic matters. Mathias continued:
With the exception of the Eisenhower administration, which virtually compelled Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai after the 1956 war, American presidents, and to an even greater degree Senators and Representatives, have been subjected to recurrent pressures from what has come to be known as the Israel lobby.
He added an indictment of his colleagues: "For the most part they have been responsive [to pro-Israel lobbying pressure], and for reasons not always related either to personal conviction or careful reflection on the national interest."
Mathias illustrated his concern by reviewing the "spectacular" success of AIPAC in 1975 when the group promoted the "Spirit of 76" letter: "Seventy-six of us promptly affixed our signatures, although no hearings had been held, no debate conducted, nor had the administration been invited to present its views."
The Maryland Republican felt that the independence of Congress was compromised by the intimidating effect of AIPAC's lobbying. He wrote that "Congressional conviction" in favor of Israel "has been immeasurably reinforced by the knowledge that political sanctions will be applied to any who fail to deliver" on votes to support high levels of economic and military aid to Israel.
Although he signed AIPAC's letter to President Ford in 1975, Mathias resisted AIPAC's 1978 lobbying against the Carter administration's proposal to sell sixty F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. In the Senate debate before the vote, he said that both Israel and Saudi Arabia were important friends of the United States and that "both need our support."
Despite this attempt to balance American interests with those of Israel and Saudi Arabia, Mathias said an "emotional, judgmental atmosphere" surrounded the arms sale issue. He quoted from a letter, written to a New York Jewish newspaper, condemning his vote:
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Mr. Mathias values the importance of oil over the well-being of Jews and the state of Israel. . . . The Jewish people cannot be fooled by such a person, no matter what he said, because his act proved who he was.
Yet Mathias had already responded to such criticism in his Foreign Affairs article:
Resistance to the pressures of a particular group in itself signals neither a sellout nor even a lack of sympathy with a foreign country or cause, but rather a sincere conviction about the national interest of the United States.
He appealed to both the president and the Congress to "help to reduce the fractiousness and strengthen our sense of common American purpose." The presidents national constituency, he wrote, afforded him a unique opportunity to work toward this end, but Congress, "although more vulnerable to group pressures," must also be active.
Mathias asserted that it is not enough simply to follow public opinion: "An elected representative has other duties as well—to formulate and explain to the best of his or her ability the general interest, and to be prepared to accept the political consequences of having done so." He warned that ethnic advocacy tends toward excessiveness and can thwart the higher good of national interests.
The Baltimore Jewish Times reported that Jewish leaders faced "a delicate dilemma" as they considered how to respond to the article:
Basically, they're damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they keep a low profile and do not challenge Mathias s assertions, they feel they will be shirking their duty and giving in. Yet if they "go after" the Senator, they will be falling into a trap by proving his point about excessive pressure.105
Some Jews decided to take the latter course. Arnold Blumberg, a history professor at Towson State University, charged that Mathias "is in the mainstream of a tradition which urged Americans to pursue trade with Japan and Nazi Germany right up to the moment when scrap metal rained on the heads of American GIs from German and Japanese planes."106 A prominent Jewish community official charged that the article was "malicious" and expressed hurt that Mathias had the "poison in him to express these views."107 Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, a Democrat from New York and a senior member of the House Foreign
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Affairs Committee, charged that Mathias was "standing on the threshold of bigotry" and denying "to the ethnic lobbies alone the right to participate in shaping the American concensus on foreign policy."108 Other critics expressed the fear that the article would encourage anti-Semitism.109
A spokesperson for the Maryland Jewish War Veterans organization said Mathias had "sold" himself "to the cause of the Saudis," while a letter to the Baltimore Sun chided, "I wish that [Mathias] had had the integrity to express those views one year prior to his re-election rather than one year after."110
One critic, identified as "a former lobbyist," told the Jewish Times of Baltimore,
Mathias is a bright, well-respected legislator who's been effective on Soviet Jewry, but when it comes to Israel he was always the last to come on board. He was always reluctant, and was pressured by Jewish groups, and he resented the pressure. He sees himself as a statesman above the fray. Now he obviously feels he's in a position to say what he really believes.111
The Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco criticized Mathias in its August 3, 1981, "Backgrounder" newsletter for raising the issue of "dual loyalty" within the "Jewish lobby." Mathias dismissed the charge as a false issue.112 In Maryland, the article was denounced by some rabbis, and Rabbi Jacob Angus of Baltimore publicly defended Mathias.
Two journalist friends, Frank Mankiewicz and William Safire, warned Mathias that his article would "cause trouble." Two years later, Mankiewicz assessed the senator's future and said he felt the article had created serious problems.
Ethnic lobbying still worried Mathias. Pondering each word over a cup of tea one afternoon in the fall of 1983, he told me,
Ethnic ties enrich American life, but it must be understood they can't become so important that they obscure the primary duty to be an American citizen. Sometimes the very volume of this kind of activity can amount to an excessive zeal.
Some of his critics had not even read his article, Mathias recalls with a smile. "In a way, they were saying, I haven't read it, but it's outrageous." At breakfasts sponsored by Jewish groups, Mathias was regularly
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challenged. "When this happened, I would ask how many had actually read my article. In a crowd of 200, maybe two hands would be raised."
Did the article close off communication with Jewish constituents? "I can't say it closed off access, but I have noticed that invitations have fallen off in the past two years," said Mathias.
Mathias did not seek a fourth term in the Senate. He told a friend that controversy in the Jewish community was a factor in his decision.
$3.1 Million from Pru-lsrael Sources
Boy wonder of industry, self-made millionaire, tireless Republican campaigner for progressive causes—Charles H. Percy was a bright prospect for the presidency in the late sixties. He skyrocketed to prominence during his first term in the Senate, which began in 1967 after he won an upset victory over Paul Douglas, the popular but aging liberal Democrat.
In his first bid for election, 60 percent of Jewish votes—Illinois has the nation's fourth largest Jewish population—went to Douglas.113 But over the next six years Percy supported aid for Israel, urged the Soviet Union to permit emigration of Jews, criticized PLO terrorism, and supported social causes so forcefully that Jews rallied to his side when he ran for reelection. In 1972 Percy accomplished something never before achieved by carrying every county in the state. Even more remarkable for an Illinois Protestant Republican, he received 70 percent of the Jewish vote.
His honeymoon with Jews was interrupted in 1975 when he returned from a trip to the Middle East to declare, "Israel and its leadership, for whom I have a high regard, cannot count on the United States in the future just to write a blank check.""4 He said that Israel had missed some opportunities to negotiate, and he described PLO leader Yasser Arafat as "more moderate, relatively speaking, than other extremists such as George Habash." He urged Israel to talk to the PLO, provided the organization renounced terrorism and recognized Israel's right to exist behind secure defensible borders, noting that David Ben Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, had said that Israel must be willing to swap real estate for peace.
A week later Percy received this memorandum from his staff: "We have received 2,200 telegrams and 4,000 letters in response to your Mideast statements. . . . [They] run 95 percent against. As you might
The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 5
imagine, the majority of hostile mail comes from the Jewish community in Chicago. They threaten to withhold their votes and support for any future endeavors."
That same year, Percy offended pro-Israel activists when he did not sign the famous "Spirit of 76" letter, through which seventy-six of his Senate colleagues effectively blocked President Gerald R. Ford's intended "reappraisal" of Middle East policy. This brought another flood of protest mail."5
Despite these rumblings, the pro-Israel activists did not mount a serious campaign against Percy in 1978. With the senator's unprecedented 1972 sweep of the state fresh in their minds, they did not seek out a credible opponent either in the primary or the general election. In fact, when the Democratic nomination went largely by default to an unknown lawyer, Alex Seith, Jews took little interest. Even Percy's vote to approve the sale of F-15 planes to Saudi Atabia during the campaign year caused him no serious problem at that time.
In fact, only about one hundred Chicago Jews, few of them prominent, openly supported Seith. The challenger's scheduler, who is Jewish, called every synagogue and every Jewish men's and women's organization in the state, but only one agreed to let Seith speak. His campaign manager, Gary Ratner, concludes, "Most Jews felt there was no way Percy would lose, so why get him mad at us." Of the $1 million Seith spent, less than $20,000 came from Jews. Encouraged by Philip Klutznick, a prominent Chicago Jewish leader, Illinois Jews contribured several times that amount to Percy. Of seventy Jewish leaders asked to sign an advertisement supporting Percy, sixty-five gave their approval. On election day, Jewish support figured heavily in Percy's victory. He received only 53 percent of the statewide vote, but an impressive 61 percent of the Jewish vote.
The 1984 campaign was dramatically different. Pro-Israel forces targeted him for defeat early and never let up. Percy upset Jews by voting to support the Reagan administration sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, a sale also supported by the Carter administration. These developments provided new ammunition for the attack already underway against Percy. His decision was made after staff members who had visired Israel said they had been told by an Istaeli military official that the strategic military balance would nor be affected, bur that they did
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not want the symbolism of the United States doing business with Saudi Arabia.
Early in 1984, AIPAC decided to mobilize the full national resources of the pro-Israel campaign against Percy. In the March primary, it encouraged the candidacy of Congressman Tom Corcoran, Percy's challenger for the nomination. One of Corcoran's chief advisers and fundraisers was Morris Amitay, former executive director of AIPAC. Corcoran's high-decibel attacks portrayed Percy as anti-Israel. His fund-raising appeals to Jews cited Percy as "Israel's worst adversary in Congress." A full-page newspaper advertisement, sponsored by the Corcoran campaign, featured a picture of Arafat and headlined, "Chuck Percy says this man is a moderate."116 A letter to Jewish voters defending Percy and signed by fifty-eight leading Illinois Jews made almost no impact.
Although Percy overcame the primary challenge, Corcoran's attacks damaged his position with Jewish voters and provided a strong base for AIPAC's continuing assault.117 Thomas A. Dine, executive director of AIPAC, set the tone early in the summer by attacking Percy's record at a campaign workshop in Chicago. AIPAC encouraged fund-raising for Paul Simon and mobilized its political resources heavily against Percy. It assigned several student interns full time to the task of anti-Percy research, and it brought more than one hundred university students from out-of-state to campaign for Simon.
Midway through the campaign, AIPAC took a devious step to make Percy look bad. The key votes that were selected by AIPAC and used to rate all senators showed Percy supporting Israel 89 percent of the time during his career. This put him only a few points below Simon's 99-percent rating in the House of Representatives—hardly the contrast AIPAC wanted to cite in its anti-Percy campaign. The lobby solved the problem by changing its own rule book in the middle of the game. It added to the selected list a number of obscure votes that Percy had cast in the subcommittee, as well as letters and resolutions that Percy had not signed. The expanded list dropped the senator's rating to only 51 percent, a mark that Simon used when he addressed Jewish audiences.
While most financial support from pro-Israel activists came to Simon from individuals, political action committees figured heavily. By mid-August these committees had contributed $145,870 to Simon, more than to any other Senate candidate.118 By election day, the total had risen ro $235,000, with fifty-five committees participating.
The Deliberative Body Falls to Deliberate 5
In addition, California Jewish activist Michael Goland, using a loophole in the federal law, spent $1.6 million for billboard, radio, and television advertising that urged Illinoisans to "dump Percy" and called him a "chameleon." Percy undertook vigorous countermeasures. Former Senator Jacob Javits of New York, one of the nation's most prominent and respected Jews, and Senator Rudy Boschwitz, chairman of the Senate subcommittee on the Middle East, made personal appearances for Percy in Chicago, and one hundred Illinois Jews, led by former Attorney General Edward H. Levi, sponsored a full-page advertisement declaring that Percy "has delivered for Illinois, delivered for America, and delivered for Israel." The advertisement, in an unstated reference to Goland's attacks, warned, "Don't let our U.S. Senate race be bought by a Californian."
Except for charging in one news conference that Simon incorrectly proclaimed that he had a 100-percent voting record for the pro-Israel lobby, Percy tried to avoid the Israel-Jewish controversy in the campaign.
These precautions proved futile, as did his strong legislative endeavors. His initiatives as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee brought Israel $425 million more in grant aid than Reagan had requested in 1983 and $325 million more in 1984, but these successes for Israel seemed to make no difference. A poll taken a month before the election showed a large majority of Jews supporting Simon. The Percy campaign found no way to stem the tide.
When the votes were counted, Percy lost statewide by 89,000 votes."9 One exit poll indicated that Percy had won 35 percent of the Jewish vote. In the same balloting, Illinois Jews cast only 30 percent of their votes for the re-election of President Ronald Reagan—evidence of their unhappiness with the chief executive's views on the separation of church and state, abortion, and other social issues, not to mention his insistence on selling AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia.
In an election decided by so few votes, any major influence could be cited as crucial. Although broadly supportive of Reagan's program, Percy was remembered by many voters mainly as a moderate, progressive Republican. Some conservative Republicans rejoiced at his defeat. The "new right," symbolized by the National Conservative Political Action Committee, withheld its support from Percy, and early in the campaign indicated its preference for Simon, despite the latter's extremely liberal record in Congress.
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The Middle East controversy alone may have been sufficient to cost Percy his Senate seat. Thousands of Jews who had voted for Percy in 1978 left him for the Democratic candidate six years later. And these votes fled to Simon mainly because Israel's lobby worked effectively throughout the campaign year to portray the senator as basically anti-Israel. Percys long record of support for Israels needs amounted to a repudiation of the accusation, but too few Jews spoke up publicly in his defense. The senator found that once a candidate is labeled anti-Israel, the poison sinks so swiftly and deeply it is almost impossible to remove.
The Middle East figured heavily in campaign financing as well as voting.120 Simons outlay for the year was $5.3 million, Percys about $6 million. With Goland spending $1.6 million in his own independent attack on Percy, total expenditures on behalf of the Simon candidacy came to $6.9 million.
Forty percent—$3.1 million—of Simons campaign financing came from Jews who were disgruntled over Percys position on Arab-Israel relations. Indeed, Simon was promised half this sum before he became a candidate. While he was still pondering whether to vacate his safe seat in the House of Representatives in order to make the race, he was assured $1.5 million from Jewish sources. The promise came from Robert Schrayer, Chicago area businessman and leader in the Jewish community, whose daughter, Elizabeth, was helping to organize anti-Percy forces in her job as assistant director of political affairs for AIPAC.
Reviewing the impact of the Middle East controversy on his defeat, Percy says, "Did it make the difference? I don't know. But this I believe: I believe Paul Simon would not have run had he not been assured by Bob Schrayer that he would receive the $1.5 million."121 Simon acknowledges, "This assurance was a factor in my decision."
AIPAC's Thomas A. Dine told a Canadian audience: "All the Jews in America, from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And American politicians—those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire—got the message."122
"Leave the Grandstanding to Others"
The message came through so loud, so clear, that some senators now find it necessary to confer with AIPAC executives before introducing
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legislation related to the Middle East. One such politician is Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), who in the 2000 elections won out over her challenger, former Representative and critic of Israel Tom Campbell. Feinstein went on to sponsor, along with Mitch McConnell (R-KY), every blatantly pro-Israel piece of legislation in the 107th Senate. These senators reportedly conferred with Howard Kohr, executive director of AIPAC, before drafting their legislation. Kohr claims to receive "dozens of calls" from lawmakers asking what they can do to help Israel.
On May 2, 2002, Feinstein and McConnell introduced Senate Resolution 247 which, like Tom DeLay s "Israel First" resolution in the House, criticized the Palestinian Authority, condemned suicide bombings, and made no mention whatsoever of Israeli aggression. Senator Robert C. Byrd (D-WV), was appalled:
Nowhere in this resolution is Israel called upon to fulfill its role in working for peace in the Middle East. ... If the Senate is serious about promoting peace in the Middle East—and I believe to the depths of my soul that we are—then we should leave the grandstanding to others. We should support the real work of peacekeeping. . . . This is not the time for the United States Senate to wade into the fray waving a sledgehammer in the form of an ill-timed, ill-advised, and one-sided resolution, and I intend to
• 123
vote against it.
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The Lobby and the Oval Office

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 8

2008-08-15T10:39:00.001-07:00

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The Lobby and the Oval Office
On a Sunday afternoon, just a few days before the 1960 ptesidential election, John F. Kennedy, the Democratic candidate, patked his car in front of the residence ar 4615 W Street, just off Foxhall Road in a fashionable section of Washington, D.C. He was alone, unencumbered by the Secret Service officers who would soon be a part of his life.
Kennedy wanted to get away from campaign pressures and have a chat wirh Charles Bartlett, a journalist and a close friend of many years. Their friendship had remained firm since they became acquainted in Florida immediately after World War II, and it was Bartlert who introduced Kennedy to his future bride, Jacqueline Bouvier.
The night before, Kennedy had gone to dinner with a small group of wealthy and prominent Jews in New York City. An episode of the evening troubled him deeply. Describing it to Bartlett as an "amazing experience," he said one man at the dinner party—he did not identify him by name— told him that he knew Kennedy's campaign was in financial difficulty and, speaking for the group, offered "to help, and help significantly" if Kennedy as president "would allow them to set the course of Middle East policy over the next four years." It was an astounding proposition.1
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Kennedy told Bartlett that he reacted to the offer less as a presidential candidate than as a citizen. "He said he felt insulted," Bartlett recalls, "that anybody would make that offer, particularly to a man who even had a slim chance to be president. He said if he ever did get to be president, he would push for a law that would subsidize presidential campaigns out of the U.S. Treasury. He added that whatever the cost of this subsidy, it would insulate future presidential candidates from this kind of pressure and save the country a lot of grief in the long run."
Just what Kennedy said at the dinner in response to the proposition, Barlett did not know. "Knowing his style, he probably made a general comment and changed the subject."
After learning of the event from Bartlett, I talked with one of the people attending the dinner.2 Myer Feldman, a Washington attorney, had worked closely in the 1960 Kennedy campaign and would later become assistant to the president, with special responsibilities for liaison with the Jewish community. I hoped he could supply further details about the dinner party conversation. As a freshman congressman in 1961-62, I had had several friendly encounters with Feldman over wheat sales to the Soviet Union.
He recalled the gathering. It was held, he said, at the apartment of Abraham Feinberg, chairman of the American Bank and Trust Company in New York and influential in national Jewish affairs and the Democratic Party. Those attending, Feldman recalled, were "ambiguous about Kennedy." They weren't sure "which way he would go" on Middle East policy and were therefore not sure they would support him. The candidate was "peppered with tough and embarrassing questions." Asked for his opinion about moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, Kennedy replied, "Not under present circumstances." Feldman said that Kennedy answered all questions directly and made a good impression on his hosts. Feldman said he was unaware of the proposition that "insulted" the future president.
It was not the first time Middle East politics intruded forcibly into presidential campaigns. Bartlett says that when he related the episode to Roger L. Stevens, founding chairman of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C., Stevens responded, "That's very interesting, because exactly the same thing happened to Adlai [former UN Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson] in Los Angeles in 1956."
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Stevenson was then the Democratic candidate for president, opposing the re-election of Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Ethnic group pressure is an ever-present part of U.S. partisan politics, and because the president of the United States is the executor of all foreign policy, and the formulator of most of it, pressures naturally center on the people who hold or seek the presidency. When the ptessure is from friends of Israel, presidents—and presidential candidates—often yield.
Lobby pressure on the White House is applied at several different levels. The most direct—person-to-person—varies greatly, depending on the inclinations of the person who is president at the time.
Some of those applying pressure are close personal friends whose influence is limited to just one presidency, an example being Harry S Truman's close friendship with Ed Jacobson, his former haberdashery partner and an ardent Zionist. Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Krim, Jewish leaders from New York, maintained a close relationship with Lyndon B. Johnson.3 A White House official of the period recalls: "Arthur Krim stayed at the LBJ Ranch during crucial moments before the 1967 war, and his wife, Mathilde, was a guest in the White House during the war." White House logs show that Mrs. Krim talked frequently by telephone with Johnson.
Other Jewish leaders maintain a relationship from one administration to another. Abraham Feinberg of New York, who hosted the dinner for Kennedy in October 1960, kept close White House ties over a period of years. He was a frequent visitor at the White House during the Johnson years, and, as late as 1984, during the pre-convention presidential campaigning, brought the leading Democratic contenders, Walter Mon-dale and Gary Hart, together for a private discussion at his New York apartment. Philip Klutznick of Chicago, former president of B'nai B'rith, kept close relations throughout the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Carter administrations.
Sometimes Istaeli diplomats have a personal relationship that gives them direct access to the president. Ephraim Evron, then deputy chief in the Israeli embassy and a friend of Lyndon B. Johnson's since his Senate days, sometimes talked privately with Johnson in the Oval Office.
The second level of pressure comes through officials close to the president—his adviser on relations with the Jewish community or others among his top aides. President Kennedy told a friend, with a chuckle, that he learned that when he was away from Washington, Myer Feldman,
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his adviser on Jewish matters, would occasionally invite Jewish leaders to the White House for a discussion in the Cabinet Room.
The third level of pressure is within the top tiers of the U.S. departments—the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council—where Israeli officials and groups of U.S. citizens who are pro-Israeli activists frequently call to present their agendas to cabinet officers or their chief deputies.
"The Votes Are Against You"
Zionists began pressing their case early in Harry S. Truman's administration and intensified their efforts in 1947, when Truman initially expressed opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.4 Jewish leaders bought newspaper advertising designed to transform public shame and outrage over the Holocaust into popular support for the idea of a Jewish national homeland. Both Houses of Congress passed resolutions urging presidential support.
When Truman continued to resist and publicly urged citizens to avoid inflaming "the passions of the inhabitants of Palestine," a group of New Jersey Jews wired: "Your policy on Palestine . . . has cost you our support in 1948."5 With election day approaching, it was a reminder of the grim political facts of life. Two-thirds of American Jews lived in New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois, and these states would cast 110 electoral votes in the presidential voting.6 Considered the underdog in the upcoming election despite his incumbency, Truman knew he must have those votes to win.
With a proclamation announcing the new state of Israel expected soon, Truman assembled his Middle East ambassadors to get their views. Their spokesman, ambassador to Egypt Pinkerton "Pinky" Tuck, advised against the United States' immediate recognition of the state.7 He told Truman that the decision to recognize Israel should be delayed long enough to allow a consultation with Arab states, which Truman's predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had promised the king of Saudi Arabia.
Truman replied, "Mr. Tuck, you may be right, but the votes are against you." In deciding to recognize Israel immediately, Truman rejected not just Tuck's advice but that of all his military and diplomatic advisers. He chose instead the recommendation of his close friend Ed Jacobson. In fact, pro-Israeli partisans today generally view Truman's
The Lobby and the Oval Office 5
immediate recognition of Israel as a prime example of effective lobbying through a "key contact" rather than via the usual pressure tactics.8 Jacob-son's pro-Zionist view was shared by Truman's political advisers, particularly his legal counsel, Clark Clifford.
Secretary of State George C. Marshall opposed the decision so strongly that he bluntly told Truman soon after his recognition announcement that if the election were held the next day he would not vote for him.9 Sentiments were, of course, much different in Israel. During a 1949 White House visit, the chief rabbi of Israel told the president, "God put you in your mother's womb so you would be the instrument to bring about the rebirth of Israel after 2,000 years."10
In partisan political terms, Truman's decision paid off. On election day he received 75 percent of the nation's Jewish vote, which helped him win a razor-thin upset victory—and a permanent place of honor on the face of Israeli postage stamps, as well as in the hearts of Zionists.
Dismayed by Partisan Cnnsideratinns
Presidential behavior toward the state of Israel took a turn in the opposite direction when Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, assumed office. He resisted pressures from the Israeli lobby, and on three occasions forced Israel to abandon major policies to which it was publicly and strongly committed.
In September 1953, Eisenhower ordered a cancellation of all aid— amounting to $26 million—until Israel stopped work on a diversion canal being constructed on the Jordan River, a violation of the 1949 ceasefire agreements." The diversion canal would help Israel assume control of water resources that were important to all nations in the region. It was the first time a president actually cut off all aid to Israel. Eisenhower also instructed the Treasury Department to draft an order removing the tax-deductible status of contributions made to the United Jewish Appeal and other organizations that raised funds for Israel in the United States.
Predictably, Eisenhower's decision kicked up a major storm.12 Dr. Israel Goldstein told an audience of 20,000 celebrating Jerusalem's 3,000th birthday at New York's Madison Square Garden: "Peace will not be helped by withholding aid as an instrument of unwarranted duress."13 New York members of Congress joined the bandwagon. Senator Robert Wagner called the decision "cruel and intemperate," and
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Congressman Emanuel Celler denounced it as a "snap judgment." All major Jewish organizations condemned the action.
Eisenhower stood firm in withholding aid, and less than two months later Israel announced it was ceasing work on the river diversion project. The president had won a first round, the confrontation was postponed, aid to Israel was resumed, and the order ending the privileged tax status enjoyed by Zionist groups was not issued.
Eisenhower faced the lobby again in October 1956, just days before his re-election as president.14 Israel had negotiated a secret deal with Britain and France under which the three nations would coordinate a military attack on the Nasser regime in Egypt, which had just taken over the Suez Canal. Israel would strike across the Sinai Desert and move against the canal, while British and French forces would deploy an air bombardment and then invade from the north.
The allied governments assumed that the United States would not interfere; France and Britain believed that Eisenhower would avoid a public showdown with his wartime allies. With the U.S. presidential election just days away, Israel counted on partisan pressures from its American lobby to keep candidate Eisenhower on the sidelines. They all miscalculated.
Israels invasion of Egypt began on October 29. Eisenhower immediately canceled all aid to Israel. He permitted only the delivery of food already in transit, stopping all other forms of assistance, both economic and military. These measures created such pressure that Israel halted its attack. The British and French, also under heavy U.S. pressure, abandoned their invasion from the north. Despite partisan assaults on his Middle East policy, the president was easily reelected.15 In fact, more U.S. Jews (40 percent) voted for Eisenhower in 1956 than in 1952 (36 percent).
But Eisenhower s problems with Israel were far from over. Even after the invasion was halted, Israel decided to keep occupying forces in the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, as well as the strategic village of Sharm el-Sheik at the access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Despite protests by the United States and six resolutions by the United Nations, Israel refused to withdraw.16 As weeks passed, lobby pressure against Eisenhowers position received support from Eleanor Roosevelt, former President Truman, and the leaders of both parties in the Senate, Democrat Lyndon Johnson of Texas, and Republican William Knowland of California.
The Lobby and the Oval Office 5
Informed that the United States might support UN sanctions against Israel, Knowland threatened to resign as a member of the UN delegation and warned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, "This will mean a parting of the ways."17 Dulles was firm: "I think you should study this. We cannot have all our policies made in Jerusalem." Dulles told Henry Luce, owner of Time, Inc. and a supporter of Israels position, "I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to carry out a foreign policy not approved by the Jews. [But] I am going to try to have one. This does not mean I am anti-Jewish, but I believe in what George Washington said in his farewell address, that an emotional attachment to another country should not interfere."
Eisenhower considered the issue vital. He summoned the bipartisan leadership of Congress to the White House to request their support. Unwilling to tangle with pro-Israeli activists, the group refused. That night the president wrote in his diary: "As I reflected on the pettiness of the discussion of the morning, I found it somewhat dismaying that partisan considerations should enter so much into life-or-death, peace-or-war decisions."18
A determined president took his case to the American people in a televised address in the spring of 1957:
Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of the United Nations' disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own withdrawal? If we agreed that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international order.19
Letters and telegrams poured into the White House. Almost all of the communications came from Jews, 90 percent of which supported Israels position. Dulles complained, "It is impossible to hold the line, because we get no support from the Protestant elements in the country.20 All we get is a battering from the Jews."
Eisenhower persisted, declaring that the United States would support a UN resolution imposing sanctions if Israel did not withdraw from all of the Sinai peninsula and from Gaza and threatening to take away the tax privilege enjoyed by donors to Israeli causes.21 Faced with that prospect, Israel finally capitulated and withdrew from the occupied territory.
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"Armed Shipments Are... Ready to Go"
Israel fared better at the hands of the next occupants of the White House. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson began to help Israel in its military activities.
Although there is no evidence to suggest that Kennedy accepted the dinner party proposition—to exchange control of Middle East policy for campaign contributions—he fared well on election day in 1960, receiving 82 percent of the Jewish vote, topping even Harry Truman's 75 percent, and, as president, he made a decision that was vital to Israel's military plans.22 He approved, for the first time in history, the U.S. sale of weapons to Israel.23
But Israel's military fortunes received a still greater boost with the arrival in the Oval Office of President Lyndon B. Johnson, whose sympathy for the underdog—in his view, Israel—made him responsive to the demands of Israel and its lobby in the United States.24 Friends of Israel with special influence included Arthur Goldberg, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations; Philip Klutznick of Chicago; and three New Yorkers, Abraham Feinberg and Arthur and Mathilde Krim.25 The Krims often worked through the Rostow brothers, Walt Rostow, Johnson's national security adviser, and Eugene Rostow, assistant secretary of state for political affairs.26
In a September 1966 letter to Feinberg, Klutznick called for an improved relationship between Johnson and the U.S. Jewish community.27 He did not want Jewish differences with Johnson over the Vietnam War or aid to private schools, for example, to complicate American support for Israel. He called on Feinberg to help establish a "sense of participation." The elements of a deal were present. At the time, Johnson desperately wanted public support for the war in Southeast Asia, and the Jewish leaders wanted assurance that the United States would stand by Israel in a crisis. Aid levels were increased, clearances for almost any military item were issued, and extensive credit was extended.
Lobby pressure may not have been needed to persuade Johnson to support Israel, but the pressure came nevertheless. Harold Saunders, a member of the National Security Council staff who would later become Carter's assistant secrerary of state for the Near East and South Asia, recalls the avalanche of telegrams and letters that urged President Johnson to stand behind Israel when Egypt's Presidenr Nasser closed the Strait
The Lobby and the Oval Office 5
of Tiran in May 1967: "I had 150,000 telegrams and letters from the Jewish community in boxes in my office. I do not exaggerate. There were 150,000 pieces of paper sitting there. They all said the same thing. And Johnson decreed that every one of them should be answered."
In early June, on the day that Israel attacked Egypt, the president received this urgent message from Walter Rostow: "Arthur Krim reports that many armed shipments are packed and ready to go to Israel, but are being held up. He thinks it would be most helpful if these could be released."28
Israel was at war, and this time the president of the United States would cause no problems. Aid would go forward without interruption, and calls for sanctions against Israel in the United Nations would face adamant U.S. opposition. The United States would actively support Israel's military endeavors. Powerful new ties with Israel would lead the president of the United States to cover up the facts concerning one of the most astonishing disasters in the history of the United States Navy, the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty.
Saunders recalls that after the Arab-Israeli war, pro-Israeli interests blanketed the White House with the basic demand that Israel not be forced to withdraw from territory it occupied until the Arab states agreed to a "just and lasting peace" with Israel. Under this demand, Israel could use occupied Arab territory as a bargaining chip in seeking Arab recognition, an option that President Eisenhower refused after the Suez crisis in 1957.
Saunders adds, "This Israeli demand was accepted by President Johnson without discussion in the National Security Council or other policy institutions. It has had a profound impact on the course of events in the Middle East since that time." According to another high official of that period, the policy was adopted because the lobby succeeded in "pervading the very atmosphere of the White House."
Nixon's Order Ignored
Although Johnson's successor, Richard M. Nixon, came to office with little Jewish help, he supported Israel so heavily in his first term as president that in the 1972 re-election campaign Israel's ambassador to Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, openly campaigned for him. Nixon won 35 percent of the Jewish vote in 1972, up twenty points from four years before.29
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In 1973 Nixon came powerfully to Israel's defense when Arab states tried to recover territory seized in 1967 by the Israelis. During the conflict, the weapons and supplies that Nixon ordered airlifted to Israel proved to be Israel's lifeline. His decision to order forces on a high state of alert worldwide may have kept the Soviet Union from undertaking a larger role in the conflict.
Privately, Nixon criticized Israel for failing to cooperate in a comprehensive settlement of issues with its Arab neighbors.30 On several occasions, he ordered Henry Kissinger, national security adviser (and later, secretary of state), to suspend aid to Israel until it became more cooperative. Three days before he resigned the presidency, Nixon instructed Kissinger to disapprove an Israeli request for "long-term military assistance." Kissinger writes in his memoirs: "He would cut off all military deliveries to Israel until it agreed to a comprehensive peace. He regretted not having done so earlier. He would make up for it now. His successor would thank him for it. I should prepare the necessary papers." Kissinger adds that Nixon did not return to the subject. Although "the relevant papers were prepared," according to Kissinger, they were "never signed." Nor did Kissinger see fit to carry out the orders. (In July 1984, Nixon verified the Kissinger account, saying it was accurate and adding that he "still believes that aid to Israel should be tied to cooperation in a comprehensive settlement."31)
Assuming the presidency in 1975, Gerald R. Ford took no action on the cutoff papers prepared for Nixon. (In 1983, while taking part in a conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, I asked Ford's former chief of staff, Richard Cheney, who had been my colleague in the House of Representatives, if he knew what happened to the papers Kissinger had drafted. He said he was totally unaware of the papers. They seemed to have disappeared without a trace.) Nevertheless, Ford confronted Rabin, who by then had become the Israeli prime minister, over the same comprehensive peace issue. In an effort to elicit greater Israeli cooperation, Ford announced in 1975 that he would "reassess" U.S. policy in the Middle East. Under lobby-organized pressure from the Senate, Ford dropped the reassessment, but this retreat did not win him votes when he sought a full rerm as president the next year. In 1976, 68 percent of the Jewish vote went to Democrat Jimmy Carter.
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Uncritical Support Is No Favor to Israel
During the period between Carter s election in 1976 and his inauguration in January 1977, the Israeli lobby played a role in his decision on who would manage foreign policy. Carter decided to nominate as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a man of decency and fairness who possessed the right impulses regarding Middle East policy. In doing so, however, he passed over George W. Ball, a man who had all these same important qualities but who also possessed the experience, personal force, and worldwide prestige Carter would need in upcoming crises in the Middle East and elsewhere.
When I visited Ball at his Princeton, New Jersey, residence during the summer of 1983, he was well into writing his fourth major book. I found him in a room at the end of a narrow corridor that was lined with cartoons and photographs of the political past. The large high-ceilinged room bustled with the activity of a city newsroom just before press time.
At the center of it all, pecking away at a word processor keyboard and surrounded by papers stacked high on a U-shaped table, sat the man who had been deputy secretary of state under two presidents, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and an executive with one of Manhattan's largest investment banking firms. At 73, he was still busy trying to bring order to a world in disarray. The Manchester Guardian characterized him as "an idealist facing chaos with dignity."32
I was armed with questions. What price had Ball paid for speaking out on Middle East issues? Had it hurt his law practice, or spoiled his chances to serve in higher office? Ball took time to talk, but he was busy. He had just addressed the cadets at West Point and was midway through preparing an editorial piece for the Washington Post in which he would warn the Reagan administration of immense pitfalls ahead in its Lebanese policy. Ball was one of my heroes, especially for his courage on Vietnam policy, and I admired his brilliance as a writer. Eloquent and witty, he reminded me of his colleague in the Johnson administration, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, although their views on Vietnam wete sharply at odds.
"I'll be with you in a minute," Ball said, glancing up from the keyboard. He gave the computer keys a few more whacks, stood up, whipped out a diskette and told his assistant, Lee Hurford, "Print it all."
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His six-foot two-inch frame exuded confidence and power. Making his way through the array of books and papers, he explained, "I'm addicted to this machine. I would never go back to a typewriter. I quit commuting to Manhattan," he added, gesturing down the corridor, "because I can slip down here evenings if I have some ideas to put down."
Put them down he has. Over the years many diplomats have firmly criticized Israeli policies, but most have confined their advice to private circles. Those who have spoken out publicly usually have done so in muted tones. Close friends doubt that Ball has any muted tones. He has never pulled any punches. But while on government assignments Ball dutifully kept his advice private.
Ball has paid a price for such candor on Israeli policy. He was one of only three people considered for appointment as secretary of state under President Carter. Had it not been for his outspoken views on Middle East affairs, his nomination would have seemed inevitable.
His political and professional credentials were immaculate. A lifelong Democrat, he twice campaigned vigorously for Adlai E. Stevenson for president. In 1959 he became a supporter of John E Kennedys presidential ambitions. His diplomatic experience and prestige were diverse and unmatched. He had served as number two man in the State Department under Presidents John E Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In those assignments he dealt intimately with the Cuban missile crisis and most other major issues in foreign policy for six years. He took the job as ambassador to the UN, a job he did not want, because, in his words, "LBJ had surrounded me."33
Ball challenged military policies forcefully within administration circles. Deliberating a proposed policy, Johnson would frequently go around the cabinet room for advice, then say, "Now let s hear what Ball has to say against it." Ball consistently argued against the buildup in Vietnam. The Washington Post described him as "the consistent dove in a hawkish administration." Journalist Walter Lippman, a close friend, urged him to resign in protest: "Feeling as you do, you should resign and make your opposition public." Ball declined, believing it important that criticism of the war be heard directly from within the administration, although Johnson usually rejected his advice.34
Ball was one of Americas best-known and most admired diplomats, but he probably spiked his prospects of becoming Carter s secretary of
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state when he wrote an article entitled "The Coming Crisis in Israeli-American Relations" for the Winter 1975-76 issue of Foreign Affairs.35 It provoked a storm of protest from the Jewish community.
In the article, Ball cited President Eisenhower's demand that Israel withdraw from the Sinai as "the last time the United States ever took, and persisted in, forceful action against the strong wishes of an Israeli government." He saw the event as a watershed. "American Jewish leaders thereafter set out to build one of Washington's most effective lobbies, which now works in close cooperation with the Israeli embassy."
He lamented the routine leakage of classified information:
Not only do Israels American supporters have powerful influence with many members of the Congress, but practically no actions touching Israel's interests can be taken, or even discussed, within the executive branch without it being quickly known to the Israeli government.
He bemoaned Israel's rejection of U.S. advice at a time when Israels dependence on U.S. aid had "reached the point of totality." Yet he was not surprised that Israel pursued an independent course:
Israelis have been so long conditioned to expect that Americans will support their country, no matter how often it disregards American advice and protests and Americas own interests.
Despite such sharp criticism, for a time candidate Carter considered Ball his principal foreign policy adviser, and selected him as one of three finalists for secretary of state. The other two finalists were Paul Warnke, former assistant secretary of defense, and, of course, Cyrus Vance. Zbig-niew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, wrote in his book Power and Principle that Ball was his preference for secretary of state during the period preceding election day (he later shifted his preference to Vance). Asked for his views during the post-election process at Plains, Georgia, Brzezinski told Carter that Ball would be "a strong conceptu-alizer but probably a poor organizer, an assertive individual but probably somewhat handicapped by his controversial position on the Middle East." He said Ball's appointment as secretary of state would be received "extremely well in Western Europe and Japan, probably somewhat less so in the developing countries, and negatively in Israel." A number of
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Jewish leaders urged Carter not to name Ball to any significant role in his administration. The characteristic that made Ball unacceptable to the Israeli lobby was his candor; he wasn't afraid to speak up and criticize Israeli policy. Carter dropped Ball from consideration.
With Carter's cabinet selection process completed, Ball continued to speak out. Early in 1977 he wrote another article for Foreign Affairs, titled "How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," in which he urged the new administration to take the lead in formulating a comprehensive settlement that would be fair to the Palestinians as well as Israel. For a time Carter moved in this direction, even trying to communicate with the Palestine Liberation Organization through Saudi Arabia. When this approach floundered, Carter shifted his focus to attempting to reach a settlement between Egypt and Israel at Camp David, where Ball believes Carter was double-crossed by Begin. "I talked with Carter just before Camp David," said Ball. "We had a long dinner together. He told me he was going to try to get a full settlement on Middle East issues, and he seemed to understand the significance of the Palestinian issue. On this I have no doubt, and I think he desperately wanted to settle it." After the Camp David meeting, Israel frustrated Carter's goals, continuing to build settlements in occupied territory and blocking progress toward autonomy for Palestinians in the West Bank.
Although not a part of the Carter administration, Ball continued to be an all-time favorite on television interview shows. One of these appearances led to a public exchange with a Jewish leader. On a panel interview in late 1977, Ball said he felt the Jewish community in the United States had put U.S. interests "rather secondary in many cases." To Morris B. Abram, Manhattan lawyer and former president of the American Jewish Committee, these were fighting words. Enlisted the year before in support of the effort to make Ball the secretary of state, Abram wrote him a public letter, published in the Washington Post, charging that these comments established Ball "as one who is willing to accept and spread age-old calumnies about Jews."36
Responding in the Washington Post, Ball denied that he was suggesting that "even the most ardent Zionist consciously choose Israel over America." He explained, "I suggest rather that the effect of their uncritical encouragement of Israels most excessive actions is not wholly consistent with the United States' interests." His correspondence with Abram was published in the Washington Post. Ball concluded:
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When leading members of the American Jewish community give [Israel s] government uncritical and unqualified approbation and encouragement for whatever it chooses to do, while striving so far as possible to overwhelm any criticism of its actions in Congress and in the public media, they are, in my view, doing neither themselves nor the United States a favor.
During the Reagan administration, Ball became one of the few Democrats who attempted to take his party back to the Middle East morality of Eisenhower. Of Reagan, he said:
He did not demand, as he should have done under the law, that we would exact the penalties provided unless the Israelis stopped murdering civilians with the weapons we had provided them solely for self-defense. Instead he bought them off by committing our own marines to maintain order while we persuaded the PLO leaders to leave rather than face martyrdom.
Ball did not let his business career, any more than his public career, soften his public expressions. He admitted that his plain talk about the Middle East "certainly hasn't helped" him as a businessman:
I'm sure that my partners at Lehman Brothers had to absorb a certain amount of punishment. But they were tolerant and understanding people. I never felt I lost anything very much by speaking out. I'm politically untouchable, but I am sure certain groups would rather shoot me than deal with me.37
While he was never shot for his views, Ball's encounters with the Israeli lobby were numerous, and they began early in his career. He recalls the day, during the 1952 presidential race, when a pro-Israel emissary visited Adlai Stevenson's presidential campaign headquarters in Springfield, Illinois. The emissary told Ball that his friends had gathered a "lot of money" but wanted to "discuss the Israeli question" before turning it over. Ball says Stevenson met with the group—"he met with any group"—but he "never made any of the promises expected."
In more recent presidential campaigns, Ball experienced lobby pressure of a different kind. In early 1979, impressed with the early pronouncements of Republican John B. Anderson, Ball announced that he planned to vote for the maverick, who was running for president as an independent. Upon hearing the news, an elated Anderson called Ball and promised to visit him at Princeton "soon." Anderson soon changed his mind. He never came. Convinced by his campaign staff that he had
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to cultivate the pro-Israeli community if he hoped to make progress as a candidate, Anderson made a ritual visit to Israel. He issued statements fully supporting Israel. He shunned Ball.
Being shunned was not a new experience for the elder statesman. In 1983, after testifying to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one morning, Ball was approached by Senator John Glenn, who was already testing the presidential waters. Glenn invited Ball to call because he wanted his advice on foreign policy issues. After trying unsuccessfully to get calls through, Ball wrote to him. He stated his willingness to help Glenn set up a panel of scholars and former diplomats who could help the candidate with ideas, statements, and speeches during the hectic days of campaigning. Ball had done the same thing for Adlai Stevenson in 1956. Several weeks later, a letter arrived from Glenn stating that he would take up the suggestions with his campaign staff. That was the end of Ball s relationship with Glenn.
Despite the intimidating factors that led candidates Carter, Anderson, and Glenn to avoid linkage with the former ambassador, Ball feels the lobby is overrated in the power it can deliver. While it controls many votes in strategically important states and provides generous financial support to candidates, he contends that these are not the principal factors of its influence. Ball believes the lobby's instrument of greatest power is its willingness to make broad use of the charge of anti-Semitism: "They've got one great thing going for them. Most people are terribly concerned not to be accused of being anti-Semitic, and the lobby so often equates criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. They keep pounding away at that theme, and people are deterred from speaking out." In Ball's view, many Americans feel a "sense of guilt" over the extermination of Jews by Nazi Germany. The result of this guilt is that the fear of being called anti-Semitic is "much more effective in silencing candidates and public officials than threats about campaign money or votes."
He Was Not Consistent
Jimmy Carter, for a fleeting moment, gave every indication of being a president who would stand up to Israel and pursue policies based on U.S. interests in the Middle East. He came to the presidency determined to be fair to Arab interests as well as to those of Israel, and once in office even advocated a homeland with secure borders for the Palestinians.
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While this endeavor soon faded, Carter made great strides in foreign policy elsewhere. In addition to organizing the Camp David Accords, his administration marked the consummation of the treaty with Panama, normalization of diplomatic relations with China, a major reform in international trade policy, and the initial agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation. In overall Middle East policy, however, he lacked consistent purpose and commitment.
Carter was dismayed when Jews in the United States remained disgruntled with his administration despite his major role in achieving a long-sought Israeli goal, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. A senior diplomat, whose career stretches over thirty years, remembered the pressures Jewish groups brought to bear following the joint U.S.-Soviet communique of October 1977.38 Carter was trying to revive the Geneva conference on the Middle East in order to get a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The American Jewish community strongly objected. The diplomat recalled, "I remember I really had my hands full meeting with protesting Jewish groups. I figured up one day, totaling just the people the groups said they represented, that I must have met with representatives of half the entire U.S. Jewish community."
The groups came well briefed. All, he says, used the same theme:
What a terrible unpatriotic act it was to invite the Russians back into the Middle East; it was anti-Israel, almost anti-Semitic. I would spend part of my time meeting Jewish groups on Capitol Hill in the offices of Senators and Congressmen. Other times I would meet with groups of twenty to forty in my conference room at the State Department. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Vance would be meeting with other groups, and the President with still others.
The pressure was too much. Carter yielded to the lobbies and quickly dropped the proposal. But he learned, like Ford had before him, that yielding to the lobby on relations with Israel did not pay dividends on election day. Many Jews deserted him when he sought re-election in 1980.
"They Wouldn't Give Him a Dime"

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 9

2008-08-15T10:37:00.000-07:00

"They Wouldn't Give Him a Dime"
The same year, the pressures of pro-Israeli activists became decisive in the fortunes of a renegade Texas Democrat who turned Republican because he wanted to succeed Jimmy Carter as president.
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In October 1979, John Connally, who had been Democratic governor of Texas, came to Washington to give the first major foreign policy speech of his campaign for the presidency. The field of Republican aspirants to the White House was already crowded. Although Ronald Reagan had not yet formally entered the race, seven other Republicans had announced their candidacy.
Connally s campaign theme was "leadership for America," and television advettisements showed him as the "candidate of the forgotten American who goes to church on Sunday."39 America, Connally believed, was looking for leadership. His speech to the Washington Press Club contained a section outlining a plan to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was part of a campaign strategy designed to present the former governor of Texas and secretary of the treasury as a decisive leader who was capable of talking man to man with powerful foreigners. He had served in several cabinet positions under President Nixon. With his wide-tanging political experience, he should have known the sensitivity of the Arab-Israeli question.
Several Middle East peace plans had been advanced by ptesidents, but the plan Connally outlined in his speech was the most ambitious ever presented by a candidate for the office. He argued that the Carter initiative at Camp David had stalled because of failed diplomatic leadership and that it was time for the United States to pursue a new Middle East policy, one "based not on individual Arab or Israeli interests, but on American interests."40
American interests demanded peace and stability in the region, Connally said, and this could best be achieved by a program whereby the Israelis withdrew from occupied Arab tetritories in return for Arab acceptance of Israeli sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Arabs would be obligated to "renounce forever all hostile actions toward Jews and give up the use of oil supply and prices to force political change." This would ensure an uninterrupted supply of Middle East oil, which, Connally said, "is and will continue to be the lifeblood of Western civilization for decades to come." The United States would guarantee the stability of the region by greatly expanding its military presence there.
Connally became the first prominent presidential candidate to declare his support for Palestinian self-determination.41 He said that the Palestinians should have the option of establishing an independent state on the
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West Bank and Gaza or an autonomous area within Jordan. Palestinian leaders who were willing to work for a compromise peace settlement with Israel should be welcomed to discussions, he added, but "those extremists who refuse to cooperate and continue to indulge in terrorism should be treated as international outlaws by the international community."
Connally also suggested that future American aid be conditioned on Israeli willingness to adopt a more reasonable policy on the West Bank. Noting the strain imposed upon the Israeli economy by the need for constant military preparedness, he said, "Without billions of dollars in American economic and military aid, Israel simply could not survive. Yet it is only candid to say that support for this level of aid, in the absence of greater willingness by Israeli leadership to compromise with their neighbors, is eroding." He criticized the Begin governments "policy of creeping annexation of the West Bank," quoting a group of American Jewish leaders who earlier in the year had denounced Israeli policy regarding the West Bank as "morally unacceptable and perilous for the democratic character of the Jewish state."
Connally knew his speech would stir controversy, and indeed the criticism came quick and hard. Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, said Connally s call for withdrawal from the territories "is a formula for Israel's liquidation." The Washington Star quoted unnamed Israeli officials in Washington as calling his plan "a total surrender to blackmail by Arab oil-producing countries." Henry Siegman, executive director of the American Jewish Congress, said Connally s criticism of the Camp David peace process "gives encouragement to the Arab confrontation states who urge a violent solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is disappointing, although perhaps not surprising, that Mr. Connally should emerge as the candidate of the oil interests."42 Connally s campaign manager later accused the Israeli embassy of orchestrating the attack.
Few news commentators praised his speech. Christian Science Monitor columnist Joseph C. Harsch found Connally's peace plan remarkable for its candor.43 Harsch wrote that Connally "broke with and, indeed, defined the pro-Israel lobby." He "said things about Israel which no prominent American politician has dared to say for a long time, with the exception of Senator J. William Fulbright." Agreeing that the peace plan was really nothing new, Harsch pointed out that it "comes out of
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the book of official American foreign policy as stated since the 1967 war." What was unusual, Harsch wrote, was that this policy should be articulated by a candidate for president:
The immediate question is whether Mr. Connally can demonstrate that it is possible to take the official government position on Middle East policy and still survive in the present political climate.
Writing in the Nation, Arthur Samuelson called Connally s plan "both wrong and dangerous," but went on to say that "Connally s candor is praiseworthy":
For all too long, public debate over the Middle East has been characterized by a marked dishonesty on the part of aspirants for public office. Rather than put forward how they plan to break the impasse in American-Israeli relations that has remained constant since 1967, they fall over one another in praise of Israel s virtues.44
The Washington Post called Connally s speech "a telling measure of how American debate on this central issue is developing":
No previous candidate for a major party's presidential nomination has staked out a position so opposed to the traditional line. Mr. Connally offers no deference to the "Jewish lobby," attacking the current Israeli governments policies head-on.45
Within a few days of the speech, however, less friendly voices were heard.46 A Jewish Republican running for mayor of Philadelphia snubbed Connally by refusing to be photographed with him. Two Jewish members of Connally s national campaign committee resigned in protest. One of them, Rita Hauser, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council of the American Jewish Committee, called the speech "inexcusable" and said it represented "the straight Saudi line." The second, attorney Arthur Mason, said he was fearful that Connally s speech might stir anti-Semitism.
The bad news kept coming. The New York Republican Committee withdrew its invitation for Connally to speak at its annual Lincoln Day dinner, and traditional big givers boycotted a fund-raiser in New York that was to feature Connally.47 The Washington Post quoted an unnamed source who said the speech had robbed Connally of the support that his
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pro-business positions had won among some Jews: "Now they wouldn't give him a dime."48
Certainly the Connally candidacy suffered problems that were unrelated to his positions on the Middle East: the campaign experienced organizational difficulties; the forceful Texan came across to some as too "hot" on the "cool" medium of television; and he was undoubtedly hurt by his switch from the Democratic to the Republican party in 1973. But Winton Blount, Connally s campaign chairman, believes that none of these factors equalled the "devastating" effect of the controversial speech. Connally himself says there is "no question" that the speech hurt. Columnist William Safire, an admirer of Connally but also a pro-Israeli hard-liner, made a pained assessment of the speech's effect on the presidential race:
Supporters of Israel—along with many others concerned with noisy U.S. weakness in the face of Soviet military and Arab economic threats—made a reassessment of Ronald Reagan and decided he looked ten years younger.49
Succumbing to Israeli Dictates
In 1984 it was no contest at all on the Republican side of the presidential race, either for the nomination or in respect to policy toward Israel. Ronald Reagan had the field to himself, and he was not about to risk a confrontation like the one that had proved fatal to the candidacy of John Connally four years before.
In late 1983, certain to be a candidate for re-election, Reagan was in a position to deliver, not just promise. He encountered Israeli pressures in opposition to his September 1982 peace plan and his delay in delivering fighter aircraft in the wake of Israel's bombing of the Iraq nuclear plant. But he avoided a major showdown with Israel, and, beginning in 1983, Reagan went all-out for the Jewish vote, pandering to the Israeli lobby while trying to keep the Middle East crisis on hold until after the election.50
Polls showed the need for repair work.51 In 1980 Reagan had received 40 percent of the Jewish vote—the largest ever for a Republican presidential candidate—but half of this support had since drifted away. In
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April 1983 Albert A. Spiegel, a longtime Reagan supporter, quit as a special adviser to Reagan on Jewish affairs.52 Spiegel was upset over a newspaper story that said that Reagan intended to press his Middle East peace plan despite Jewish opposition, and that he felt he could be reelected without Jewish votes.
In December, Reagan launched a broad bid for Jewish support. The first action was upgrading the position of the White House liaison with the Jewish community, but his changes on the policy front were even more significant. After meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in December 1983, Reagan announced a dramatic increase in the level of aid to Israel.53 Instead of the old formula, under which Israel was required to pay back some of the funds advanced, the administration requested that in the future all aid be in the form of a grant. In addition, in a gesture to Israel's sagging industry, he agreed that $250 million in U.S. aid funds could be spent in Israel to help finance the manufacture of a new Israeli warplane.54 United States aircraft firms were dismayed, because they receive no similar government aid.
Reagan proposed a new, higher level of "strategic cooperation" in the military field and a free trade relationship that would make Israel the only nation with tariff-free access to both the European community and the United States. All of this won applause from the Israeli lobby. Near East Report, the AIPAC newsletter, declared editorially: " [Reagan] has earned the gratitude of all supporters of a strong United States-Israel relationship."55
In March, Reagan made further concessions to the lobby.56 He refused to intercede with Israel at the request of King Hussein of Jordan, whom he had been pressing to join the peace process. Aiming both to strengthen Yasser Arafat against more radical elements within the Palestine Liberation Organization and to improve his own influence over the Palestinian cause, Hussein asked the president for help. He wanted Reagan to press Israel to permit Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza to attend the upcoming session of the Palestine National Council. In another message, Hussein asked the United States to support a UN resolution declaring illegal the settlements Israel had built in the Arab territory it occupied, a position maintained for years by previous presidents. Reagan rejected both requests. Hussein rold a reporter for the New York
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Times that "the United States is succumbing to Israeli dictates," and that he saw no hope for future improvement.57
The leading contenders for the Democratic nomination never missed an opportunity to pledge allegiance to Israel. The 1984 presidential contest often focused on the competition between former Vice President Walter Mondale and Senator Gary Hart on the question of who was more loyal to Israel. Mondale accused Hart of being weak in supporting the removal of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.58 Hart accused Mondale of trying to "intimidate and coerce Israel into taking unacceptable risks" while he was vice president under President Carter.59
Cy Vance Took the Blame
Actually, Mondale was the principal pro-Israel force within the Carter Administration. During the 1980 campaign, he responded to lobby pressure by helping to engineer a diplomatic maneuver that proved costly to the United States. When Donald McHenry, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, cast a vote on March 1 in favor of rebuking Israel publicly for its settlements policy—the first such rebuke of an Israeli action since the Eisenhower administration—Jewish circles were furious, and so was Mondale.60 McHenry's vote supported a resolution that offended the pro-Israel lobby on two fronts: it was critical of Israeli settlements on the West Bank, and it referred to East Jerusalem as "occupied territory."
Mondale organized an immediate counterattack within White House circles. He persuaded Carter that the State Department had wrongly advised him. Late in the evening of the controversial vote the White House announced a "failure in communications" between Washington and New York. It explained that McHenry had misunderstood his instructions and should have abstained. Three days later, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance personally took the blame for the "failure." Few believed him.61
Both the nation and the Carter-Mondale ticket would have been better off had Carter ignored Mondale's demand for a vote reversal.62 For Carter, the episode was an unrelieved diplomatic disaster. Arabs were outraged by what they viewed as a shameless withdrawal in the face of Jewish pressure.63 American Jews, urged to action by Israeli Defense
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Minister Ariel Sharon, doubted the honesty of the explanation and felt betrayed. Sharon told Jews in New York, "I do not like to interfere with internal United States affairs, but the question of Israeli security is a question for Jews anywhere in the world."64 To the world, the administration appeared out of control.
Senator Edward Kennedy was the main beneficiary of Carrer s embarrassment. Calling the UN vote a "betrayal" of Israel, he won the Massachusetts primary by two to one. He also carried New York and Connecticut, where earlier polls had shown Carter ahead. In New York, Jews voted four-to-one for Kennedy. A member of the Israeli parliament said: "The American Jewish community showed itself to have the leverage to swing a vote over the issue of whether the president is good to Israel."
Mondale's measures did not placate the Jewish vote. In November, Carter-Mondale became the first Democratic presidential ticket to fail to win a majority of the Jewish votes cast. Exit polls showed it received, at the most, 47 percent.65
After losing to the Reagan-Bush ticket, Mondale devoted himself full-time to campaigning for the presidency, with his uncritical support of Israel becoming a principal plank in his platform. Early in the campaign, he dismissed the idea that Saudi Arabia would "become a strong assertive force for moderation" and urged the prepositioning of high-technology U.S. military equipment in the custody of Israeli "technicians, an arrangement that would eliminate any possibility that the equipment could be used for purposes independent of Israeli wishes."
Later, Mondale and his campaign team carefully avoided any relationship with Arab interests, or even Arab American interests. In June 1984 this zeal led Thomas Rosenberg, Mondale's finance director in Illinois, to return five $ 1,000 checks to Chicagoans of Arab ancestiy who had presented them as campaign donations.66 He explained that some of the comments they had made in a personal meeting with Mondale amounted to "an anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic diatribe." One of the five, Albert Joseph, a lifelong Democrat and owner of Hunter Publishing, denied the accusation, recalling, "We passed forty-five minutes with [Mondale] in the utmost friendliness and respect."
Joseph said that when the checks were returned he was informed by Joseph Gomez, at the time a member of the Mondale finance commit
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tee in Illinois, that Mondales organization had decided to "take no more money from Arab Americans in the future." The Chicago publisher said he felt "insulted, betrayed, and shocked." He told a reporter that Mondale was "disenfranchising a whole group of Americans." Upset by the decision to return the funds, Gomez, a Chicago banker and Hispanic leader, withdrew from the Mondale campaign. Gomez said the Mondale campaign decision confirmed his view that "people of Arab ancestry are the most persecuted group in America today."
Candidate Gary Hart's record of support for Israel was as unblemished as Mondales, and his campaign organization displayed a similar indifference to Arab American sensibilities. Upon learning that the First American Bank in Washington, D.C.—where he had done his personal banking for years—had been purchased by a group of Middle East investors in 1982, Hart immediately closed out a campaign loan of $700,000 and severed all ties with the bank.67 His special counsel explained, "We didn't know it was an Arab bank. We got [Hart] out of it as soon as we knew." Hart's competitor for the nomination, Jesse Jackson, denounced the move as a "serious act of racism."68
As a senator, Hart voted for every pro-Israeli measure, opposed every initiative intended to provide arms to Arab states, and put his signature on every major letter and resolution helpful to the Israeli cause.69 When a few colleagues, such as Senator John Glenn, condemned Israel's raid on rhe Iraqi nuclear installation, he deplored the condemnation.
"Intimidation is Su Great"
Senators Ernest Hollings of South Carolina and Alan Cranston of California and former Florida governor Reuben Askew—early dropouts in the Democratic competition—were similarly uncritical in their support of Israel.70 So was Senator John Glenn of Ohio, who had been expected by many observers to take a middle road position on Middle East policy. In the past he had criticized Israeli military actions, supported the sale of F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and even suggested talks with the PLO.71 Bitten by the presidential bug, Glenn shifted ground in 1983, effectively ruling out such talks and excusing his vote for the F-15 sale on the grounds that Saudi Arabia would otherwise have bought planes from France with "no strings attached."72
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In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Glenn went much further, saying that the United States should recognize Jerusalem as the official capital of Israel once the terms of Camp David were completed or if negotiations broke down completely.73 He characterized the PLO as "little more than a gang of thugs" and said the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East was Arab refusal to accept the legitimacy of Israel.
Although the speech did not allay Jewish suspicion, it cost him the support of citizens who felt that the next president must respond to Arab as well as Israeli concerns. One of Glenn's closest colleagues, an Ohio congressman, reacted with alarm and distress: "Glenn caved in, and he didn't have to do it. I was so demoralized by that statement I delayed making some calls to labor people in his behalf."74 The speech caused a veteran diplomat of the Johnson administration, former Ambassador Lucius Battle, to refuse to serve as a Glenn foreign policy adviser.75
Only two candidates spoke up for a balanced policy in the Middle East: black civil rights activist Jesse L. Jackson and George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee. McGovern called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state and criticized Israeli military and settlement actions.76 His proposals were even more precise than those that brought John Connally's campaign to an end four years before.
In a speech at a Massachusetts synagogue in February, McGovern asked, "Is it not both bad politics and bad ethics to brand as anti-Israel an American politician who is willing to apply the same critical standards to Israeli policies that are applied to United States policies?"77 McGovern said that even though during his twenty-two years in Congress he had voted " 100 percent" for measures providing economic and military aid to Israel, he nevertheless opposed Israel's invasion of Lebanon: "I don't think one sovereign nation has the right to invade another."
Neither McGovern nor Jackson had a serious prospect for nomination. In different ways, each presented himself in the role of "party conscience." The "Super Tuesday" primaries in March eliminated McGovern, and only Jackson's conscience remained in the campaign.78
Jackson had become controversial with U.S. Jews four years before his presidential bid, when he carried his human rights activism abroad to Lebanon and there met PLO leader Yasser Arafat.79 Until then, the former disciple of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., worked mainly for
The Lobby and the Oval Office 5
black rights through his organization, People United to Save Humanity (PUSH), a Chicago-based group that received substantial Jewish financial support. In Lebanon, he came face-to-face with the misery of Palestinians, describing them as "the niggers of the Middle East."
Early in 1983, Jackson began traveling around the country as a "non-candidate" but already drumming up interest in a "rainbow coalition" of interest groups. At a time when prospective candidates often try to blur controversial statements made in the past, Jackson reiterated his recommendation that the United States open a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization. In a televised statement in New York, he said the United States could best help Israel by supporting the creation of a Palestinian homeland. Until that happened, he said, Palestinians would engage in "more acts of terrorism, more acts of desperation." He urged direct U.S. talks with the PLO to get the peace process moving, but he said that our diplomats could not even discuss this option, because "intimidation is so great" in the United States. These statements put him at odds with most Jewish leaders.
By the time Jackson became a candidate in October 1983, Washington Post editorial editor Meg Greenfield had called him one of the nations two greatest political orators (sharing the honor with President Reagan).80 Jackson immediately enlivened the political scene by flying to Syria, where he negotiated the release of a U.S. Navy pilot held captive there.81 He proclaimed, "The temperature has been lowered somewhat between Syria and America. The cycle of pain has been broken."82
In the critical primaries beginning in March, Jackson received impressive support in Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania, as well as in southern states. In televised debates with Mondale and Hart, Jackson called for compassion in dealing with all people in the Middle East and tejected the "terrorist" labels so often attached to all Palestinians.83 While Mondale and Hart rejected Jackson's plea for a comprehensive Middle East peace involving a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank, the exchange was moderate in terms and expression. It was the first time that Palestinian righrs had been discussed with civility in a presidential campaign.
Jackson found himself on the defensive when a reporter disclosed that, in a private conversation, he had referred to Jews as "Hymies" and New York as "Hymietown," a slip that led many to charge him with
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being anti-Semitic.84 He was encumbered by the endorsement of controversial black leader Louis Farrakhan, who called Judaism a "dirty religion" and Hitler a "wickedly great man." Inspired by attacks from Jewish leaders, the press never let up in pressing him about the allegations of anti-Semitism and his relationship with Farrakhan.85 Even in his press conference in Cuba, where his endeavors brought the release of several U.S. citizens, the anti-Semitic theme dominated the questioning. In advance of the Democratic convention, the American Jewish Committee organized a campaign to keep Jackson from attaining prominence in the campaign of the expected nominee, Walter Mondale.86
Despite these problems, Jackson rallied support broadly enough to remain a major factor throughout the convention. While no one expected Jackson to be on the presidential ticket, he emerged a winner even before the convention. He proved that a black man could be a credible candidate for the nation's highest office, even while supporting positions strongly opposed by the Istaeli lobby. In doing so, he lifted the self-esteem of two ethnic groups often abused or neglected in U.S. society: blacks and Arab Americans.
The winner of the presidential sweepstakes, Ronald Reagan, was left to wondet if his heroic endeavors for Israel had paid off at the polls. He received 31 percenr of the Jewish vote, down from rhe 40 percent he received in 1980.
"One Lonely Little Guy"
Reagan's successor, President George H. W. Bush, did slightly worse than his former boss in the 1988 elections, receiving an even smaller percentage of the national Jewish vote. Two years later, Bush got involved in what one author calls "the most noteworthy showdown with Israel and the American-Israeli lobby of any American president."87 It began in March 1990, when Israel submitted a request to the United States for more than $1 billion in loans, gifts, and donations. The money was going to pay to resettle Soviet Jews in the occupied territories—in clear violation of international law. Bush's response was simple and straightforward: There should be no new settlements in the West Bank or Easr Jerusalem."
The Lobby and the Oval Office 5
This reiteration of American policy would open the floodgates to a tidal wave of criticism. Eighteen months later in September 1991 the request was repeated—except this time, Israel asked for a $10 billion loan guarantee. Again, the purpose was to build and expand settlements in the occupied territories. The request was made despite U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's suggestion five months earlier that Israel cease settlement expansion, which Baker called "an obstacle" to peace. Adding to the Oval Office's concerns were Bush's plans to convene an Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid—plans that would have been significantly undermined had the president agreed to subsidize further illegal Israeli settlements.
Bush asked Congress to delay the loan guarantees for four months. Immediately, almost one thousand pro-Israel lobbyists swamped Capitol Hill, insisting that the United States dispense the guarantees at once. Congress, not surprisingly, was inclined to listen. Sensing that both his authority and plans for peace were at risk, President Bush made the following complaint:
I heard today there were something like a thousand lobbyists on the Hill working the other side of the question. We've got one lonely little guy doing it.88
When Congress realized that the "lonely little guy" was their president, and that he was serious about delaying the loan guarantees, they quickly approved his request. American Jews were indignant, labeling Bush an anti-Semite for his criticisms of lobby pressure and accusing him of denying them the right to practice citizen advocacy. Bush quickly apologized, but to many it was a case of too little, too late. According to one author, "The showdown led to a strain in United States-Israel relations, and some Republicans say Bush lost Jewish votes." Of course, this overlooks an important factor of the episode: during the showdown, polls showed that more than 80 percent of the American public supported Bush, a tide of support members of Congress could not ignore.85
While his stance in 1991 may have cost Bush Jewish votes, he lost the votes of those critical of Israel the next summer when, despite continued construction of the controversial settlements, the U.S. president finally caved to pressure and approved the loan guarantees. Bush also
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exhibited strong—and strongly biased—support for Israel in October of
1991 when, after U.S. intelligence determined that Israel had exported missile components to South Africa, the president waived U.S.-mandated sanctions against Israel.
Nevertheless, this support was not enough to erase the memory of the Bush-Israel showdown from the minds of Israel's American supporters. While campaigning for the presidency in 2000 against Bush's son, Democratic candidate Al Gore mentioned the incident—and Bush's
1992 loss at the polls—in a speech to AIPAC:
I vividly remember standing up against a group of administration foreign policy advisers who promoted the insulting concept of linkage. . . . We defeated them.90
It was a lesson well learned by American politicians, as no U.S. president since has openly threatened to withhold funds to ensure Israeli compliance with international law. Indeed, according to USA Today, current President George W. Bush "says he believes his father, the first President Bush, made a political mistake that helped cost him re-election when he threatened to withhold some U.S. aid" from Israel.91
6
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State
The Pentagon—-that enormous, sprawling building on the banks of the Potomac—houses most of the Department of Defense's central headquarters. It is the top command for the forces and measures that provide Americans with security in a troubled wotld. Across the Potomac is the Department of State, a massive eight-story building on Washington's Foggy Bottom, the nerve center of our nation's worldwide diplomatic network. These buildings are channels through which flow thousands of messages dealing with the nation's top secrets each day. No one can enter either building without special identification or advance clearance. Armed guards seem to be everywhere, and in late 1983 conctete embankments and strategically placed heavy trucks were added to provide extra buffers should a fanatic launch an attack. These buildings are fortresses, where the nation's most precious secrets are carefully guarded by the most advanced technology.
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But how secure are the secrets?
The leaks to Israel are fantastic.1 If I have something I want the secretary of state to know but don't want Israel to know, I must wait till I have a chance to see him personally.
This declaration came from an ambassador, still on active duty in a top assignment, while he reviewed his long career in numerous posts in the Middle East. Although hardly a household name in the United States, his is one of Americas best-known abroad. Interviewed in the State Department, he spoke deliberately, choosing his words carefully: "It is a fact of life that everyone in authority is reluctant to put anything on paper that concerns Istael if it is to be withheld from Israel's knowledge," said the veteran. "Nor do such people even feel free to speak in a crowded room of such things."
The diplomat offered an example from his own experience. "I received a call from a friend of mine in the Jewish community who wanted to warn me, as a friend, that all details of a lengthy document on Middle East policy that I had just dispatched overseas were 'out.'" The document was classified "top secret," the diplomat recalled. "I didn't believe what he said, so my friend read me every word of it over the phone."
His comments will upset pro-Israel activists, many of whom contend that both the State Department and Defense Department are dominated by anti-Israeli "Arabists." Such domination, if it ever existed, occurs no longer. In the view of my diplomat source, leaks to pro-Israel activists are not only pervasive thtoughout the two departments, but "are intimidating and very harmful to our national interest." He said that, because of "the ever-present Xerox machine," diplomats proceed on the assumption that even messages they send by the most secuie means will be copied and passed on to eager hands. "We just don't dare put sensitive items on paper." A factor making the pervasive insecurity even greater is the knowledge that leaks of secrets to Israel, even when noriced—which is rare—are almost nevet investigated.
Whatever intelligence the Israelis want, whether political or technical, they obtain promptly and without cost at the source. Officials who normally would work vigilantly to protect our national interest by identifying leaks and bringing charges against the offenders are demoralized.
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 5
In fact, they are disinclined even to question Israel's tactics for fear this activity will cause the Israeli lobby to mark them as troublemakers and take measures to nullify their efforts, or even harm their careers.
The lobby's intelligence network, having numerous volunteer "friend-lies" to tap, reaches all parts of the executive branch where matters concerning Israel are handled. Awareness of this seepage keeps officials—no matter what rung of the ladder they occupy—from making or even proposing decisions that are in the United States' interest.
If, for example, an official should state opposition to an Israeli request during a private interdepartmental meeting—or worse still, put it in an intra-office memorandum—he or she must assume that this information will soon reach the Israeli embassy, either directly or through AIPAC. Soon after, the official should expect to be criticized by name when the Israeli ambassador visits the secretary of state or another promi-nenr U.S. official.
The penetration is all the more remarkable because much of it is carried out by U.S. citizens on behalf of a foreign government. The practical effect is to give Israel its own network of sources, through which it is able to learn almost anything it wishes about decisions or resources of the U.S. government. When making procurement demands, Israel can display better knowledge of Defense Departmenr inventories than the Pentagon itself.
Israel Finds the Ammunition—in Hawaii!
In its 1973 Yom Kippur war against Egypt and Syria, Israel sustained heavy losses in weapons of all kinds, especially tanks. It looked to the United States for the quickest possible resupply. Henry Kissinger was their avenue. Richard Nixon was entangled in the Watergate controversy and would soon leave the presidency, but under his authority the government agreed to deliver substantial quantities of tanks to Israel.
Tanks were to be taken from the inventory of U.S. military units on active duty, reserve units, even straight off production lines. Nothing was held back in the effort to bring Israel's forces back to its desired strength as quickly as possible.
Israel wanted only the latest-model tanks, which were equipped with 105-millimeter guns. But a sufficient number could not be found even
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by stripping U.S. forces. The Pentagon met the problem by filling part of the order with an earlier model fitted with 90-millimeter guns. When these arrived, the Israelis grumbled about having to take "second-hand junk." Then they discovered they had no ammunition of the right size and sent an urgent appeal for a supply of 90-millimeter rounds.
The Pentagon made a search and found none. Thomas Pianka, an officer then serving at the Pentagon with the International Security Agency, recalled: "We made an honest effort to find the ammunition. We checked everywhere. We checked through all the services—Army, Navy, Marines. We couldn't find any 90-millimeter ammunition at all."2 Pianka said the Pentagon sent Israel the bad news: "In so many words, we said, 'Sorry, we don't have any of the ammunition you need. We've combed all depots and warehouses, and we simply have none.'"
A few days later the Israelis came back with a surprising message: "Yes, you do. There are 15,000 rounds in the Marine Corps supply depot in Hawaii." Pianka recalled, "We looked in Hawaii and, sure enough, there they were. The Israelis had found a U.S. supply of 90-millimeter ammunition we couldn't find ourselves."
Richard Helms, director of the CIA during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, recalled an occasion when an Israeli arms request had been filled with the wrong items.3 Israeli officials resubmitted the request complete with all the supposedly top-secret code numbers and a note to Helms that said the Pentagon perhaps had not understood exactly which items were needed. "It was a way for them to show me that they knew exactly what they wanted," Helms said. Helms believed that during this period no important secret was kept from Israel.
Not only are the Israelis adept at getting the information they want—they are masters at the weapons procurement game. Les Janka, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who is a specialist in Middle East policy, recalled Israeli persistence:
They would never take no for an answer. They never gave up. These emissaries of a foreign government always had a shopping list of wanted military items, some of them high technology that no other nation possessed, some of it secret devices that gave the United States an edge over any adversary. Such items were not for sale, not even to the nations with whom we have our closest, most formal military alliance—like those linked to us through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.4
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 5
Yet Janka learned that military sales to Israel were not bound by the guidelines and limitations that govern U.S. arms supply policy elsewhere. "Sales to Israel were different," he said. "Very different."
Janka has vivid memories of a military liaison officer from the Israeli embassy who called at the Defense Department and requested approval to purchase a military item that, because of its highly secret advanced technology, was on the prohibited list: "He came to me, and I gave him the official Pentagon reply. I said, Tm sorry, sir, but the answer is no. We will not release that technology.'"
The Israeli officer took pains to observe bureaucratic courtesies and not antagonize lower officials who might devise ways to block the sale. He said, "Thank you very much, if that's your official position. We understand that you are not in a position to do what we want done. Please don't feel bad, but we're going over your head." And that of course meant he was going to Janka's superiors in the office of the secretary of defense, or perhaps even to the White House.
Asked if he could remember an instance in which Israel failed to get what it wanted from the Pentagon, Janka paused to reflect, then answered, "No, not in the long run."
Janka had high respect for the efficiency of Israeli procurement officers:
You have to understand that the Israelis operate in the Pentagon very professionally, and in an omnipresent way. They have enough of their people who understand our system well, and they have made friends at all levels, from top to bottom. They just interact with the system in a constant, continuous way that keeps the pressure on.
The Carter White House tried to establish a policy of restraint. In an interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's assistant for national security, Brzezinski remembered Defense Secretary Harold Brown's efforts to hold the line on technology transfer.5 "He was very tough with Israel on its requests for weapons and weapons systems. He often turned them down." But Brown's was not the final word. For example, Brzezinski cited as the most notable example Brown's refusal to sell Israel the controversial antipersonnel weapon known as the cluster bomb. Despite written agreements restricting the use of these bombs, Israel had used them twice against populated areas in Lebanon, causing death and injury to civilians. Brown responded by refusing to sell Israel replacements. But even on that request,
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Despite that somber revelation, no official effort was launched to discover who had revealed the sensitive information.
Israel eventually prevailed. President Reagan reversed the administration policy, and cluster bombs were returned to the approved list.
Others who have occupied high positions in the executive branch were willing to speak candidly, but, unlike Janka, they did so with the understanding that their names would not be published. As one explained, "My career is not over. At least, I don't want it to be. Quoting me by name would bring it to an end." With the promise of anonymity, he and others gave details of the astounding process through which the Israeli lobby is able to penetrate the defenses at the Defense Department—and elsewhere.
Sometimes the act is simple theft. One official says, "Israelis were caught in the Pentagon with unauthorized documents, sometimes scooping up the contents of 'in boxes' on desk tops." He recalls that, because of such activity, a number of Israeli officials were told to leave the country. No formal charges have ever been filed against an Israeli official involved in such activities, and Israel has covered each such exit with an excuse such as family illness or some other personal reason: "Our government never made a public issue of it." He added, "There is a much higher level of espionage by Israel against our government than has ever been publicly admitted."
The official recalled one day when he received a list of military equipment that Israel wanted to purchase. Noting that "the Pentagon is Israel's 'stop and shop,'" he took it for granted that the Israelis had obtained clearances. So he followed usual procedure by circulating it to various Pentagon offices for routine review and evaluation:
One office instantly returned the list to me with a note: 'One of these items is so highly classified you have no right to know that it even exists.' I was instructed to destroy all copies of the request and all references to the particular code numbers. I didn't know what it was. It was some kind of electronic jamming equipment, top secret. Somehow the Israelis knew about it and acquired its precise specifications, cost, and top secret code number. This meant they had penetrated our research and development labs, our most sensitive facilities.
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 5
"They Always Get What They Want"
Israel s agents are close students of the U.S. system, and they work it to their advantage. Besides obtaining secret information by clandestine operations, they thoroughly and effectively apply open pressure on executive branch offices. A weapons expert explains their technique:
If promised an answer on a weapons request in thirty days, they show up on the thirty-first day and announce: "We made this request. It hasn't been approved. Why not? We've waited thirty days." With most foreign governments, you can finesse a problem. You can leave it in the box on the desk. With Israel, you can't leave anything in the box.
He said the Israeli embassy knows exactly when things are scheduled for action:
It stays on top of things as does no other embassy in town. They know your agenda, what was on your schedule yesterday, and what's on it today and tomorrow. They know what you have been doing and saying. They know the law and regulations backward and forward. They know when the deadlines are.
He admired the resourcefulness of the Israelis in applying pressure:
They may leak to Israeli newspapers details of their difficulty in getting an approval. A reporter will come in to State or Defense and ask a series of questions so detailed they could be motivated only by Israeli officials. Sometimes the pressure will come, not from reporters, but from AIPAC. If things are really hung up, it isn't long before letters or calls start coming from Capitol Hill. They'll ask, "Why is the Pentagon not approving this item?" Usually, the letter is from the congressman in whose district the item is manufactured. He will argue that the requested item is essential to Israel's security. He probably will also ask, "Who is this bad guy in the Pentagon— or State—who is blocking this approval? I want his name. Congress would like to know."
The American defense expert paused to emphasize his point: "No bureaucrat, no military officer likes to be singled out by anybody from Congress and required to explain his professional duty."
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He recalled an episode involving President Carter's secretary of defense, Harold Brown:
I remember once Israel requested an item on the prohibited list. Before I answered, I checked with Secretary Brown and he said, "No, absolutely no. We're not going to give in to the bastards on this one." So I said no. Lo and behold, a few days later I got a call from Brown. He said, "The Israelis are raising hell. I got a call from [Senator Henry] 'Scoop' Jackson, asking why we aren't cooperating with Israel. It isn't worth it. Let it go."
When Jimmy Carter became president, the Israelis were trying to get large quantities of the AIM 9-L, the most advanced U.S. air-to-air missile at the time. A former Pentagon official said his colleagues objected. One of them said, "No, no, no. It isn't yet deployed to U.S. troops. The production rate is not enough to supply even U.S. needs. It is much too sensitive to risk being lost." Yet, early in his administration, Carter overruled the Pentagon, and Israel got the missiles.
A former administration official recalled a remarkable example of Israeli ingenuity:
Israel requested an item of technology, a machine for producing bullets. It was a big piece of machinery, weighed a lot, and it was exclusive. We didn't want other countries to have it, not even Israel. We knew if we said no, the Israelis would go over our heads and somehow get approval. So, we kept saying we were studying the request. Then, to our astonishment, we discovered that the Israelis had already bought the machinery and had it in a warehouse in New York.
The Israelis did not have a license to ship the equipment, but they had nonetheless been able to make the purchase. When they were confronted by the Defense official, they said, "We slipped up. We were sure you'd say yes, so we went ahead and bought it. And if you say no, here's the bill for storage, and here's what it will cost to ship it back to the factory." Soon after, the official recalled, someone in the State Department called and said, "Aw, give it to them," adding an earthy expletive.
This sense of futility sometimes reaches all the way to the top. Unrestricted supplies to Israel were especially debilitating in the 1974-77 period, when U.S. military services were trying to recover from the 1973
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 15 5
Arab-Israeli war. In that conflict, the United States had stripped its own army and air forces in order to supply Israel.
During this period of U.S. shortage, Israel kept bringing in its shopping lists. The official recalls that the Pentagon would insist, "No, we cant provide what you want now. Come back in a year or so." In almost every one of those cases, he said, the Pentagon position was overruled by a political decision out of the White House. This demoralized the professionals in the Pentagon. Still worse, it handicapped national security: "Defense Department decisions made according to the highest professional standards went by the board in order to satisfy Israeli requests," said the official.
"Exchanges" That Work Only in One Direction

PAUL FINDLEY They Dare to Speak Out 10

2008-08-15T10:34:00.000-07:00

"Exchanges" That Work Only in One Direction
The Israelis are particularly adept at exploiting sympathetic officials, as a former Pentagon officer explained:
We have people sympathizing with Israel in about every office in the Pentagon. A lot of military personnel have been in Israel, and some served there, making friends—and, of course, a number of Israeli personnel study in U.S. military schools. The guts, the energy, the skill of the Israelis are much admired in the Pentagon. Israelis are very good at passing back to us their performance records using our equipment. Throughout our military schools are always a large number of Israeli students. They develop great professional rapport with our people.
For years, the United States and Israel have exchanged military personnel. On paper, it works both ways. In practice, Israel is the major beneficiary. The reason is more one of culture than anything clandestine. Israeli officers generally speak English, so its no problem for them to come to the United States and quickly establish rapport with U.S. officers. On the other hand, hardly any U.S. officers speak Hebrew.
Language disparity is not the only problem. Of equal gravity is the American laxity in enforcing its security regulations. Many Israeli officers spend a year in a sensitive area—one of the U.S. training commands, or a research and development laboratory. At the start they are told they cannot enter certain restricted areas. Then, little by little, the rules are relaxed. A former Defense Department official explained:
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The young Israeli speaks good English. He is likeable. You know how Americans are: they take him in, and he's their buddy. First thing you know, the restrictions are forgotten, and the Israeli officers are admitted to everything in our laboratories, our training facilities, our operational bases.
The former official quickly added that rules are seldom relaxed in Israel:
This means that the officer training exchange is really a one-way street. Israel does not permit our officers, whether they speak Hebrew or not, to serve in sensitive military facilities in Israel. Many areas are totally off limits. They are very strict about that. Our officers cannot be present even when U.S.-supplied equipment and weapons are being delivered for the first time. U.S. officers on exchange programs in Israel are, more often than not, given a desk in an office down the hall, and assigned just enough to do to keep them busy and prevent them from being too frustrated. Without knowledge of Hebrew, they have almost no way to know what is going on.6
Camaraderie is also an element. Many employees in the executive branch, Jewish and non-Jewish, feel that the United States and Israel are somehow "in this together" and therefore cooperate without limit. Many also believe that Israel is a strategic asset and that weapons and other technology provided to Israel serve U.S. purposes. These feelings sometimes cause official restrictions on sharing of information to be modified or conveniently forgotten. As one Defense official put it, the rules get "placed deeper and deeper into the file":
A sensitive document is picked up by an Israeli officer while his friend, a Defense Department official, deliberately looks the other way. Nothing is said. Nothing is written. And the U.S. official probably does not feel he has done anything wrong. Meanwhile, the Israelis ask for more and more.
"Like Sending a Weather Report"
Despite such openhanded generosity by the United States, the flow of information—like the unbalanced U.S.-Israel officer "exchanges"—is a one-way exchange. The September 1990 publication of Victor Ostrov-sky s By Way of Deception did much to broaden awareness of what goes on in the realm of Israeli perfidy.
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 15 7
The shocking expose, written by a former Israeli spy, reports that the Mossad, Israels intelligence agency, failed to relay to the United States early data about the 1983 suicide bombing that killed 241 U.S. Marines who were asleep in a barracks at the Beirut airport.
An informant had told the Mossad that a large truck was being fitted by Shi'ite Muslims with spaces that could hold bombs of exceptional size. Local agents concluded that the marine barracks was among the most likely targets, but, according to Ostrovsky, the Mossad chief in Tel Aviv made a conscious decision not to warn the U.S. government, declaring: "Were not there to protect Americans." Accordingly, only a routine notice went to the CIA, which Ostrovsky writes "was like sending a weather report."
In an attempt to cover up this and other damning information, the government of Israel requested—and a New York judge ordered—that Ostrovsky s book be banned in the United States. The New York Post headlined: "Israelis muzzle spy author." The New York Times summed up the books allegation: the Mossad failed to warn the CIA because it wanted "to poison American relations with Arab countries." When the ban was overturned by a higher court the next day, the book enjoyed a second round of nationwide publicity. Overnight, it became a bestseller.
In addition to withholding valuable intelligence information from its number one benefactor, Israel does not hesitate to obtain United States classified information through all-out espionage, a process that the American government has been unable to halt.
The Mossad's Role in the Network
Exactly three U.S. government employees have been punished for leaking classified information to Israel. The first was Fred Waller, a career foreign service officer in charge of the Israel-Jordan desk at the State Department, who in 1954 read in a classified document that revealed that a friend on the staff of the Israeli embassy—under suspicion for espionage—was being recommended by the FBI for expulsion from the United States.
Waller told associates that he considered the charges "unjustified" and, according to allegations, tipped off his friend at the Israeli embassy. For this, Waller was the first person ever marked for dismissal, but he
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was later permitted simply to retire. "They wanted to throw him out without a nickel," states Don Bergus, who succeeded Waller in the State Department assignment. During those years of McCarthyism, Bergus recalls, "the FBI was recommending that a lot of people be declared persona non grata. They were so happy with themselves in doing this. They knew damned well their recommendations wouldn't be acted upon."
Bergus recalled that Israel obtained a lot of information without resorting to espionage: "A lot of the information was volunteered. The apples were put on the table, and I don't blame Israel for taking them."
The investigation of Waller occurred during the high point of our government's concern over Israeli intelligence activities in the United States. Because the Eisenhower administtation was trying to withhold weapons from Israel, as well as other states in the Middle East, a major attempt was made to bring leaks of classified information under control. A veteran diplomat recalled the crisis: "Employees in State and Defense were being suborned and bribed on a wide scale, and our government went to Israel and demanded that it stop."
After high-level negotiations following the Waller affair, the United States and Israel entered into an unwritten agreement to share a larger volume of classified information and, at the same time, to sharply restrict the clandestine operations each conducted in the other's territory. The diplomat explained that it was supposed to be a two-way street: "The deal provided that we would get more from them too, and it was hoped the arrangement would end the thievery and payoff of U.S. employees."
The understanding with Israel did not end the problem, however, as the Israelis were not content to let the United States decide what classified information it would receive. Israel did not live up to the tetms of the agreement and continued to broadly engage in espionage activities throughout the United States.
This was still true more than twenty years after the Waller episode, during the tenure of Atlanta mayor Andrew Young as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations during the Carter administration. Young recalled, "I operated on the assumption that the Israelis would learn just about everything instantly. I just always assumed that everything was monitored, and that there was a pretty formal network."7
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Young resigned as ambassador in August 1979 after it was revealed that he had met with Zuhdi Terzi, the PLO's UN observer, in violation of the U.S. pledge to Israel not to talk to the PLO.8 Press reports on Young's episode said Israeli intelligence learned of the meeting and that Israeli officials then leaked the information to the press, precipitating the diplomatic wrangle that led to Young's resignation.
Israel denied that its agents had learned of the Young-Terzi meeting. The press counselor at the Israeli embassy went so far as to tell the Washington Star, "We do not conduct any kind of intelligence activities in the United States." This denial must have been amusing to U.S. intelligence experts, one of whom talked with Newsweek magazine about the Mossad's activities here: "They have penetrations all through the U.S. government.9 They do better than the KGB," said the expert, whom the magazine did not identify.
The Newsweek at tide continued:
With the help of American Jews in and out of government, the Mossad looks for any softening in U.S. support and tries to get any technical intelligence the administration is unwilling to give to Israel. "The Mossad can go to any distinguished American Jew and ask for his help," says a former CIA agent. The appeal is a simple one: "When the call went out and no one heeded it, the Holocaust resulted." The United States tolerates the Mossad's operations on American soil partly because of reluctance to anger the American Jewish community.
Another reason cited: the Mossad is often a valuable source of information for U.S. intelligence.
Penetration by Israel continued at such a high level that a senior State Department official who has held the highest career positions related to the Middle East confides, "I urged several times that the United States quit trying to keep secrets from Israel. Let them have everything. They always get what they want anyway. When we try to keep secrets, it always backfires."
An analysis prepared by the CIA in 1979, twenty-five years after the U.S.—Israeli espionage agreement, gives no hint that the Mossad had in any way restricted its operations within the United States. According to the forty-eight-page secret document, titled Israel: Foreign Intelligence
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and Security Services, the United States continued to be a focus of Mossad operations:
In carrying out its mission to collect positive intelligence, the principal function of the Mossad is to conduct agent operations against the Arab nations and their official representatives and installations throughout the world, particularly in Western Europe and the United States. . . . Objectives in Western countries are equally important (as in the USSR and East Europe) to the Israeli intelligence service. The Mossad collects intelligence regarding Western, Vatican, and UN policies toward the Near East; promotes arms deals for the benefit of the IDF; and acquires data for silencing anti-Israel factions in the West [emphasis added].
Under "methods of operation," the CIA booklet described the way in which the Mossad makes use of domestic pro-Israeli groups. It states that "the Mossad over the years has enjoyed some rapport with highly placed persons and government offices in every country of importance to Israel." It adds, "Within Jewish communities in almost every country of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathizers who render strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort." It explained:
Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, deception material, propaganda, and other purposes. . . . Mossad activities are generally conducted through Israeli official and semiofficial establishments—deep cover enterprises in the form of firms and organizations, some especially created for, or adaptable to, a specific objective—and penetrations effected within non-Zionist national and international Jewish organizations. . . . Official organizations used for cover are: Israeli purchasing missions and Israeli government tourist offices, El Al, and Zim offices. Israeli construction firms, industrial groups and international trade organizations also provide nonofficial cover. Individuals working under deep or illegal cover are normally charged with penetrating objectives that require a long-range, more subtle approach, or with activities in which the Israeli government can never admit complicity. . . .
The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on the various Jewish communities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting general information. The aggressively ideological nature of Zionism, which emphasizes that all Jews belong to Israel and must return to Israel, had had its drawbacks in enlisting support for intelligence operations, however, since there is considerable opposition to Zionism among Jews throughout the world.
Aware of this fact, Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate discreetly within Jewish communities and are under instructions to han
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die their missions with utmost tact to avoid embarrassment to Israel. They also attempt to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition.
The theft of scientific data is a major objective of Mossad operations, which is often attempted by trying to recruit local agents:
In addition to the large-scale acquisition of published scientific papers and technical journals from all over the world through overt channels, the Israelis devote a considerable portion of their covert operations to obtaining scientific and technical intelligence. This had included attempts to penetrate certain classified defense projects in the United States and other Western nations.
The Israeli security authorities (in Israel) also seek evidence of illicit love affairs which can be used as leverage to enlist cooperation. In one instance, Shin Bet (the domestic Israeli intelligence agency) tried to penetrate the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem through a clerical employee who was having an affair with a Jerusalem girl. They rigged a fake abortion case against the employee in an unsuccessful effort to recruit him. Before this attempt at blackmail, they had tried to get the Israeli girl to elicit information from her boyfriend.
Israels espionage activities, according to the CIA, even included "crude efforts to recruit marine guards [at the United States Embassy at Tel Aviv] for monetary reward." It reports that a hidden microphone "planted by the Israelis" was found in the office of the U.S. ambassador in 1954, and that two years later, telephone taps were found connected to two telephones in the residence of the U.S. military attache. Retired diplomat Don Bergus recalls the episode: "Our ambassador, Ed Lawson, reported the bug in a telegram to Washington that went something like this: 'Department must assume that all conversations in my office as well as texts of my telegrams over the last six months are known to the Israelis.' Ed had dictated all telegrams to his secretary."
During the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980, columnist Jack Anderson quoted "U.S. intelligence reports," actually supplied by the Israeli embassy, by way of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, that the PLO had mined the embassy to frustrate any rescue attempt by the United States. The intelligence reports proved to be bogus.
Asked about the present activities of the Mossad in the United States, a senior official in the Department of State, was candid:
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"No One Needs Trouble Like That"
Leaks of classified information remain a major problem for policy makers. An official whose identity I promised to withhold says that during the Carter administration his colleagues feared even to speak up even in small private meetings. When Israeli requests were turned down at interagency meetings attended by, at most, fifteen people—all of whom knew the discussions were to be considered top secret—within hours "the Israeli military attache, the political officer, or the ambassador—or all of them at once—were lodging protests. They knew exactly who said what, even though nothing had been put on paper." He adds, "No one needs trouble like that."
He said that David McGiffert, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, was often subjected to pressure. Frequently, the Israeli embassy would demand copies of documents that were still in the draft stage and had not reached his desk.
To counteract these kinds of leaks, some officials have taken theit own precautions.
Although no charges are ever brought, those suspected of leaking information to Israel are sometimes bypassed when classified documents are handed out. The word is forwarded discreetly to drop their names from the disttibution list. One such official served during both the Carter and Reagan administrations. When he occupied a senior position in the Carter administration, his superiors were instructed to "clear nothing" in the way of classified documents related to the Middle East through his office and to use extreme caution when discussing such matters in his pres
We have to assume that they have wiretaps all over town. In my work I frequently pick up highly sensitive information coming back to me in conversations with people who have no right to have these secrets. I will ask, "I wonder who has the wiretaps out to pick that up," and usually the answer is, "I don't know, but it sure isn't us."
The same official said he never gives any highly sensitive information over his office phone. "You have to respect their ingenuity. The Mossad people know how to get into a system."
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ence. One of his colleagues says, admiringly, "He is brilliant. He belongs in government, but he has a blind spot where Israel is concerned."
To strike back at government officials considered to be unsympathetic to Israeli needs, the pro-Israel lobby singles them out for personal attack and even the wrecking of their careers. In January 1977 a broad-scale purge was attempted immediately after the inauguration of President Carter. The perpetrator was Senator Richard Stone of Florida, a Democrat, a passionate supporter of Israel.10 When he was newly installed as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the Middle East, he brought along with him a "hit list." In his view, fifteen officials were not sufficiently supportive of Israel and its weapons needs, and he wanted them transferred to positions where their views would create no problems for Israel. Marked for removal were William Quandt, Brzezin-ski's assistant for Middle East matters, and Les Janka, who had served on the National Security Council under Ford. The others were career military officers, most of them colonels. Stone's demands were rejected by Brzezinski. According to a senior White House official, "after pressing reasonably hard for several days," the senator gave up. Although unsuccessful, his demands caused a stir. One officer says, "I find it very ironic that a U.S. senator goes to a U.S. president's national security adviser and tells him to fire Americans for insufficient loyalty to another country."
Leaks Disrupt American Foreign Policy
At least four times in recent years, major leaks of information to Israel caused serious setbacks in our relations with Israel's neighbors. The first destroyed an arrangement with Jordan that had been serving U.S. security interests successfully for years.
Under a long-standing secret agreement, Jordan's King Hussein received secret financial support from the CIA. This was a carryover of a normal support system developed by the British. Under it, moderate leaders such as Hussein received payments in exchange for helpful services, which enabled them to maintain their political base without having to account to anyone locally.
Early in the Carter administration, a White House review was ordered of all covert operations, including, of course, the CIA payments
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to the Middle East. Nineteen people attended the review meeting in early February 1977. One of the senior officials who attended recalled: "I feared at the time that leaks were certain to occur." A few days later, the Washington Post headlined a story "CIA Paid Millions to Jordan's King Hussein."1' Written by Bob Woodward, the article said that over a period of twenty years the CIA had made "secret annual payments totaling millions of dollars" to Hussein. It said the payment in 1976 was $750,000. The disclosure provoked wide international controversy.
When he read Woodward's Washington Post article, Senator James G. Abourezk of South Dakota called in Harold Saunders, then an official of the National Security Council, and received confirmarion that Israel, as well as Jordan, was receiving secret payments from the CIA.12 Abourezk recalled that Saunders estimated that during the same period Hussein received about $10 million, more than $70 million went to Israel. The payments helped Israel support its own burgeoning foreign aid program in Africa, and Abourezk believed that the payments still continued. Hussein used the funds to maintain a strong relationship with the Bedouin tribes of his desert kingdom.
After confirming the information, Abourezk called Woodward and asked if he was aware of the CIA's aid to Israel when he wrote about the payments to Jordan. Abourezk recalls, "Woodward admitted knowledge of the payments to Israel, but said he thought the circumstances were different, and that was why he did not write about them." Abourezk recalls being so outraged at this explanation and Woodward's "selective" coverage of the news that he shouted over the phone, "It seems to me that sort of judgment is better left up to the readers of the Post. "
Abourezk tried unsuccessfully for several months to interest Washington journalists in the news that Israel too received CIA payments.13 Months later, after the furor over Jordan had died down, Jack Anderson mentioned the payments to Israel in his syndicated column. There was no public outcry.
The CIA arrangement with Jordan was viewed by Zbigniew Brzezin-ski, Cartel s national security adviser, as "very valuable" to the United States. But as a result of the publicity, he recalls, the arrangement had to be canceled, Hussein was embarrassed, and the Unired Srates suffered a setback in its relations with the Arab world.
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The next leak so embarrassed U.S.-Saudi relarions that a career intelligence officer was ordered out of Saudi Arabia. After the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, there was speculation that the Saudi regime also might fall. The CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia reported this information to Washington in a secret cable, citing it as only a tumor, not a forecast. On the basis of this and other reports and analysis in Washington, the CIA produced a paper that was given restricted circulation in the official policy community. That paper discussed the stability of the Saudi regime. A report was leaked to news services, which erroneously stated that the CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia predicted the fall of the Saudi government within six months.
John C. West, former governor of South Carolina, was the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time. West tecalls the CIA story: "Of course, there was no such prediction that the Saudi government would fall, but that's the way it was printed." The episode caused deep resentment in the Saudi capital, and the station chief was asked to leave.14
West had other problems with leaks. On another occasion, this time in 1980, a government employee's leak of secret information destroyed a sensitive mission to Saudi Arabia and, in West's opinion, led to a costly confrontation between the president and the Senate. The leak came from a secret White House meeting, where West and a small group of high officials discussed several Saudi requests to buy military equipment. "The arms package was of very, very great concern to the Saudis," West recalled:
It was essential that they, as serious customers, not be embarrassed. As we went over the items, I said, "Whatever we do, we must not say no to the Saudis on any of these. Its very important that we avoid a flat turndown."
The group agreed to approve four of the requests, but found the other two highly controversial. The Saudis wanted to buy high technology AWACS intelligence-gathering aircraft and special bomb racks for F-15 fighter planes they already owned. These sales would cause an uproar in neighboring Israel, and the Carter administration did not want to offend either government.
West worked out solutions to both problems. "Let's do this," he advised the group:
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The bomb racks haven't yet been adopted as a part of the U.S. system. There are still some bugs that need to be worked out. Let's explain that we won't make a decision until we decide the bomb racks are right and meet our own requirements. Given that explanation, the Saudis will go along.
Regarding the AWACS dilemma, West predicted that the Saudis would withdraw their request to buy the planes if the United States would resume a practice that had been initiated during the tense period following the fall of the Shah of Iran. At that time, he says, "The United States met Saudi intelligence needs by operating AWACS planes from Saudi bases and supplying to the Saudi government the information accumulated on these flights." West told the group, "I will explain to the Saudis that the United States cant deliver the new planes until 1985, and by then the technology will probably be outdated."
Wests recommendations were accepted. The Saudis would be permitted to buy the four noncontroversial items, and the other two requests would be set aside in a way that would cause no offense. West says, "I was instructed to explain the decisions personally when I returned to Saudi Arabia."
But once again, sensitive information was leaked in a twisted form. West recalled:
The very day I left for Saudi Arabia, the New York Times published a story headlined: "Carter Is Said to Refuse Saudi Request for Arms." Other news services reported that at a high level meeting the White House decided to turn down the Saudi request, and after debating for several days on how to break the news, West was instructed simply to tell them no.15
I knew nothing of the leak until I landed in Saudi Arabia, ready to meet Saudi officials in appointments already scheduled. The news story hit me in the face when I got off the plane. It was terrible.
The Times story delivered the blunt negative answer that West had warned must be avoided at all cost. "It destroyed all chance of success in my diplomatic mission."
West does not know how the newspapers got the damaging report. Only a few had attended the meeting in the White House, but notes were taken, memos prepared. He speculates that the story, with deliberate inaccuracies, was leaked by "someone determined to worsen relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia."
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A few months later, the Carter administration resumed AWACS operations based in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, embarrassed by the earlier headlines, Saudi officials decided to insist on buying their own AWACS planes and launched a public relations campaign in the United States that culminated in a costly, bruising showdown two years later in the U.S. Senate. Without the leak, West believed, the Saudis would have accepted the Carter administration decision, and the AWACS controversy would never have surfaced. If so, the U.S. taxpayers might have been spared an extra $1.2 billion in aid to Israel—the price Israel's lobby demanded as compensation when it lost the AWACS vote in the Senate.16
West recalled that leaks to Israel were so frequent that he imposed strict rules on communications:
I would never put anything in any cable that was critical of Israel. Still, because of the grapevine, there was never any secret from the government of Israel. The Israelis knew everything, usually by the time it got to Washington. I can say that without qualification.
West added that if he wanted to communicate any information that was in any way critical of Israel, he felt more confident using an open telephone line than a top-secret cable.
West's problems with the lobby did not end with his departure from diplomatic service. Before leaving his post in 1981, in an interview in Jeddah, he told a reporter that the "most difficult question" he encountered during his work as ambassador was trying to explain why talks between the United States and the PLO were not permitted.17
This mild comment caused trouble when West returned to private life. His appointment as distinguished professor of Middle East studies at the University of South Carolina brought a strong protest from a group of South Carolina Jews, led by State Senator Hyman Rubin. "The group charged bias," West recalls, "and the protest so disturbed the university administration that public announcement of my appointment was delayed for more than a year." When he learned of the protest, West asked Rubin to arrange a meeting with his group. The result was a candid two-hour discussion between twenty critics and the ambassador-turned-professor. In its wake, West said, "The controversy subsided," and he assumed his post.
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In 1983 the Israeli embassy itself directly arranged a news leak that effectively blocked U.S. support for a Jordanian rapid deployment force, although the embassy concealed its own role in the event. The White House was privately considering a proposal under which the United States would help Jordan establish an airborne unit that would be able to provide swift help if nearby Arab states were threatened. A White House official explained:
When the Bahrainis asked for help during the Iranian crisis, Jordan wanted to help but had no way to get there. The Jordanian force idea is sound. Arabs need to be able to defend their own territory. Instead of having an American rapid deployment force going to the Persian Gulf, it would be better for Arabs to do the job themselves. Better to have Muslims defending Muslim territory than American boys.
L. Dean Brown, former ambassador to Jordan, says the proposal would have been a "godsend" to the small countries of the gulf.18 "What Jordan needed was C-130 transport planes in order to move light weapons by air."
At first, Israel raised no objection. Told of the plan while he was still Israel's ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens simply listened. A White House official close to the project recalled, "We told Arens that we were going to have Israeli interests in mind, but we were going ahead. We would proceed in a way that would not harm Israel."
The noncommittal Israeli reaction was mistaken as a green light, and, after getting clearance from the intelligence committees of Congress, the Reagan administration proceeded with secret negotiations.
After Arens left to become Israel's defense minister, the proposal ran into trouble. Briefed on the progress of the project by Secretary of State George Shultz, Meir Rosenne, Israel's new ambassador, suddenly raised objections. The Israeli embassy tipped off a reporter for an Israeli radio station about the issue, suggesting he go to Congressman Clarence Long, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee that handles aid to Israel, saying "he will tell you the whole story." Long cooperated, Israeli radio broke the story, and with controversy swirling in Israel, AIPAC joined the fray with its own salvos.
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A White House official recalled the effect. "Once this became public," he said, "King Hussein of Jordan backed away too. He didn't want to be seen as a tool of the Americans." The official says his colleagues at the White House were convinced that the whole thing was a carefully engineered leak by the Israeli embassy. It was delayed only until Arens left Washington. "It was a carom shot, bounced through Doc Long and Israeli radio in such a way that it would not be traced back to the embassy." Former U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown described the leak by the Israelis as "purposeful."
"The State Department Leaks Like a Sieve"
A leak got Talcott Seelye, ambassador to Syria, in hot water in 1981 when he sent a classified cable from Syria to the State Department protesting a resolution just introduced in the House of Representatives by Stephen Solarz, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Solarz represents a New York district in which Jews of Syrian origin are numerous, and his resolution criticized Syria for not permitting more Jews to leave that country.
In the cable Seelye warned that approval of the resolution would make Syria less cooperative, not more. Seelye explained, "My cable said that if Solarz was sincere and serious about getting the Jews out of Syria, he would not go ahead with this resolution; on the other hand, if he merely wanted to make points with the voters, he should do something else." The cable was leaked to Solarz, who called Secretary of State Vance and demanded, "Look, you've got to get Seelye out of there." Vance was furious over the leak.
Seelye kept his job, but the State Department did little to defeat the resolution. When the resolution was taken up in the House, only one "no" vote was heard.
The employee guilty of leaking the cable to Solarz worked under Ed Sanders, Carter's official liaison with the Jewish community, who then had an office in the State Department as well as in the White House. No punishment was imposed; the employee was simply transferred to a different job. The leak confirmed rhe fears of diplomats who
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had strongly opposed locating a Jewish liaison office in the State Department. One diplomat of the period describes Sanders as "a very decent human being, and he was there to do his job at the request of the president. At the same time, some of the stuff we were doing should not get out of the building to anybody."
Harold Saunders, a scholarly career Middle East specialist who occasionally got in hot water by noting Atab concerns, was then assistant secretary of state.19 He voiced his feelings to Vance: "How would you like having somebody from U.S. Steel sitting in our Economic Bureau's tariff office?" Vance, too, opposed the arrangement, but Sanders's State Department office was not closed for months.
Seelye pinpointed a very mundane reason for the wave of leaks: the prevalence of copying machines.20 He says that, as ambassador to Syria, he operated on the assumption that the Israelis would learn everything he sent to Washington. He said, "The trouble with our system of classification is that even when we limit distribution, say, to just twenty copies for the whole government, one of the offices on the list will make a dozen extra copies for their own use, and so on. It's hard to control."
Veterans in government lay the blame for much of the leaking on political appointees holding important positions in the State Department and not on career diplomats. In the early months of the Reagan Administration, National Security Adviser Richard Allen was viewed as highly sympathetic to Israeli interests and, in fact, as the de facto clearance officer, encouraging the placement of personnel who were acceptable to the state of Israel in key positions. After Allen's departure from government, a senior officer of the State Department recalled, "No one was needed to replace him, as people with pro-Israeli interests—we call them mail carriers—are spotted in every important office."
A senior diplomat, now on leave, says: "The leaks are almost never traced to professional foreign service officers. In my experience, leaks are normally by staff members brought in by political appointees, and every administration brings in a lot of them. They seem to be all over the place." He says these "loose-tongued amateurs" are prominent on the seventh floor, where offices of senior State Department officials are located, and on the staff for policy planning, as well as in the White House. This gives them ready access to sensitive matetial. "Unfortu
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nately," he added, "they do not have the same idea of discipline and sense of loyalty as the professionals."
Some leaks originate from a few members of Congress and their staff. A former Defense Department official recalled:
There were individuals on Capitol Hill that the Pentagon viewed as conduits to Israel. No question about it. A number of times we would get requests from congressmen or senators for intelligence materials. We knew damn well that these materials were not for their own edification. The information would be passed to Israel. For example, we would get a letter from a congressman, stating he had heard the Pentagon had done a study on the military balance between Israel and its Arab neighbors. He would like to have a copy of it. We would respond, "We can't give you a copy, but we can give you an oral briefing." The usual answer is, "Sorry, we are not interested in an oral briefing."
The Case of Stephen Bryen
In the opinion of all these sources, Israeli penetration of State and Defense departments reached an all-time high during the Reagan administration. In 1984 people known to have intimate links with Israel were employed in offices throughout the bureaucracy, particularly in the Defense Department, where top-secret weapons technology and other sensitive matters are routinely handled.
The bureaucracy was then headed by Fred Ikle, undersecretary of defense for international security. The three personalities of greatest importance in his area were Richard Perle, Ikle s assistant for international security policy; Stephen Bryen, Perle's principal deputy, whose assigned specialty was technology transfer; and Noel Koch, principal deputy to Richard Armitage, assistant secretary for international security affairs. Koch was formerly employed by the Zionist Organization of America. Perle previously served on the staff of Democratic Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, one of Israel's most ardent boosters, and had the reputation of being a conduit of information to the Israeli government. Stephen Bryen came to the administration under the darkest cloud of all.
Bryen's office had representatives on the interagency unit, known as the National Disclosure Policy Commission, which approves technology
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transfers related to weapons systems. The commission includes representatives of the State and Defense departments, National Security Council, and the intelligence services. Bryen was publicly accused in 1978 of offering a top-secret document on Saudi air bases to a group of visiting Israeli officials.21
The accusation arose from an incident reported by Michael Saba, a journalist and former employee of the National Association of Arab Americans. Saba, who readily agreed to a lie detector test by the FBI, said he overheard Bryen make the offer while having breakfast in a Washington restaurant. At the time, Bryen was on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A senior career diplomat expressed the problem that State Department officials encountered during that period: "Whenever Bryen was in the room we always had to use extreme caution." During the controversy, Bryen was suspended from the committee staff, but he was later reinstated.22 He later left the committee position and became executive director of the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), an organization founded—according to The Jewish Week—to "convince people that the security of Israel and the United States is interlinked."23 When Bryen moved to a position in the Defense Department, his wife, Shoshona, replaced him at JINSA.
After nine months, the investigating attorneys recommended that a grand jury be impanelled to consider the evidence against Bryen. According to the Justice Department, other witnesses testified to Bryen's Israeli contacts. Indeed, a Justice Department memorandum dated January 26, 1979, discussed "unresolved questions thus far, which suggest that Bryen is (a) gathering classified informations for the Israelis, (b) acting as their unregistered agent and (c) lying about it. . . ."24 The Justice Department studied the complaint for two years. Although it found that Btyen had an "unusually close relationship with Israel," it made no charges, and in late 1979 it closed the file. Early in 1981 Bryen was hired as Richard Perle's chief deputy in the Pentagon. He remained in that highly responsible position for several years, and was twice awarded the Defense Department's highest civilian honor, the Distinguished Public Service Medal. Apparently forgetting (or ignoring) the suspicions surrounding Bryen, President Ronald Reagan once insisted that Bryen "made lasting contributions to our national defense that have earned him the respect and admiration of his colleagues and the gratitude of all Americans."25
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Bryen's former boss, Richard Perle, was also the subject of an Israel-related controversy. An FBI summary of a 1970 wiretap described Perle discussing classified information with someone at the Israeli embassy.26 He came under fire in 1983 when newspapers reported he received substantial payments to represent the interests of an Israeli weapons company. Perle denied a conflict of interest, insisting that, although he received payment for these services after he had assumed his position in the Defense Department, he was between government jobs when he worked for the Israeli firm.
Because of these controversies, both Perle and Bryen were given assignments in the Reagan administration that—it was expected—would keep them isolated from issues relating to Israel. But, observed a State Department official, it did not work out that way. Sensitive questions of technology transfer, that affect Israeli interests, were often settled in the offices of Perle and Bryen.
Despite the investigation, Bryen held one of the highest possible security classifications at the Department of Defense. It is a top secret code word classification, which gave him access to documents and data anywhere in the government, almost without limit. A high official in the Department of State explained the significance of Bryen's access: "With this classification, Bryen can keep up to date not only on what the United States has in the way of technology, but on what we hope to have in the future as the result of secret research and development."
'Til Take Care of the Congress"
Admiral Thomas Moorer recalls a dramatic example of Israeli lobby power from his days as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.27 At the time of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Mordecai Gur, the defense attache at the Israeli embassy who later became commander-in-chief of Israeli forces, came to Moorer demanding that the United States provide Israel with aircraft that were equipped with a high technology air-to-surface anti-tank missile called the Maverick. At the time, the U.S. had only one squadron so equipped. Moorer recalled telling Gur:
I can't let you have those aircraft. We have just one squadron. Besides, we've been testifying before the Congress, convincing them we need this
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equipment. If we gave you our only squadron, Congress would raise hell with us.
Moorer looked at me with a steady, piercing gaze that must have kept a generation of ensigns trembling in their boots. "And do you know what he said? Gur told me, 'You get us the airplanes; I'll take care of the Congress.'" Moorer paused, then added, "And he did." America's only squadron equipped with Mavericks went to Israel.
Moorer, speaking in his office in Washington as a senior counselor at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, said he strongly opposed the transfer but was overruled by "political expediency at the presidential level." He notes that President Richard Nixon was then in the throes of Watergate. "But," he added:
I've never seen a president—I don't care who he is—stand up to them [the Israelis]. It just boggles your mind. They always get what they want. The Israelis know what is going on all the time. I got to the point where I wasn't writing anything down. If the American people understood what a grip those people have got on our government, they would rise up in arms. Our citizens don't have any idea what goes on.
On another occasion, fear of lobby pressure caused a fundamental decision regarding further military sales to Israel to be deliberately pigeonholed. It involved the general consensus of professionals in the Pentagon that Israel had enough military power for any need as of 1975. By then it had reached a level of regional superiority that was overwhelming. In December 1976 the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel wrote a report to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, concluding that no additional arms sales to Israel were necessary. Rumsfeld did not send the report to the State Department, however. It was the closing days of the Ford administration, and its transmission as an official document and subsequent leakage would have given the Democrats a partisan edge with the Israeli lobby.
Jewish groups in the United States are often pressed into service to soften up the secretary of state and other officials, especially in advance of a visit to the United States by the Israeli prime minister. A senior Defense Department official explained, "Israel would always have a long shopping list for the prime minister to take up. We would decide which items were
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worth making into an issue and which were not. We would try to work things out in advance." There was the constant threat that the prime minister might take an arms issue straight to the president, and the tendency was to clear the agenda of everything possible. "We might decide that we don't want this chickenshit electronic black box to be an issue between the president and prime minister, [so] we would approve it in advance."
On one such occasion, Ed Sanders, President Carter's adviser on Jewish affairs, brought a complaint to the National Security Council offices: "I'm getting a lot of flack from Jewish Congressmen on the ALQ 95-J. What is this thing? And why are we being so nasty about it? Shouldn't we let Israel have it? The president is getting a lot of abuse because the Pentagon won't turn it loose." It was a high technology radar jamming device, and soon it was approved for shipment to Israel.
In advance of Carter's decision to provide a high technology missile to Israel, a procession of Jewish groups came, one after another, to say:
Please explain to us why the Pentagon is refusing to sell AIM 9-L missiles to Israel. Don't you know what this means? This missile is necessary so the Israelis will be able to shoot down the counterpart missile on the Mig 21, which carries the Eight Ball 935.
A former high-ranking official in security affairs cited the intimidating effect of this procession on career specialists:
When you have to explain your position day after day, week after week, to American Jewish groups—first, say, from Kansas City, then Chicago, then East Overshoe—you see what you are up against. These are people from different parts of the country, but they come in with the very same information, the same set of questions, the same criticism. They know what you have done even in private meetings. They will say, "Mr. Smith, we understand that in interagency meetings, you frequently take a hard line against technology transfers to Israel. Wed like you to explain yourself." They keep you on the defensive. They treat you as if you are the long pole in the anti-Israeli tent no matter how modest the position you have taken.
Jewish groups in turn press Capitol Hill into action:
We'll get letters from congressmen: "We need an explanation. We're hearing from constituents that Israel's security is threatened by the refusal of the
5 They Dare to Speak Out
Pentagon to release the AIM 9-L missile. Please, Mr. Secretary, can you give me your rationale for the refusal?"
The certainty of such lobby pressure can be costly to taxpayers. In one instance, it kept the United States from trying to recover U.S.-supplied arms, which Israel captured from Lebanon. During Israels invasion of Lebanon in 1982, its forces overran and captured tons of equipment of all sorts, including weapons supplied by the United States to the government forces in that country. Knowledge of this came to light in an unusual way a year later.
During a visit to Lebanon, the Reverend George Crossley of Del-tona, Florida, was shown cases of U.S.-made M-16 rifles, which Israeli officials said were captured from Palestinian forces.28 Crossley noted that they carried a Saudi insignia, and he wrote down the serial numbers. Saudi Arabia, of course, had no forces involved in the fighting in Lebanon, and the clergyman jumped to the conclusion that rifles, sold by the United States to Saudi Arabia, had been turned over to PLO forces in Lebanon, then captured by the Israelis. If true, this would have been a violation of a U.S. law that prohibits transfer of U.S.-supplied weapons to another country without permission.
Crossley wrote to his congressman, Bill Chappell, Jr., who asked the State Department to explain. A check of records showed that the United States had never sold M-16 rifles to the Saudis, who prefer a German make. The rifles in question were provided directly to forces of the Lebanese government.29
The episode got public attention at a time when the U.S. government, at great expense, was once again equipping Lebanese forces. A White House official, reading accounts of the Crossley affair, asked the desk officer at the Pentagon why the United States didn't demand that the Israelis give back these rifles and all other equipment they had taken from the Lebanese army. The Pentagon had an accurate list of what the United States had supplied. Surely, he argued, the Israeli government could be forced to cooperate, and this would ease United States' costs substantially.
The desk officer exploded: "Are you kidding? No way in hell! Who needs that? I answer maybe one hundred letters a month for the secretary of defense in reply to congressmen who bitch and complain about our mis
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 5
treatment of Israel. Do you think that I want to increase my workload answering more shitty letters? Do you think I am going to recommend action that will increase the flow of problem letters to my boss? Be serious."
Every official of prominence in the State and Defense departments proceeds on the assumption—and certainty—that at least once a week he will have to deal with a group from the Jewish community. One of them summarized:
One has to keep in mind the constant character of this pressure. The public affairs staff of the Near East Bureau in the State Department figures it will spend about 75 percent of its time dealing with Jewish groups. Hundreds of such groups get appointments in the executive branch each year.
In acting to influence U.S. policy in the Middle East, the Israeli lobby has the field virtually to itself. Other interest groups and individuals who might provide some measure of counterbalancing pressure have only begun to get organized. Americans of Arab ancestry, for example, remain divided. A diplomat who formerly served in a high position in the State Department gave this example:
When a group concerned about U.S. bias favoring Israel would come in for an appointment, more often than not those in the group start arguing among themselves. One person will object to a heavy focus on Palestinian problems. Another will want Lebanon's problems to be central to the discussion. I would just sit back and listen. They had not worked out in advance what they wanted to say.
Les Janka had similar experiences.30 In a commentary at a gathering sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, he recalled visits by groups who were sympathetic to Arab problems:
Their complaints tended to be fairly general. They would say, "We want the United States to be more evenhanded, more balanced," or "We want you to be more interested in the Palestinians." Nothing specific. In contrast, the Jewish groups come in with a very specific list of demands.
On all kinds of foreign policy issues the American people just don't make their voices heard. Jewish groups are the exceptions. They are prepared, superbly briefed. They have their act together. It is hard for bureaucrats not to respond.
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Aid Dollars Into the Pockets of Traitors
The first nationwide shockwave that revealed Israel in an untrustworthy posture emanated from a bizarre spy case, one of the most extraordinary in American history. Jonathan Jay Pollard, Jr., thirty-one, a navy counterintelligence analyst, was arrested in November 1985 for stealing classified documents as a paid spy for Israel.
"We have a moral problem," a former Mossad member said when he learned of the arrest. "You can't take the money of the United States, and then use that money to buy information about that country." Immoral or not, that is exactly what happened.
Before the arrest, the prosecution of those involved in Israeli espionage had been taboo at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, despite long-standing evidence that placed other federal employees under suspicion. Like officials at the State Department, where a senior diplomat describes as "fantastic" the level of spying for Israel, FBI officials habitually chose to look the other way, viewing pro-Israel political influence as great enough to make attempted prosecution an exercise in futility.
The FBI "knew of at least a dozen incidents in which American officials transferred classified information to the Israelis," according ro Raymond W. Wannal, Jr., a former assistant director of the FBI. None was prosecuted. The files gathered dust.
John Davitt, a career official and former chief of the Justice Department's internal security section, said: "When the Pollard case broke, the general media and public perception was that this was the first time this had ever happened. No, that's not true at all." He adds that, during his tenure, only the Soviet Union did more spying in the United States than Israel.
Pollard's thievery, however, was so gross and frequent it could not be ignored. On several occasions he took large boxes of classified documents from the Pentagon, flagrantly abusing his "coutier" clearance.
In the wake of Pollard's arrest, William Safire, a columnist who rarely ctiticizes Israel, warned, "The stark fact is that if the espionage charges hold up in court, American aid dollars will have been channeled by Israel into the pockets of American traitors. That will blow up, not over." From the day of his arrest until the present, aspects of the scandal have appeared frequently in nationwide headlines and newscasts.
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As it came to light, the Pollard case had all the trappings of a fiction thriller—free luxury trips to faraway places, expensive gifts for the spy's wife, shady spymasters who handled the cash and stolen documents, dashes to elude surveillance teams, and finally, arrest just steps away from political asylum—in the Israeli embassy.
The spy deal was cut in the summer of 1984 when Pollard, an ardent Zionist, met Aviem Sella, an Israeli aviation hero who doubled as an espionage agent. He promised Sella military secrets in return for $1,500 a month. The process began with a flourish. Pollard and his wife, Anne, twenty-six, traveled first class to Paris for a luxury holiday and meetings with Sella, as well as with Rafael Eitan, the famous Israeli Nazi-hunter and spymaster, who gave the Pollards $10,000 to cover expenses. Anne received a sapphire ring worth $7,000 from their hosts. They were also introduced to Joseph Yagur, a member of the Israeli embassy staff in Washington who subsequently became Pollard's main "handler."
Returning to Washington, Pollard stole documents from U.S. military files about three times a week and delivered them for copying to either Yagur or Irit Erb, another embassy employee.
The next spring, the Pollards enjoyed another $10,000 luxury trip— this time to Israel, where Jonathan received an Israeli passport under a new name, a raise in pay to $2,500 a month, and a promise that the pay would continue for the next nine years. He was informed that a Swiss bank account had been established in his name.
Six months later—just over a year after the espionage began—the operation fell apart. FBI agents stopped Pollard for questioning in the parking lot near his Washington work station. Pollard broke away long enough to telephone his wife and, with the code word "cactus," warned her to remove all stolen documents from their apartment. While he returned for further questioning by the agents, Anne gathered up the papers and took them in a suitcase to Erb's residence.
Shaken by the interview, Pollard asked Yagur for guidance. He suggested that the Pollards "lay low" for a while, elude FBI surveillance, and then find political asylum at the Israeli embassy. On November 21, 1985, they made the break, but failed to shake their surveillance. They were refused asylum just inside the embassy gates and arrested as they left the property. Meanwhile, Yagur and Erb left for Israel.
5 They Dare to Speak Out
After Pollatd's arrest, embarrassed Israeli officials apologized for the spying. They denounced it as an unauthorized "rogue" operation unknown by anyone at cabinet level, and offered full cooperation in a U.S. investigation. They pledged that "those responsible will be brought to account."
Secretary of State George Shultz warmly accepted the apology, and the State Department quickly attempted a cover-up. Shultz sent a team headed by legal adviser Abraham Sofaer, an ardent Zionist who maintained a home in Israel, on a brief investigation there. Returning, Sofaer falsely reported that Israel had provided "full access" to all persons with knowledge of the facts. Within a month of the arrest, the department announced that Israel had returned all stolen documents and that the United States had resumed sharing intelligence with Israel "in all fields." The matter, for the State Department, was now closed.
More Damage Than Terrorists Could Dream Of
Elsewhere, the matter was far from closed. At the Justice Department, U.S. Attorney Joseph E. DiGenova pressed the prosecution vigorously, and the case remained in the headlines for more than three years, giving the American people frequent reason to question Israel's cooperation and reliability, especially since the Pollard spy ring—far from being a "rogue" operation—had reported to the highest levels of the Israeli government, including the Defense Ministry.
In addition, the "return" of stolen documents was a mockery. Of the thousands copied by the Pollatds, Israel bothered to return only 163 and, given its appetite for top secrets, surely retained extra copies of these as well.
Instead of cooperating, Israel stonewalled attempts by the U.S. Justice Department to investigate the spy ring, refusing to permit key officials to be intetviewed in eithet the United States or Israel. One U.S. official, reflecting on the Sofaer mission, said, "The question is whether we got the truth. Quite frankly, we didn't."
The two Israelis who had the most prominent roles in the spy episode were "brought to account" by the Israeli governmenr in a curious way: each won a higher position. Colonel Aviem Sella, identified by Pollard as his first principal "handler" and later indicted by a U.S. court for complicity with Pollard, was promoted to commander of Israel's Tel
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 5
Nof air base, usually the last rung in the command ladder before becoming air force commander. As a further reward, Israel refused to permit Sella to return to the United States for prosecution. Rafael Eitan, the man who headed the spy program, received similar "punishment"— appointment as the chief executive officer of Israel's largest state-owned company.
The promotions inspired embarrassing headlines, and a delegation of American Jews flew to Israel, urging the government to rescind the decisions. In the face of these protests, Sella resigned as air base commander but later quietly assumed a posh job at Electro-Optic, a major defense corporation. When they learned of this latest salute to Sella, the outraged editors of Defense News called for a $200 million cut in Israeli aid each year until the U.S. government recovered the full cost of the Sella-Pollard espionage.
The case returned to prime news coverage on June 4, 1986, when Jonathan Pollard, after engaging in extensive plea-bargaining interviews, pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide U.S. military secrets to the Israelis, and his wife, Anne, pleaded guilty to conspiring to receive and embezzle government property.
In return for Jonathan Pollard's cooperation, the prosecution did not ask for a life sentence. Judge Aubrey Robinson, impressed by a forty-six-page memorandum from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, selected that punishment anyway. He sentenced Anne Pollard to five years.
Weinberger wrote that the thievery caused "substantial and irrevocable harm," risked the lives of U.S. agents, and created the danger that "U.S. combat forces, wherever they are deployed in the world, could be unacceptably endangered through successful exploitation of this data." He added that Pollard had "both damaged and destroyed policies and national assets which have taken many years, great effort, and enormous national resources to secure."
In the wake of sentencing, Israel doubled Pollard's pay. The same government that had earlier denounced the affair as an unauthorized "rogue" operation began depositing in Pollard's bank account $5,000 each month, assuring him a comfortable life in Israel if he is ever released for good behavior.
Pollard became a cause celebre in both the United States and Israel, where public protests against his sentence were organized and legal
5 They Dare to Speak Out
defense funds raised. These funds were only a pittance; the Israeli government provided most of the $200,000 that American lawyers for the two Pollards collected.
Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard professor and an attorney for Pollard, cited Weinberger's assessment of U.S. security damage as the main reason the court ordered a life sentence. Dershowitz considered the sentence excessive, and he challenged Weinberger to prove that Pollard's thievery actually harmed U.S. security.
It was a limp challenge, as the public record already disclosed overwhelming evidence of damage. Items stolen by Pollard included photographs of security-related installations taken by high-flying U.S. surveillance planes, sensitive data on laser technology and U.S. weapons, secret information on naval forces, mines, and port facilities in the Middle East, and the text of a large handbook, nicknamed the "bible," which contained strategies the U.S. Navy would use if attacked. The stolen documents were voluminous enough, the court was told, to fill a box six by six by ten feet in dimension.
Israel made quick use of the secrets. Information provided by Pollard enabled Israeli warplanes to evade U.S. naval and air surveillance in the Mediterranean during their October 1985 air strike against the Tunis headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The precisionlike attack, dismissed by President Ronald Reagan as "legitimate self-defense" but later denounced by other administration officials, left nearly one hundred dead, mostly Tunisian civilians, and the PLO headquarters in shambles.
The gravest harm to U.S. interests at the time occurred when the Soviet Union acquired documents stolen by Pollard, perhaps all of them. The Soviets acquired the data through two separate secret channels. Israel opened one of them ditectly, offering U.S. secrets in an attempt to influence Moscow's policy on Jewish emigration. Using some of these same contacts, the KGB, Moscow's intelligence service, opened the other channel without the knowledge of Israeli leadership, establishing a spy network within the Mossad.
These shocking revelations came in a news report distributed by United Press International on December 13, 1987. The author, Richard Sale, reported that the Soviet Union had breached Israeli intelligence and that information stolen by Pollard "was traded to the Soviets in return for
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 5
promises to increase emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel." A State Department source told Sale, "It began as a straight data-for-people deal," but through it the Soviets "penetrated the Israeli defense establishment at a high level."
This new scandal belied Pollard's excuse that, in helping Israel, he did not hurt the United States. U.S. intelligence sources said stolen documents reaching Moscow by this route included "sensitive U.S. weapons technology and strategic information about the defense forces of Turkey, Pakistan, and moderate Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia."
Soviet acquisition of documents stolen by Pollard was discussed during an urgent review of the scandal by the CIA, FBI, and other U.S. intelligence officials: "One of the guys was commenting that if Pollard had stolen the stuff, at least it was going to a U.S. ally, but a CIA guy spoke up and said that if the Mossad was involved it meant that copies of everything were going to [the KGB's] Moscow center."
The Israel-Moscow spy link enabled highly placed Soviet moles to penetrate the Mossad, the most serious blow to Israeli intelligence in twenty years. One U.S. intelligence analyst fixed the blame on "right-wing Jews" in Israel. U.S. agents first learned of the Israeli—Moscow spy link when information stolen by Pollard was "traced to the Eastern bloc."
The reported diversion of stolen documents to Moscow made headlines in nine newspapers, but competing news services and television networks ignored it. The New York Times and the Washington Post printed not a word.
In yet another episode, Israel used data stolen by Pollard as the basis for a proposed military strike. Alarmed by the possibility that Pakistan might be building its own nuclear weapons—a concern that was shared by India—and armed with satellite photographs, stolen by Pollard, that showed a secret nuclear facility, Israel officials approached New Delhi in June 1985 with a daring plan. They urged that the two governments destroy the facility in a joint air attack. India refused.
The Pollard case continued to make headlines: In April 1988, Israel refused to let Howard Katz, an Israeli lawyer who had been associated with Pollard, visit the United States for questioning. In June, two committees of the Israeli parliament, previously ciring "lies, whitewash, and contradictions," closed their official reporr on the Pollard affair by blaming senior officials of both the Labor and Likud parties, but recommended
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no action. On several occasions in the 1990s, President Bill Clinton was approached with proposals to grant Pollard clemency—proposals the president greeted with warmth until drastic actions by senior staff members (such as the threatened resignation of CIA director George Tenet) convinced him otherwise.
By 1995, CNN correspondent and former AIPAC employee Wolf Blitzer estimated that the Pollards were due around $600,000 in deferred payments from Israel—or would be, had Jonathan not divorced Anne immediately after she served her five years in prison, hence cutting her off from further payments. The money, therefore, is all Jonathan's, although Anne, who lives in Israel, continued to profit from the incident by opening a nightclub in Tel Aviv called "Pollard's Place."31
Finally, despite Israels claims that the Pollard affair was part of a "rogue operation," on the tenth anniversary of his arrest Israel granted Jonathan Pollard full Israeli citizenship. In May 1998, after denying for thirteen years that Pollard was an Israeli spy, Israel officially recognized Pollard as its agent, in an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate his release. From all this, columnist Safire concludes, "The Pollards, in America, and their spymasters in Israel, have done more damage to their respective countries than any terrorists could dream of doing."
"Ml I Cn tell hi..."
The imprisonment of the Pollards did not end Israeli espionage in the United States. In 1997, forty-year-old U.S. Army Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) engineer David Tenenbaum was suspended from his employment without pay and had his credentials confiscated by U.S. authorities after admitting to divulging "non-releasable classified information to every Israeli liasion officer assigned to TACOM over the last ten years."
Widespread speculation that the Tenenbaum case might develop into another Pollard affair caused the FBI to make very little information about the new incident public. The Detroit Jewish News reported in June 1998 that Tenenbaum had been cleared of all charges; however, FBI agents refused to confirm that report. Instead, said one:
All I can tell you is a two-sentence statement. The case is closed. No criminal charges have been filed.
Penetrating the Defenses at Defense and State 18 5
Of course, the question that remains is whether Tenenbaum was charged and formally acquitted or if, as the FBI agents statement suggests, the investigation was dropped entirely. A spokesman for TACOM noted that Tenenbaum was back at work, although not at his previous job—a fact that caused some to seriously question Tenenbaum's innocence. "If the FBI investigation found that Tenenbaum is innocent," one colleague asked, "why isn't he back at his previous job?"32
An Unofficial Network
In a 1986 statement to the press, Israeli Embassy spokesman Yossi Gal said:
The Pollard affair was an unauthorized deviation from the clear-cut Israeli policy of not conducting any espionage activity whatsoever in the United States or activities against the interests of the United States, given that the United States is a true friend of Israel.33
Numerous bits of evidence suggest otherwise, as time and again individuals accused of passing classified information to Israel are allowed to disappear, or worse, receive promotions and financial compensation. Still, most of the secret information passed onto Israel is furnished by U.S. citizens without compensation of any kind. As one official complains, "The Mossad is the most active foreign intelligence service on U.S. soil."
For years, Israel has been able to learn virtually every secret about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Reporter Charles Babcock of the Washington Post, basing his estimate on a 1979 CIA report and recent interviews with more than two dozen active or former U.S. intelligence officials, concluded, "This remarkable intelligence harvest is provided largely not by paid agents, but by an unofficial network of sympathetic American officials who work in the Pentagon, the State Department, congressional offices, the National Security Council, and even the U.S. intelligence agencies." A 1996 U.S. government report stated the problem more explicitly: Israel "conducts the most aggressive espionage operation against the United States of any U.S. ally."34
7
The Assault on Assault